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Abs t r a C t
We've probably all had the experience, when reading, of
coming across an unfamiliar word and trying to guess some of
its meaning. This thesis is a study of the guessing strategy
used. Independent variables are: word meaning (known/unknown),
form of presentation (cloze/pseudoword), word class
(noun/verb), amount of information (3 amounts), orders of types
of information (6).	 Dependent variables are: accuracy,
confidence (belief in one's accuracy) and uncertainty (the
number of alternative hypotheses held).
	
Subjects are native
speaker university students.
The main result is that subjects tend not to guess
unknown meanings. They treat them as known meanings (I e. they
guess a familiar single word rather than a new meaning) by
regarding the meaning cues, as they appear across varying
amounts of information, as inconsistent items of information.
Whilst there are interesting differences for form, the presence
or absence of an unfamiliar form does not materially affect
this process. There are also interesting differences for
order. However, an interpretation of this finding in terms of
a principle of costs and benefits suggests subjects would not
employ an order based strategy in real life.
The effectiveness of guessing as a communication and as a
learning strategy is evaluated in the light of these findings.
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Chapter 1
In Search of a Question
We've probably all had the experience of coming across an
unknown word when reading and trying to use the context to
guess at least some of its meaning rather than going to the
dictionary. The tangibility of this phenomenon has perhaps
been one of the factors which has attracted research into
guessing word meanings, but there are at least two other
reasons why this topic maintains its popularity.
Firstly, guessing word meanings is seen as an important
communication strategy. Here, the work of Hosenfeld (1977)
forms a background. Guessing is seen as a way of maintaining
reading fluency in preference to breaking off to use a
dictionary or glossary whenever an unknown word appears.
Subjects who adopt such strategies are often termed risk takers
in that they are prepared to gamble on a guess which may only
be partially correct, or even wrong, rather than rely on an
appeal to external authority as do subjects who are not risk
takers. Communication strategies like guessing are
particularly Important in the world of foreign language
teaching where students can encounter high numbers of unknown
words, but there is no reason why they should not also be of
relevance to native speakers.
Secondly, guessing words Is seen as an important learning
strategy. Here native speaker children are the main focus
although there is no reason why this should not also apply to
-1-
foreign language learners. The motivation behind this work is
the observation that children seem to learn large numbers of
words very quickly but don't seem to rely on dictionaries or
teachers. To quote one group of researchers in this area,
Jenkins et al (1984), "Although it is too early to dismiss
direct instruction as a factor in vocabulary development, the
available evidence is far from supportive. Given the changes
in vocabulary knowledge which are said to occur, the results of
classroom observations, which find little vocabulary
instruction ... it is hard to resist the conclusion that
changes in word knowledge must result from something other than
direct instruction .., The next most plausible explanation is
that increases in word knowledge are largely a function of
learning from oral and written context."
Perhaps, with relevance to learning strategies, we should
take the work of Seliger (1977) as a background, although he is
concerned with foreign language learners not natives. The good
learner is termed a high Input generator. This subject seeks
out opportunities to use language and rejects a passive role.
Another idea connected with this is that depth of processing
encourages learning. In terms of guessing, we might envisage
such a subject going over and over the context in the area of
an unknown word or target as It is often referred to in
experimentation in an attempt to get as much of Its meaning as
possible. Low input generators might seek to avoid targets to
a greater extent. The more times a subject goes over the
unknown the better are his chances of remembering it. Perhaps
-2-
we should also note here the work of Fillmore (1979) in second
language acquisition. She describes a successful subject,
Nora, as someone who seeks interaction which tends to suggest a
high input generator. But the way in which Nora seeks to keep
conversation going also suggests something of a risk taker.
Fillmore suggests that her motivation is the key in that she
identifies with the foreign language and perhaps this is a
common element between risk takers and high input generators.
Fillmore also describes subjects who are poor language
learners. These are pretty much the opposite of Nora in that
they don't seek interaction or try to keep the conversation
going.
Since guessing words, then, is a popular topic, it is
important to take a brief look at the literature to see what
questions have been asked partly to help formulate a question
of our own and also to provide a background to such a question.
Before doing this we need two things. First, a rough
definition of the term guessing in order that we can get a
fairly clear picture of what is going on in the literature and
second some categories to divide the literature into.
As to a definition, try and guess the following word:
1. a) - o p - - -
b) This is a kind of cat.
c) 1 - o p - - d
-3-
In order to guess or form a hypothesis as to the word (I'll use
the term target in future to refer to the object which has to
be guessed) at 1, we need clues. (From now on I'll use the
more technical term cue in place of clue.) Also, in terms of
the hypotheses we form, we need to know whether we are correct
ie. Are we accurate in our guesses? Guessing then can be
viewed as a relationship between cues or information and the
accuracy of the hypotheses we form on the basis of this
information. In any empirical study, information would form an
independent variable and accuracy a dependent variable and we
can ask questions as to whether two letters in the middle of
the disguised or unknown word, or target as I will refer to
it, is a better cue than one letter at the beginning of the
target and one at the end or whether the type of "meaningful"
cue at ib) is better than the letter cues at Ia) and ic). In
other words we can ask questions about type of cues. We could
also ask whether two cues are more effective than one and
whether three cues are more effective than two. In other words
we can ask questions about amount of information. We could
also ask whether using the information at 1 in the sequence abc
is more effective than in the sequence cba etc. In other words
we can ask questions about the order of cues.
Moving on to the to see what has been done in terms of
guessing unknown words. As to categories which could be used
to organise this background review, the obvious division is
into communication and learning strategies. This division,
however, I am not going to adopt. Rather, to begin with, I am
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going to disregard any difference between communication and
learning strategies in an attempt to look at the information
and accuracy variables. Admittedly- though many since have
blurred this distinction- Corder (1978) warns against not
drawing a distinction between the two types of strategy. But
information is common ground to both since learning can be
viewed simply as something not different but rather additional
to communication.	 That is, we guess in order to carry on
reading, but then we can go one stage further and retain our
guess. In empirical terms, the major difference between
communication and learning strategies is the presence of a time
gap in the latter which lies between the guessing activity and
the test of how much information has been acquired.
The first background area to review then	 will be
concerned with information. Its purpose will not only be to
review literature but also to limit what type of cue will be
focussed on and to suggest a framework based on amount and
order of information which can be used for the research planned
in this study. The second background area will be concerned
with type of target. Here I plan to pick out a problem which
has given rise to some concern amongst researchers and in
showing how it can be combined with the research structure in
the previous section set the theme for the original work in
this study. I will also try to demonstrate the relevance of
this theme for communication strategies. The third background
area will be concerned with learning strategies and will look
briefly at some of the topics more peculiar to this field than
-5-
communication strategies and will attempt to show how the theme
of this thesis may be of relevance to guessing as a form of
learning.
Two further points, briefly. I will confine myself in so
far as possible to research covering the last ten years,
stepping further back only where something seems to be of real
importance.	 Secondly, articles of the type which give good
advice to the teacher abound. Burroughs (1982) is a good
example and the title How I Learned to Stop Worrying about Word
Lists at once suggests the anecdotal nature of the contents.
Such articles are valuable in that they can stir thought, but
for the purposes of this study they will be ignored.
Information
The major preoccupations of work in guessing have been to
categorise or classify the types of cue available to subjects,
to assess them in terms of effectiveness generally using
accuracy as the dependent variable and to judge the effect of
factors related to information such as cohesion and distance of
the cue from target again In terms of accuracy. Another area
is the effect of different amounts of Information on a
dependent variable like accuracy. Yet another area is
concerned with the order in which subjects use Information.
These five areas, then, give us our sub-headings for looking
at the information variable.
-6-
Cue classifications:
Most cue classifications are now dated so I must step
outside my ten year limit. The interested reader is referred
to the following classifications: Ames (1966), Dulin (1970),
Ffrench (1981) and Sternberg et al (1982). The most detailed
classification is that of Ffrench but it is too lengthy to give
here. As an example, so that we can get some idea of the kind
of cues which have been identified I will give the Ames
classification at 2.	 This is probably the most frequently
quoted classification and is based on responses of graduate
native speaker students as subjects. There is also a
replication of this study by Quealy (1969) using senior high
school students. Ames creates targets by using made up word
forms or pseudowords to replace real words in a text.	 I'll
simply give the real word to be guessed in brackets.
2. Cue Type	 Example
a. Familiar expressions	 Written all over their (faces)
b. Modifying phrases/clauses	 He knocked her down and
(slashed) her repeatedly with
a knife
c. Definition/description	 ...professional (donor). A few
who sell blood
d. Words connected	 sonnets and (plays)
e. Comparison/contrast	 .. a blessing or a (curse)
-7-
f. Synonym
g. Tone/setting/mood of
of a selection
h. Referral cues
i. Association
It (provoked)- and still
provokes
Maybe the space age does belong
to us after all. ....it is
necessary for (astronauts) to
be ambidextrous in order to
manipulate the keys..on their
instrument panels from their
strapped and cramped positions.
Knowing that women don't want
anything they have to scrape,
chop or wash through three
waters, Jenkins started doing
these (things) at the store.
Little boys wear short
(trousers)
j. Cues derived from main 	 I soon found a (practical) use
idea an supporting ideas	 for it. I began storing orange
of paragraph organisation	 juice in it since it fitted
inside the refrigerator.
k. Cues provided through
question and answer
paragraph organisation.
1. Preposition cues
And what about (writing)
itself? The English language
has been designed by right-
handers to be written with the
right hand Le. from left to
right.
He sped northward along the
(freeway)
-8-
m. Non-restrictive relative	 A mother's stay is limited to
clauses/appositive phrases 	 24 hours- (hardly) a sufficient
period for her infant to
stabilize
n. cause/effect patterns	 By cheating the insurance
companies, they are only
pushing their own premiums
(higher).
One can pick holes in this classification. Cue 2a is
only going to be available to native speakers. Cue 2f is
really repetition rather than synonym. However, I don't want
to get bogged down in detail here.
What general points can we draw from a classification
such as that given at 2?
The first point is that it is incomplete. Conspicuous by
its absence is the category of cues in the word form. For
example, the morphology of a target word form could provide us
with an idea of its meaning. One possible reason why Ames does
not mention this category is that researchers tend to make a
distinction between contextual cues such as those at 2 and word
form cues. One tends to focus on one or the other. So we need
to make a decision. Do we focus on context cues or word form
cues? In answer to this, I intend to focus on context cues
such as those given by Ames and ignore word form cues. The
reason for this, I'll come to later.
A second point is that we should ask how the cue types at
2 work. Well, leaving aside fairly explicit definitions like
-9-
cue c) the relationship between cue and target depends on some
form of meaning relationship. These meaning relationships can
be seen as either definitional or pragmatic and purely
associational.
As an example of a definitional link between cue and
target we can take beauty-> ugliness. Both have has part of
their meanings the idea of ESTHETIC (the first being pleasingly
so the other not) so if they were to appear in a contrast as at
e) with one of them as a target we would be able to guess this
part of the definition of the target and since Ames is using
pseudowords, choose the only available hyponym ugliness. A
word of caution here. Contrast may not always lead us to the
exact opposite since there may not be one. A contrast on iron
could lead us to get any metal. So it would be better,
following authors like Blakemore (1987), to see the constraint
on the target as NOT IRON. This would still, however, give us
the definitional information METAL. In a synonym cue like f),
pleasing would give us definitional information on beauty as a
target. Another example of a definitional relationship would
be where selection restrictions operate.
	 Welnreich (1971)
points out that in a phrase like pretty children then children
is interpreted as girls. When the noun in this phrase is
ANIMATE the adjective also selects FEMALE. In the same way,
the verb wear at cue i) selects CLOTHING and passes on this
part of the target's definition. 	 (granted one can wear a
smile).
If we turn to associative links between cue and target we
- 10 -
could form a contrast purely on pragmatic/associative lines:
beautiful-> intelligent. 	 Similarly, pragmatic synonyms would
be beautiful-> stupid or__empty->_harmless. 	 Also, with cue
1), a selection restriction might only pass on a very vague
aspect of the target's definition. The selection restriction
on the verb eat is not FOOD but SOLID and it is only
association which would lead us to guess steak before light
bulb. Similarly, although the preposition at cue 1) imposes
limitations on the noun we would not get far without the
association sped. When we come to cue type g) the relationship
is wholly pragmatic. The target astronaut is surrounded by a
set of purely familiar associations like space age, instrument
panel etc. Much the same could be said for the paragraph
structure cue at j). Here, in the way in which we are talking
about sets of familiar associations we are coming close to the
idea of schema which I'll come to shortly.
Ames and others classify cues by what they are. An
alternative approach based on the above is to classify them in
terms of how they work or rather the kind of information they
give. We can, then, talk perhaps of three broad cue types
which cut across the classification at 2.
Explicit definitional cues. Here the meaning of a target is
quite simply stated. Ideally, this cue type would be more
overt than 2c where recognition of the cohesive link between
target and definition is important.
Implicit definitional cues. Here a cue shares some of the
definitional elements of the target.
- 11 -
Implicit associational cues. Here the link between cue and
target is in the main or purely associational and pragmatic.
Effectiveness of cue types:
Here I'm going to focus on three areas involving the cue
types from the last section: between cue comparisons or
explicitness, schema and cues in the word form in order to give
a picture of what is being done in terms of experimentation in
this field in linguistics. 	 I'll clarify each area as I come
to it. A point to remember is that in linguistic studies the
dependent variable almost universally used is accuracy. Unless
I state otherwise the reader can take it that this is the case.
Explicitness or Between Cue Type Comparisons: A term
which one frequently comes across in the literature is
explicitness. It is usually a way of referring to comparisons
in terms of effectiveness between cues of the contextual type
I'll mention three studies in connection with this topic.
First, Carroll and Drum (1983) contrast cues which give a
precise definition and are termed explicit with cues that
require a guess, these being termed implicit. An example is
given at 3 where the target is underlined. Subjects are native
speaker 11th and 12th graders. The example at 3a gives a
definition where we can see that the subject is informed by the
words we call it that he is being given the meaning of the
target 5_-n1uch the same way as he would find it in a
- 12 -
dictionary.	 Such cues are termed explicit in this study and
I've
3 a) If energy is absorbed in a chemical reaction, we call it
an endothermic reaction.
b) Previously, sailors depended on landmarks. Now the
compass, the astrolabe and the development of more accurate
mapmaking enable them to navigate.
labelled them above as explicit definitional. Really, a guess
is not required. With the cue at 3b we should be able to guess
at least some of the meaning and identify astrolabe as a kind
of navigational instrument since cues and target share this
meaning component. This cue is seen as implicit in this study.
I'd tend to say that the cue is implicit definitional.
Second, Carnine et al (1984) tested the following dine
of explicitness in cues: synonym, contrast and inference or
deduction.	 The synonym Is seen as the most explicit. 	 An
example Is at 4. Subjects are native speaker 4th/5th and 6th
graders.
4. The starfish has a most idiosyncratic way of eating.
a) It's certainly very strange. (synonym)
b) It's certainly not normal. (contrast)
c) Most animals do not eat in this way. (deduction)
All three cues at 4 are pretty much paraphrases of the target
and I would tend to see them as all being fairly explicit
- 13 -
definitional.
Third, Carroll and Drum (1982) contrast definition and
synonym cues. They don't give examples, unfortunately, but it
looks as though we might have a contrast between explicit
definitional and implicit definitional cues. Subjects are
native speaker 8th graders.
The key question is can we see any difference in
effectiveness for the different types?
Carroll and Drum (1983) find definition (explicit
definitional) superior to cues requiring a guess (implicit
definitional). We do need to be careful here, though, as there
is an important point concerning the amount of information
given to subjects. If we look back at 3a) we are given
basically a dictionary definition of endothermic. We have a
general category or genus in that this word describes reactions
involving heat. It holds this feature in common with other
words in the same family such as exothermic. We also have a
more specific item of information in that heat is absorbed not
given off which we can call a differentia and serves to
distinguish this word from exothermic. However, if we look at
3b where we have a cue involving a guess we are only in a
position to find a genus category and identify an astrolabe as
a navigational instrument. In other words the superiority of
the definition cue may be coming not from the fact that this is
an easier cue to handle but rather that subjects are given more
information in this condition.	 We need to correct this
disadvantage by giving a cue to the differentia of astrolabe in
- 14 -
order to compare the two types of cue on equal terms.
With the Carroll and Drum (1982) study we do in fact find
no difference between definition (explicit definitional) and
synonym (explicit and implicit definitional functions). But
there is a problem here, also. Unfortunately they don't give
examples so I would be very cautious here. The authors replace
words in a text with pseudowords. So what might be happening
is that the synonym might simply be a repetition of the actual
word which has been replaced by a pseudoword and so gives a
complete description of the target just as a definition would.
A normal synonym would usually differ from the target in some
respects.
Carnine et al found that synonym was better than
deduction but there was no difference between synonym and
contrast or contrast and deduction. I don't find this lack of
any fine distinctions surprising since all these cues seem to
be paraphrases and are fairly explicit definitional in
function.
It is reasonable to think of different cue types having
different powers. If we turn to the psychological literature
work in this area, then, Neely (1982) when asking subjects to
predict which of a pair of candidates would win an election
found that subjects based decisions on both the number of wins
a candidate had and the strength of opposition he had defeated.
But a candidate who had won a few times against strong
opposition was generally preferred to one who had won many
times against weak opposition. Strength of opposition defeated
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seems to be the more powerful type of cue. Different types of
cue and their respective powers needs to be kept in mind in any
experiment.
Returning to the linguistic studies mentioned we can sum
up what has been done and what needs to be done. We've
identified three broad cues in terms of the information they
give. There is the possibility that explicit definitional cues
are superior to implicit definitional, but we do need to be
careful here because of the problem with amount of information.
Also, a very interesting place to look for a contrast would be
between implicit definitional and implicit associational cues.
One would expect the former to be more powerful than the
latter. But to the best of my knowledge this contrast has not
been explored.	 So an important piece of work would be to
compare these cues carefully.	 Also we have 14 cue types
mentioned by Ames. Can these cue types be classified by the
kind of information they give? Contrast at 2e) can give
information in two ways, but perhaps we can suggest that it
favours the implicit definitional type whilst tone and setting
2g) seems to operate completely in an implicit associational
way.
Schema: Again we are looking at the effectiveness of a
type of information.	 The term schema refers to familiar
patterns of knowledge.	 Bower et al (1979) investigate the
knowledge people have of routine activities such as eating in a
restaurant.	 We may, for example, know that the first thing
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that happens in such a schema is being shown to a table and the
last, tipping the waiter. What we really looking at is sets of
familiar associations (we're very close to cue type 2g) and so
we are in the area of implicit associational cues. However,
researchers seem not to contrast schema with other cue types.
Rather, they are interested in whether or not schema has any
effect or not.
Anderson et al(1976) shows how general terms are
instantiated by schema as in:
5. The woman was outstanding in the theatre.
where our knowledge of the theatre would lead us to substitute
actress for woman. In much the same way, schema might help us
to guess.
6. I ____ the waiter before leaving.
Knowing that tipping is the last act in a restaurant scene, we
should be able to fill the space at 6 with this verb, or if the
word form Is unknown, with a phrase like gave the waiter money.
From what is said broadly in the text we recognise a familiar
pattern of knowledge le. associations which we are able to draw
on to guess the target.
As to empirical studies involving guessing, Adams (1982)
using a mixed group of native and non-native speakers guessing
targets in a passage which have been replaced by pseudowords
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ie. nonsense words, gets an effect for schema, with those
subjects operating in the schema condition performing more
accurately than those without schema. There was no interaction
between type of subject and schema non schema condition so both
native and foreign speakers seem to benefit fairly equally.
One problem with this experiment is that Adams uses
schema or script activators: a very brief account of what the
passage is about. Those in the schema condition get this
activator those in the non schema condition do not. Perhaps a
safer method would have been to give subjects in the schema
condition a passage about which they had familiar background
knowledge and denying this advantage to the non schema
subjects. The use of script activators leaves her open to the
criticism that those in the schema condition have received more
information than those in the non schema condition. 	 On
reflection, though, the script activator only repeats
information subjects get in the passage and doesn't add
anything new so I'd tend to accept this result.
Freebody and Anderson (1981a) and Anderson and Freebody
(1.983) using only native speaker subjects look at the idea of
whether the presence of a schema is helpful in the presence of
unfamiliar words. Their experiment is fairly complex. They
are not looking directly at guessing unknown words. Rather
they are looking at something called the compensatory
hypothesis. This suggests that if one source of information in
a text is damaged another source can compensate for it. So if
we have some unknown words in a text then a familiar schema may
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make up the deficit. But note that the measure is in reading
comprehension not in terms of stating the meanings of the
targets and this is a complication.
Also, in order to support the compensatory hypothesis,
Freebody and Anderson are looking for an interaction. They
have a vocabulary condition with easy a difficult levels and a
schema condition which is simply the presence or absence of a
familiar background (topic) to the text. They predict that the
condition of unfamiliar topic and difficult vocabulary will
produce a markedly poor performance since it is the only
condition	 which	 receives	 absolutely	 no	 support	 or
"compensation". They don't get this interaction.
I would make two points with reference to the Freebody
and Anderson experiments.
First, I would very cautiously suggest that the
interaction they predict is not likely to occur. If we label
the schema conditions F and U (Familiar and Unfamiliar) and the
vocabulary condition H and E (Hard and Easy) and if we award F
and E 2 points because they are helpful and U an H 1 because
they cause problems we get the picture at 7.
7	 FE(4)
UE (3)
FH (3)
UH (2)
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The lines stay parallel.
Secondly, the authors do get a main effect for schema and
the familiar schema containing both difficult and easy
vocabulary does seem to be superior to the unfamiliar schema
containing both vocabulary types.
It seems to me that there is support that familiar schema
(and so the implicit associational cues) do help in guessing.
The question of whether this is as effective as other cue types
remains open though.
Cues in the word form: Morphology is one type of
information and some interesting work has been done on its
effectiveness. Morphology could be a good source of information
where the words formed are not idiomatic and where subjects
have some knowledge of morphology. Both these are big "ifs",
however.	 Otherwise it could be a dangerous source of
information.
Anderson and Freebody (1983), using false alarms as a
test ie. claiming to know the meaning of a word when one
doesn't, found that able native speakers used word formation
rules aggressively and dangerously claiming to know words like
loyalment. They don't regard this as too serious since, as
morphology is used In new word formation, subjects could be
trying to create or coin new words. However, low ability
subjects tended to false alarm on targets that were
phonemically or visually similar, "juggling" the decoding until
they found a match with a real word eg. grell -> grill. This
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kind of superficial similarity isn't strictly speaking
morphological but resembles it in so far as both sources of
information lie in the word form. For natives then, ability
seems to be a factor here. This is supported by Carroll and
Drum (1982) who found that low ability subjects, native speaker
school children in this case, sometimes substitute look alikes
for the target. Boettcher (1980 p153) using native speaker
12th graders also finds that subjects make this kind of error.
However, she finds no effect for ability but does get one for
part of speech. It's more likely to happen on nouns. This
latter part of the result might be something of an accident.
On the whole, I would go along that this kind of error is more
likely to happen with low ability subjects.
With foreign language learners, there is a series of
papers: Bensoussan and Laufer (1984), Laufer and Sim (1985)
and Laufer (1987a) which suggest that this type of subject both
uses morphology badly and is deceived by the surface
resemblance of the target to another word. As an example of
the former, In the (1984) article, they cite mistranslating
outline as the sum of iomponents and getting out of line,
and of the latter, misidentifying implication as application.
These are serious errors and span both high and low ability
subjects.
Two other researchers, van Parreren and Schouten van
Parreren (1981) note that not only do language learners make
errors off morphology but feel very sure about the correctness
of such guesses. It's little wonder that more recently, Laufer
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(1987b) advocates direct teaching of vocabulary rather than
guessing.	 There is an interesting footnote in an article by
Laufer and Bensoussan (1982), however: 	 "But the reality is
that in the course of their academic studies our students have
to face authentic academic bibliographies." We seem to be
talking about courses in English for Specific Purposes as
advocated by Munby (1978) which, by tending to focus on the
target level rather than the starting level of students, can
produce a problem. My suspicion is that much of what has been
noted above is down to the texts used by these researchers
being too difficult for the subjects. Granted, morphology
should function in isolation from the context, but in real life
subjects probably balance morphological guesses against the
rest of the context to see how well they fit. If, however,
subjects don't understand the context they do become easy
victims to the possibly idiomatic nature of morphological
information. (Note that in word association tests, responses
using only sound: chair->hair seem a last resort. See Meara
1982).
Certainly, if one turns to Japanese then work by Hatano
et al (1981) suggests that morphology is very helpful to
language learners. Probably, this type of information Is more
systematic in Japanese than English and so subjects become more
aware of it. Possibly also it is less idiomatic.
Interestingly, here Kaye et al (1987) with native speaker
subjects found that adults performed better than adolescents
with morphology but that this was linked to another independent
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variable, metacognitive knowledge of the system which we
mentioned above. This variable probably not only affects age
but I suspect ability and one would expect to get an effect for
this with foreign language learners if text difficulty is
matched with proficiency. That is we'd see low proficiency
subjects make slips to similar looking/sounding words and more
proficient subjects use morphology more effectively.
Regarding the way in which subjects are deceived by the
superficial similarity of targets to other words this might be
linked to some interesting psychological work by Esposito
(1987) on the effects of fixation ie. staring at words. He
records how fixation can alter the shape of letters: E becoming
K and L becoming T and its effect on larger units with WAIT
becoming WA-IT. Possibly lower ability subject who take more
time to puzzle something out are tending to fixate words with
this result. It's possible that something like the following
might happen. The reader comes across an unknown form like
devilope. Fixation could produce devil-ope with the hypothesis
being some kind of antelope or de-vilope -> de-velope with the
final hypothesis being develop. There might be an interesting
parallel dimension here with foreign language learners. Green
and Meara (1987) suggest that subjects from different kinds of
script background- Roman, Arabic, Chinese etc. produce
different patterns of visual search when interpreting a word.
This could have an effect on how a reader using a non-native
script might break up words when trying to guess from the word
form.
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To sum up this section, cues in the word form seems to be
a particularly interesting area with a lot of work being done
and a lot more which can be done.	 However, I am going to
exclude it from this study. The way in which ability and
awareness of morphology can create divisions within any group
of subjects are going to create differences within any
experiment which we won't be able to account for without
measuring for these factors before hand. To do this would be
to place too great a strain on resources. Also Boettcher
(1980) identifies the contextual type of cue as described by
Ames as that most frequently used and I intend, therefore, to
focus here rather than word form cues.
Information related factors
This section looks at factors which aid or hinder the
exploitation of cues, these cues being mainly of the textual
sort.
Cohesion: Here we are not so much looking at a type of
cue but at a factor which can affect all the various types,
namely the clarity of the cues. Herman et al. (1987) contrast
four versions of text: the original, a macrostructure revision
where titles are made explicit, irrelevant information removed
etc., a microstructure revision which makes text relationships
like cause/effect etc. explicit by adding signal words and an
elaborated version where information about key concepts is
added. Note here that in the elaborated version we have not so
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much the making explicit of existing text relationships but the
addition of cues. So the versions are not balanced in terms of
amount of information. The microstructure version can be
seen as a maximising of cohesion and the macrostructure as a
maximising of the closely related idea of coherence. Two
different texts/passages were used in the experiment, each in
the original, macrostructure, microstructure and elaborated
version giving eight test groups. Subjects were native speaker
high school children. Each subject saw only one of the
passages but was tested on vocabulary targets contained in both
so we have basically a context versus no context situation with
four different versions of the latter. The dependent variable
was accuracy measured by multiple choice questions directed at
low frequency words in the texts. Context was more effective
than no context, but if we look at the different versions of
contex then the only effect was for the elaborated version
which produced higher scores than the other versions. This is
not surprising since as noted above this version appears to
have an advantage over the others in terms of amount of
information. More interesting, neither cohesion nor coherence
have an effect.
Is the lack of a result in the above experiment for
cohesion in some way aberrant? Anderson and Freebody (1983)
and Freebody and Anderson (1981a) also experiment with cohesion
using native speaker high school students. Here passages are
constructed at three different levels of cohesiveness.
Vocabulary	 difficulty is manipulated by the substitution
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unfamiliar synonyms so that each level of cohesiveness is seen
in vocabulary familiar and vocabulary unfamiliar conditions.
Measures are based on general comprehension and not number of
words guessed. It is hoped that in the highly cohesive version
the cohesion will compensate for unfamiliar vocabulary in terms
of comprehension. Whilst vocabulary difficulty affects
subjects' performance (the authors suggest that subjects try to
avoid unfamiliar words) there is no main effect for cohesion
nor an interaction between vocabulary difficulty and cohesion.
Possibly this lack of a result for cohesion comes from using
the indirect measure of reading comprehension rather than
measuring the number of difficult words guessed. It does,
however, support the idea that cohesion may have little impact
on guessing.
Cohesion should be seen as part of a wider debate as to
what helps make cues relevant to the guesser. One would like
to say that knowledge of the language system plays a part and
despite the negative results above, this, I suspect, must be to
some extent the case. One might try to argue that the lack of
a result is due to cohesion being in some way subsumed by
coherence but the Herman et al (1987) results seem to rule this
out. We should, however, persist with the idea of cohesion.
Importance:	 The position of the target in terms of
importance may play a role in guessing.	 Anderson and Freebody
(1983) and Freebody an Anderson (1981b) asked a group of
subjects to rate a set of propositions in a paragraph in terms
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of importance. Two versions of the text were created. One
with targets in unimportant positions and one with targets in
important positions. A second group was then asked to read the
paragraph and after the passage had been removed to summarise
it.	 They found that passages with unfamiliar targets in
unimportant positions were better summarised than those with
targets in important positions. The conclusion is that
subjects try to avoid targets and can do so with less damaging
results when they are in unimportant positions. We also need
to consider the possibility that a target in an important
position can put more pressure on a subject to guess than if a
target is in an unimportant position.	 We might link this
factor with cohesion in future experiments. It could be that
anything which helped to clarify targets in Important positions
would be seized upon by subjects.
Similarity: In the psychological literature factors
like the surface similarity of the cue to the statement of the
problem are discussed as factors which make the cue relevant,
see Stein et al (1986). Whilst there is certainly an element
of this in the errors noted in the section on cues in the word
form, I think we'd want to say that there is more to the idea
of relevance In guessing words than a surface similarity
between cue and target and that the language system must be
involved. Possibly the psychological literature may somewhere
hold an idea overlooked by the linguistic.
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Time: Another factor mentioned in the psychological
literature which could have an effect on relevance is time.
Bowden (1985) shows that allowing subjects thinking time
increases their ability to pick out relevant information. He
takes two groups of subjects. The first group is informed
which cues are relevant, the second is not. Clearly, the first
group has an advantage, but the subjects in the second group
are able to reduce this advantage increasingly as performance
is measured at successive points across a two minute time
scale. Possible we might get an effect for cohesion by timing
subjects' responses on cues which are overtly cohesive as
opposed to those that are not with the expectation that the
former type would be used more speedily than the latter.
Proximity and direction of cues: With proximity, Madison
Carroll and Drum (1982) found that cues near the target were
easier to recognise than those further off and Carnine et al
(1984) get the same result. Direction is more ambiguous.
Carroll and Drum (1982) found cues before the target easier to
recognise than after, but Madison, Carroll and Drum (1982) got
no result on the same measure. Note that we are again talking
of what makes cues relevant here and It would be nice to tie
these factors to the linguistic system In some way. Perhaps
this could be done through syntax using the complement/adjunct
distinction. A cue in the complement being nearer to the
target than one in the adjunct. (See for example Radford 1988
pp. 174-179 for an explanation of these terms)
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Text type: Are some genres easier to guess from than
others? Carroll and Drum (1982) found fiction and biography
easier than science in terms of accuracy and ease of spotting
cues.	 One would expect a lot of variation within genres,
however, which will complicate things. Selinker and Douglas
(1985) in dealing with communication strategies in language
production, notice how their subject, Luis, behaves more
positively and tenaciously in a technical domain he has
knowledge of than in a non-technical domain. Perhaps, we need
to take this idea of how a subject regards the domain he is
being asked to perform in into account when dealing with the
idea of genre in the receptive strategy of guessing.
Looking back at the topics discussed so far, then I've
decided to exclude cues in the word form in favour of
contextual cues. Also, we need to decide about information
related factors like cohesion and text type etc. Whilst a lot
of interesting work has been done here and much more in fact
can still be be done, they are to some extent peripheral to the
guessing process itself, helping or hindering this process. I
am going to exclude information related factors from this study
in the interests of focussing on the guessing process itself.
We must remember, however, that in real life we will come up
against these factors.
A second point I would make here is that the independent
variable amount of information which is clearly of importance
in experiment design in the area of guessing seems to some
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extent to be escaping the attention of researchers. There are
three cases above: Adams (1982), Herman et al (1987) and
Carroll and Drum (1983) where schema, elaborated text versions
and definitions are claimed to be superior when in fact these
results could be explained in terms of amount of information
giving accuracy an advantage. This does not mean that these
researchers are wrong.
	
They would, perhaps, have been more
clearly right had amount of Information been controlled. I
want to move now to look at what has been said about the amount
of information variable in the linguistic literature.
Amount of information
The impression given so far is that accuracy will
increase as Information increases. This Is not necessarily the
case, however. A subject could mistake a cue which is not
relevant as relevant and so accuracy could suffer with
information.	 Providing then that subjects can pick out
relevant cues, accuracy will rise as information increases.
Carroll and Drum (1982) found a context condition in
which targets were presented in short paragraphs containing
cues to be better than a no context condition where the
paragraph contained no cues; in other words the condition which
provided some information produced greater accuracy than that
which provided none. In terms of guessing as a form of
learning, Duffelmeyer (1984) shows dramatic gains for a context
as opposed to a no context condition. Here the no context
condition consists of a multiple choice test asking subjects to
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identify the meanings of words in isolation. The context
condition uses the same test at a later date but this time with
targets embedded in a sentence containing cues. Again we have
the dependent variable of accuracy responding positively to the
independent variable amount of information. Li (1988) compares
cue adequate and cue inadequate conditions not only in terms of
accuracy but also certainty and gets a positive effect. The
main problem with these studies is that the information
variable is crude, basically something versus nothing.
Na and Nation (1985) found that unknown words in a text
where the density was one target to twenty five words were
easier to guess ie. produced greater accuracy, than in a text
of one target to every ten words. Here instead of something
versus nothing we have two different amounts of information and
accuracy appears to be Increasing as more information becomes
available. Another way in which the variable amount of
information makes itself felt in experiments is through
repeated exposure to targets in different contexts. An example
of such an experiment Is McNaughton (1983) who records that
after six reading sessions Involving exposure to targets
accuracy increases quite noticeably. The variable of amount of
information is treated more subtly In these studies, but it
seems also to be peripheral. The first study Is concerned with
target frequency and the second with repeated exposures. The
idea that amount of information is bound up with these Ideas
doesn't seem to be explicit.
In an experiment by van Daalen-Kapteijns and Elshout-Mohr
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(1981) subjects are given five amounts of information (brief
contexts) and asked to deduce verbally- the results being tape
recorded- a guess as they see each cue in this series of five.
They are interested in the kind grammatical operations used by
subjects to decontextualize the meaning of the target and also
in the accuracy of the guesses. First they identify two groups
of subjects: one group of subjects likely to decontextualize
well and one group where the subjects are not so likely to do
well. They then use the data collected in the way described
above to see if there is a real difference between high ability
subjects, termed high verbals and low ability subjects, termed
low verbals. The article, I find extremely stimulating, but
it must be said that these researchers under use their data.
When we come to the statistics it's the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
which is used to differentiate between the two types of subject
when it might have been possible to alter the design and use an
ANOVA across five means (the amounts of information) for the
two groups. Why do this? Well instead of a stark contrast
between two types of subject we would have seen thejj..._-
dependent variables develop across the continuum of five means.
For example, accuracy might have involved a steady rise for
good subjects and a lower rise for the poorer ones or perhaps
the poorer ones might have started low and then caught the good
ones up, and at each interesting point we could go to the data
and look for an explanation rather than waiting until the end.
In short, amount of information used efficiently
	 as an
independent variable can give us a description of the guessing
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process. Here, however, this possibility is lost. Perhaps I'm
being unfair in criticizing the statistical test used. It is
appropriate to the intention of the authors which is to
differentiate between subject types. What is frustrating is
the realisation that amount of information can produce changes
in variables, hence the five amounts of information are used to
chart a process like decontextualization, but not to have this
carried through to the statistics. These authors do, however,
give some interesting examples of subjects' guesses which I'll
return to later.
Recently the idea of amount of information has been
caught up in a debate involving authenticity or naturally
occurring contexts and this has, perhaps, distracted attention
away from its possible use as a research tool. The argument is
briefly that authentic texts do not give us sufficient
information to guess from (they also mention the interesting
idea that cues might mislead) and that many of the more
positive results achieved by researchers have been due to the
use of simplified texts which are "over rich" In Information.
This argument comes to a head with Schatz and Baldwin (1986)
who find no difference between a context condition and a word
in Isolation condition. My feeling is that this result is
caused by the construction of the Items used to measure
success. If we look at an example of one of their test
questions given at 8:
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8. He takes out an envelope from a drawer, and takes paper
money from it. He looks at it ruefully, and then with decision
puts it Into his pocket, with decision takes down his hat.
Then dressed, with indecision looks out of the window to the
house of Mrs. Lithebe, and shakes his head.
RUEFULLY
a) sorrowfully
b) thankfully
c) fearfully
d) casually
e) longingly
One could guess that the target means an expression denoting
some kind of emotion, which, In my opinion is a reasonable
guess and better than one could do for the word in Isolation,
but since all the distractors are within this category then the
choice is random or, in other words, the context condition Is
no different to a situation where the distractors are presented
in isolation without a context. They also use a test involving
written definitions but these are marked very tightly as right
or wrong and the effect is similar.
To be fair to these authors, they seem really to be
trying to discover whether subjects can guess the meaning, in a
complete sense, of words we have never seen before. They do
not really want to consider the possibility of just guessing
some of the meaning. One thing the authors do not do Is
specify whether they regard guessing as a communication or a
learning strategy since in a learning strategy it is arguable
that we need a substantial part of a target's meaning whilst
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this need not be the case with a communication strategy.
Also, I'm not sure that bringing in the Idea of natural
or authentic contexts is the way to tackle this problem.
Clearly, we need to look at realistic studies of guessing. But
does the idea of authenticity really describe 'normal' text?
Can a small sample of natural texts be thought to be
representative of a vast and diverse reality? I would go
along with Widdowson (1990) when he remarks that authenticity
"...does not depend on the source from which the language as an
object is drawn but on the learners' engagement with It". It
Is this term "engagement" I would emphasise. It applies not
only between reader and text but also between writer and
reader. The writer will always write to a preconceived
audience- admittedly he will sometimes make a misjudgement- but
where he feels he is pushing his audience then he will help by
adding information and so simplifying. What this suggests is
that we can get large variations of cue density In ordinary
writing and it Is the effect of cue density Ie. various amounts
we need to look at and not the authentic distinction.
An idea we should not forget with respect to amount of
Information is that whenever we put cues together they will
stand In some kind of a relationship to each other. Beck et
al. (1983) pick up on this idea of what might happen within a
cluster of cues all of which are perceived as relevant. They
categorise	 four	 context	 types:	 directive,	 general,
nondirective, misdirective.	 Here we don't just have differing
amounts of Information. Whether or not a cue points us in the
- 35 -
right direction is important. The first type points to a
specific meaning, the second to just a general idea of the
meaning, the third isn't really helpful at all and the last
sends us completely in the wrong direction. We can see here
that accuracy as a dependent variable might not always rise
with number of cues; in a misdirective context it would
probably remain low. An interesting question here is what the
result of such a context would be on a dependent variable like
certainty, mentioned earlier. Beck et al do miss one point,
however, in that they tend to see cues as either pointing
towards a target, away from a target or in the case of the non
directive context there just not being enough of them. But
what if one perceived cue points to the target but a second
points to a meaning or word which is not the target ie. the
cues point in different directions. The inconsistency of cues
is a problem pointed out by Carton (1971) and is a problem we
can't really avoid once we start looking at amounts of
information in real life.
In this study, I will focus on the amount of information
variable within directive contexts. The alternative contexts
are clearly important, but it will be more logical to look at
guessing under favourable conditions prior to unfavourable
ones.
Order of cues
Having discussed amount of information and decided that
it is a worthwhile variable to explore, if we now bring back
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type it becomes more of an unknown quantity. The combination of
amount and type of information gives us a new variable, namely
sequence or order. The question here is, when there is more
than one cue available and these cues are of different types,
then will subjects go for one type of cue before the other?
The importance of order is that it can affect outcome in
that It might allow us to avoid a difficulty or exploit an
advantage. Imagine a farmer who rather than operating in the
normal sequence prepared the land in autumn, sowed in winter
and came back to harvest in spring. The outcome of the normal
sequence is usually a reasonable crop. But in this case he
would get nothing.
However, very little work has been done on order. Clarke
and Nation (1980) propose an order which they hope will lead to
greater accuracy but this is not researched and is In the
nature of good advice to the teacher. FIrst, they recommend
using cues which give the part of speech, then looking at the
clause in which the target occurs. Finally, they suggest
looking at relationships between clauses like cause and effect.
The most interesting piece of work on order is by van
Parreren and Schouten-van Parreren (1982) and Schouten-van
Parreren (1986). Native and foreign speaker subjects take
part. The former see targets in a doze format whilst the word
forms are left intact for the latter. The authors use the
cue types based on the idea of linguistic levels: syntax->
semantics (textual cues)-> word form cues-> and stylistic cues
and suggest that the most effective way to guess, based on the
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findings of an error analysis, is by moving systematically
through these levels in the order indicated. So adhering to a
particular order should generate more accuracy. However, when
they come to an examination of expert behaviour they find it
"...characterized by estimating how many difficulties guessing
a certain word would present and then entering on apparently
the most appropriate level. Sometimes, however, this
estimation proved to be wrong and in that case the skilled
guesser 'went down' or 'moved up' a level". Subjects seem to
be be basing their strategies not on order but on limiting the
amount of Information used by going for specific cue types
only.
What we see In this study Is a contrast between a desire to
find a superior order In research and what actually happens in
real life. The distinction, I would suggest, is often
controlled by a principle of costs and benefits as described by
Payne (1982). Costs, In terms of processing information, are
high where order is concerned in that a lot of effort is
required of the working memory the capacity of which, as
Indicated by authors like Chang (1980), is small- approximately
one clause. Simply distinguishing a best order from other
possibilities is complex to begin with. Also, in reception,
Information won't come, in all probability, in the order one
wants to use it. So cues will have to be found, held and then
placed in the appropriate order. A lot of processing Is
involved, particularly in holding some cues whilst searching
for others. The result is that If a sufficiently attractive
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benefit is not apparent, order is not going to be considered as
a strategy in real life. So research might find superior
orders that are not used. On the other hand, one might find
that although a superior order does not exist the mind does in
fact choose to operate in a specific sequence in real life
perhaps because it is programmed to do so. I would not expect
this latter case to be likely though.
In the experiments I will conduct, I intend to force
subjects to operate in all possible orders In the hope of
finding one or more to be superior. We must realise, however,
that If a superior order emerges, It does not mean that
subjects follow it In real life, subjects do not follow one
in real life. This is, however, a good way to begin to look at
this variable because of the control it gives us over
information,
From a purely empirical point of view, if we combine
order with type and amount of Information we get a sharper
research tool since we can now look at process through the
amount of information variable, order and, if there is an
effect for order, then the nature of the process going on
within order.	 The structure of our research tool le. the
variables we systematically manipulate, 	 now looks like the
representation at 9.	 Remember also that we have already
selected contextual cues as the type with which we will be
concerned with in this study so we will be concerned with order
within this type. If we say, for example, that order 1 is an
implicit definitional cue followed by an Implicit association
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and that order 2 is the reverse then on one amount of
information half our subjects
9.
1 amount	 2 amounts
order 1
	 order 2	 order 1	 order 2
would see an implicit definitional cue and half an implicit
association and on two amounts of information those who saw the
implicit definitional cue would now see the association and
visa versa.
The framework at 9, then gives us a basic experiment
design or structure of Independent variables through which we
can carry out research. The design raises questions like: What
will be the effect of amount of Information on a dependent
variable? What will be the effect of order of type of cue?
and so on. But rather than end up simply asking vaguely about
the effects of information and order on a dependent variable
what we need now is a question, a very precise question, which
can be fitted into this design and which any effects produced
by Information and order can be used to answer.
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Target type
What is there about the kind of target we ask subjects to
guess that may be of interest?
It's noticeable that some researchers, when designing
experiments, take a passage and replace some of the words with
a doze gap. Beck et al (1983) is an example of this. Other
researchers make up a nonsense word, a form which obeys the
spelling and phonological rules of the language but which
doesn't exist in the language, and replace a real word in a
passage with one of these. I'll refer to such nonsense words
as pseudowords in future. Carroll and Drum (1982) is an
example in point. Other researchers keep the word form intact,
not replacing it with a doze blank or pseudoword, but create
targets by trying to ensure the subject has never seen the word
before. In order to do this a vocabulary test may be given to
assess subjects' knowledge of the targets before
experimentation begins; Bensoussan and Laufer (1984) ask their
foreign speaker subjects to translate targets into their mother
tongue one week before they see them in context and Schatz and
Baldwin (1986) field test their targets on a similar group of
subjects (10th grade native speakers) to those who will sit
their experiment.	 Another way of doing the same thing is to
choose low frequency words which we think the subjects wouldn't
know.	 Madison, Carroll and Drum (1982) do this. 	 There is,
however, always the risk that a subject might have come across
one of the targets.	 Sometimes we even find a combination of
techniques.	 Na and Nation (1985) replace relatively low
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frequency targets with pseudowords, this second step, I
suspect, being taken because they are worried that some of the
subjects were familiar with some of the targets.
Well, what do we have here? Where a doze gap or
pseudoword replaces a word to form a target then there is a
likelihood that subjects will know the meaning of the target.
Clearly this is not necessarily the case, but we do run
probably a fairly high risk of this happening.	 We have a
situation where targets, then, are unknown simply because their
forms are missing or unknown.	 If a subject can guess that
familiar meaning he will gain access to the word's form
automatically. In the situation where we use very low
frequency words and more particularly, where we use a pretest
of vocabulary knowledge the subject cannot guess the form since
it is not a part of his knowledge. Rather, he must now only
guess the target's unfamiliar meaning.
We have then a contrast between guessing known meanings
and guessing unknown meanings. Is there likely to be a
difference? Well, many of the researchers who use doze gaps
and pseudowords don't blindly accept that the meaning will be
unknown. Most express reservations. I'll quote Na and Nation
(1985) on this point. "The research would have been much more
realistic if the subjects had been guessing words that they
really did not know. The use of nonsense words was an attempt
to control this.	 However, if the subjects already knew the
word that they were trying to guess they could use clues like
typical collocations to help guess the word."
	 There is a
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feeling then that guessing unknown meanings is somehow more
difficult than guessing forms where the meanings are known.
Other researchers such as Nagy et al (1985) and Beck et al
(1983) make much the same point but nobody seems really to have
asked why guessing known meanings might be different to
guessing unknown meanings. The question I am therefore going
to ask in this thesis is: "Is the guessing of known meanings
somehow different from guessing unknown meanings and if so in
what way?"
The contrast between known and unknown meanings cross
classifies with doze gaps and pseudowords. Therefore, when we
fit it into the research design given at 9 we get something
along the lines of the design shown at 10. Note here that the
pattern of variables beneath doze should be repeated under
pseudoword. A question which needs to be asked here is: Why
bring the cloze/pseudoword distinction Into guessing known and
unknown meanings?. It might be, for example, where the
meaning Is unknown, that an unknown form le. pseudoword, might
act as a kind of trigger that motivates a subject to treat the
target as an unknown meaning whereas the doze format might
not. In such an event we might find that pseudowords over a
known meaning have something in common with pseudowords over an
unknown meaning and similarly the two remaining doze
situations might have something In common. It might of course
turn out that pseudowords are treated In exactly the same way
as doze gaps. The point here is that this distinction has not
to the best of my knowledge been researched.
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10.
doze	 pseudoword
known meaning	 unknown meaning
1 amount	 2 amounts (information)
order 1	 order 2
We can see that at 10 there are four possible combinations
form and meaning. Let's look at each in turn and at the same
time ask what relevance each situation has for communication
strategies.
First, we have doze over a known meaning. Since we are
not likely to meet doze gaps in everyday life, except perhaps
where a word form is unintelligible through poor printing or
handwriting which is difficult to read and perhaps where a
subject creates a doze gap by making a prediction in order to
read quickly, this represents the kind of artificial
experimental situation used by researchers in receptive
communication strategies to gather data. 	 If we simply go
through a passage and delete say every tenth content word there
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is clearly a high risk that the meanings of many of these words
will be known to the subjects. This situation is interesting
to communication strategy workers from an experimental point of
view then.
Second, we have a doze gap over an unknown meaning.
Again, because of the doze, this is of interest more in
experimental than real life terms. The point of interest being
that if we delete targets we can't take It for granted that the
meaning will always be known. A subject could be in the
position of lacking both form and meaning and It is of Interest
to communication strategy researchers to know what might happen
here.
Third, we have a pseudoword over a known meaning. This
again represents an experimental technique in communication
strategies since pseudowords are sometimes used rather than
doze gaps. There Is, however, a more realistic counterpart
here. Language learners, when they encounter an unknown, will
not have seen the form before. This form then becomes the
equivalent of a pseudoword. There is a good chance, however,
that they will have a counterpart, or rough counterpart to the
target in their native language. Whilst the form then is
unknown the meaning Is known. Native speakers could also find
themselves In this position where a reasonable synonym for the
target exists and is known by the subject. This situation,
though, I would see as mainly of interest to communication
strategy researchers in the foreign language field.
Fourth, we have a pseudoword over an unknown meaning.
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Both form and meaning are unknown. Clearly, foreign language
learners will sometimes find themselves in this position, but
in the main this situation applies to native speakers where,
if a form is unknown so is the meaning. Full synonyms are
rare. This fourth category is interesting if we want to talk
about guessing as a communication strategy with native
speakers.
By using the amount of information and order variables we
should be able to build up a picture of how the guessing
process develops in each of these four situations. Then by
contrasting these situations we should be able to highlight any
differences in process which might occur and decide whether
such differences might involve difficulty for subjects. It
could be that accuracy might suffer in one or more conditions
so that if subject were to use such guesses they would go
wrong. Perhaps also if accuracy were to be damaged In a
particular situation and subjects were aware of this they would
be reluctant to use guesses produced by the attendant process.
- Is there anything of relevance in these four situations
to guessing as a learning strategy?
Guessing as a learning strategy
Most of the work in this area concerns native speaker
children. Heibeck and Markman (1987) view guessing as a form
of learning. They are interested in three things. First,
process. They identify a process used by children which they
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term fast mapping. Essentially, it is the use of contrast
cues. For more detail the reader is referred to the article.
Second, retention. There is a short break between the guessing
task and the test of knowledge. Third, they are interested in
numbers. Can this method of guessing account for large gains
in word knowledge and justify the assertion that a large part
of our vocabulary is picked up through guessing and not from
dictionaries or instruction? 	 They do actually record quite
high gains in word knowledge.
If we go on to look at the literature, the first thing to
notice is that emphasis on process is slight. Largely,
learning is seen to involve the same guessing process as
communication and the question then becomes one of retention.
If we look at retention the best way to assess learning
is by comparing it with other mnemonic strategies. Margosein
et al (1982) finds semantic mapping (learning new words by
identifying similarities and differences with related known
words) superior to guessing and Pressley et al. (1982), Levin
et al. (1984) and McDaniel and Tiliman (1987) all find the
keyword strategy superior to guessing in terms of recall. But
nobody is saying that guessing is bad, just that keyword is
better- which is really pretty much what one would expect given
that keyword is a specifically designed mnemonic technique
whereas guessing isn't. Surprisingly, McDaniel and Tillman
found that keyword was only superior to guessing in a cued
recall condition, in a free recall condition both were equally
good.
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If one goes on and looks at other possible learning
strategies, like using the dictionary, which haven't been
designed as such but which could account for vocabulary gains
then Crist (1981) and Gipe and Arnold (1979) both find guessing
superior. Again this isn't surprising. O'Brien and Myers
(1985) suggest why. They gave subjects a passage to read that
contained targets which were predictable or unpredictable
targets from cues in the preceding context. The reading time
was increased on the unpredictable targets but so was recall.
In other words the increased reading time suggests greater work
or if we prefer a more technical term, depth of processing.
This work translates itself into retention. Since digging at
the context involves work it leads to retention, more so than
with a dictionary simply because it involves more work and
probably a bit less than keyword because it involves less work.
That guessing can lead to retention is, I think, pretty much
established. If a little anecdotal evidence will help, then
two months after sitting an experiment which we'll see later,
one subject spotted me and came up to ask what one of the
targets he thought he'd guessed badly meant. Since it was a
pseudoword over an unknown meaning which was unknown by virtue
of being made up I was a little worried. I'd taken pains
after the experiment to warn subjects about these targets, but
someone had slipped past. It does show how words can stick in
the mind though.
The numbers issue is altogether more serious for guessing
as a learning strategy since this strategy must be able to
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account for fairly large gains or be seen as deficient.
Duffelmeyer (1984) records dramatic gains for this strategy.
Here the time gap between guessing and testing is two weeks.
NcKeown (1985) found gains only for good readers not poor ones.
Low ability subjects tended to get distracted by personal
experience rather than relying on the context. Block (1985)
terms such readers non integrators. What we see here is the
guessing process, not recall going wrong. 	 Nagy et al (1985)
find statistically significant but very small vocabulary gains
from guessing. Herman et al. (1987) replicates this. These
researchers suggest that the probability of learning a word
from one exposure is about 0.1. The Nagy study comments to the
effect that although 0.1 seems small, tentative extrapolations
from the results and current estimates of the volume of
children's reading lead them to believe that incidental
learning can account for a substantial proportion of word
growth. About 3,000 words a year Is the final tally. This is
about correct, comments Duffelmeyer (1985), but what about the
effects of forgetting? It's a neat, but rhetorical question
since- he has his answer ready. The studies by Nagy et al and
Herman et al deal only with guessing and learning from a
written context. Children also learn from aural contexts and
this helps make up for the effects of forgetting words learnt
from written contexts. (Some experimentation on the effects of
forgetting, perhaps comparing aural and written contexts might
be interesting).	 Work by Rice and Woodsmall (1988) using
television as a context supports this as does a study by Drum
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and Madison (1985) using conversational contexts. Dickinson
(1984) in an experiment with native speaker children using
conversational and story contexts and an explicit definition
condition found some learning in all conditions though older
children benefited more from explicit definitions.
It's fair, I think, to say that there is disquiet about
the numbers issue and a feeling that there might be something
not quite right with guessing as a language learning strategy.
Bialystok (1981) makes an interesting comment. She uses a
questionnaire to try and get subjects, foreign language
learners, to give her information on language learning
strategies of: monitoring, practising and guessing and but
finds that very few people report using guessing as opposed to
the other two. She suggests there may be something wrong with
the questionnaire with respect to this strategy but adds: "The
inferencing strategy is possibly reserved for contextual
situations in which it Is necessary to ascertain only the gist
of a difficult utterance." This could be taken in two ways. It
could suggest that the natural context doesn't always contain
sufficient cues, something which Schatz and Baldwin (1986)
would argue. I've suggested above that it's a little dangerous
to generalize on the context in this way. The other thing
which Bialystok may have in mind, and I put this forward very
tentatively because Bialystok may not have intended it, is
that the difficulty is not in the context but in the process
and that guessing only gives partial meaning because somehow,
even if there Is sufficient information around it can't all get
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processed for some reason. The fourth type of guessing
situation mentioned above, a pseudoword covering an unknown
meaning, now becomes relevant to guessing as a form of
learning. As far as native speakers are concerned then this
situation for most of the time is the prelude to learning. If
this form of guessing is "inefficient", and we should be able
to see not only how the process behaves through the amount of
information variable but also contrast it with the processes
attendant on the other three situations, then even if subjects
go on to retain what they have guessed, this knowledge could be
faulty or subjects may not be very confident with it and so not
use it. Possibly, if guessing In this fourth situation has
inherent problems it might be that subjects need confirmation
of their guesses by teachers, parents, dictionaries etc. before
they are prepared to commit them to long term memory. It could
be a combination of these factors which reduces the results on
experiments which test guessing/learning. It could be that
foreign language learners actually have an advantage over
native speakers in that they will often find themselves in the
third situation of pseudoword over a known meaning so that if
they have enough cues, they can attach the form to a known
meaning and then all they have to do Is retain It and Iron out
the odd point where the Li definition doesn't quite fit the L2
counterpart.
One final point here. I'm not going to pursue guessing
as a learning strategy In the sense that I will not be looking
at how well subjects retain guesses. This study Is of Interest
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to guessing as a form of learning only in so far as we can look
at the quality of the guess made and the process leading to
this point. The main question then becomes to decide whether
the process is efficient enough and the guess of a reasonably
high enough quality to account for fairly large gains in
vocabulary knowledge if guessing is to be seen as a form of
learning.
Just to finish this chapter, I'd like to say a few words
about subjects I'm going to avoid.
Context facilitation: One occasionally comes across an
article like that of Nicholson and Hill (1985) the very title
of which tends to give one a scare: Good readers don't guess.
The point here, though, is that such articles are not part of
the guessing debate but rather of the context facilitation
debate. In the '70s psycholinguists- see for example Smith's
(1973) collection of articles- held that the reading process
itself was a form of guessing and that we used pragmatic,
semantic, graphological etc. cues to predict and constrain
meaning ie. the context facilitated or helped. Nicholson and
Hill are not claiming that humans don't guess, they are simply
opposing this method of describing the reading process and
argue that instead of predicting we rely more on decoding.
Exponents of decoding would not seek to deny that we guess.
Rather, reading proceeds by decoding until we hit a problem
like a doze gap and then we have to go to the context. The
contrast then is not about whether we use the context but when
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we use the context at a very basic level- context facilitation
says we use it all the time, decoding only when we hit a
problem. A large part of the debate focuses on polysemy. Does
the context constrain which meaning we activate (facilitation)
or do we decode and activate all possible meanings with the
context then decidinwhich one we accept? The debate still
seems to be raging and the last time I looked at it Till et al
(1988) were in favour of decoding, van Petten and Kutas (1987)
were in favour of facilitation, criticizing the the
experimental technique of the facilitation researchers, whilst
West et al (1983) seem to go for something in the middle
suggesting that the poorer a decoder is the more he relies on
context. The only reason I bring these topics up is because
they do get a mention in the guessing literature. But as I say
nobody is disputing the fact that we guess, rather we are
talking about a reading process which takes place at a very
basic level well below any sense of consciousness. One reason
why it does get pulled in is because facilitation advocates
would argue that subjects would complete a doze test on the
basis of their theory, but this is "guessing" at a non-
conscious level and I will exclude these arguments from now on.
In short, we'll be looking at guessing in a context where
subjects are, to some extent, aware of what they are doing
because there is a clear local problem to resolve.
Communication strategies in language production: There
has	 been great	 interest	 in	 these	 strategies	 lately.
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Essentially, they are also concerned with how foreign language
students get around gaps in their lexical knowledge but in
speaking not reading. A large number of strategies have been
described and they involve offering what information the
subject has available instead of the correct lexical item.
Tarone (1981) gives the interesting example of airball which is
really a morphological cue to balloon. Poulisse (1987) talks
of holistic and analytic cues. If a subject were trying to
describe desk the an example of the former would be table and
of the latter, It's got a flat top. In a sense we're dealing
with the opposite side of the coin to guessing and are asking
what governs the type of cues the subject seeks to give. It
would also be interesting to see how the receiver of these cues
responds and what quality of guess each type of information
produces.	 I will, however, be avoiding aural contexts in
favour of written.
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Chapter 2
In Search of a Ruler
In the last chapter we looked at the literature on
guessing and in so doing identified some key variables that
need further research if we are to get closer to what really
goes on.	 We also put forward a question which might be
explored by means of that research design. That question
essentially asked whether or not there might be a difference of
process involved in the guessing of known meanings as opposed
to unknown meanings in doze and pseudoword presentation. The
research design to be applied to this question involved two
further	 independent variables:
	 amount of information and
order. Amount of information, I argued, would allow us to see
something of the guessing process since we would be able to
note how guesses change and develop across information as must
happen in real life. The order variable, I argued, would allow
us to see whether one order might be more effective than others
when different cue types are available and if so we could then
use the interaction of order with amount of information to look
at process within order. What is needed now is a dependent
variable or variables which can be used to quantify the guesses
which will be made by subjects and which will respond to the
independent variables of meaning (known/unknown),	 form
pseudoword/cloze),	 amount of information and order. 	 In
short, we need a ruler which can be used to measure the
possibly varying strengths	 of responses	 generated by
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independent variables. Note also that in posing the question
of how known and unknown meanings will perform across
information etc., we are assuming that any dependent variable
we select will somehow respond to the independent variable: it
may rise in value, fall in value, remain static or form
possible combinations of these responses. It is important,
then, as well as noting possible dependent variables to also
gather what information Is available on their likely responses
to the independent variables. Most research concentrates on
amount of information. Little seems to have been done on the
other independent variables in this study.
In this chapter I am, then, going to look first at
possible candidates for the role of dependent variable noting
also the way in which such a variable might respond primarily
to varying amounts of information. 	 I then want to look at
possible ways of measuring these dependent variables. Next,
there is a clear gap in my description of independent variables
since, although I've talked about known and unknown meanings, I
haven't yet offered any way of establishing the difference
between them or how meaning cues can be defined. I'm therefore
going to have to return to the subject of Independent
variables.
Dependent Variables
There are three dependent variables which follow from the
research question and which can be used to quantify guesses:
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accuracy, confidence anduncertainty. I'll define these as I
come to them.
Accuracy
Accuracy is an obvious dependent variable since we are
interested in measuring the relative "success" of different
orders/amounts of information with known versus unknown word
meanings in doze and pseudoword presentation. As we've seen,
it's also the most widely used dependent variable in research.
What is accuracy? We could say that accuracy involves
using the word with the correct meaning in the correct
situation. If we are not sure of this relationship then we
check it in a dictionary or ask a teacher or some other person
whose knowledge about the language we have reason to trust.
What a dictionary or teacher will give us is not a
psychologically real description of the word's meaning for one
person but rather the collective definition which society has
decided upon. This, of course, Is where teachers and
dictionaries derive their authority from; they are held to be
more closely In touch with society's norms than other types of
person or book. It may be that such norms are established by
research, in which case accuracy Is a question of stating:
"Most people say X here" and then measuring what the individual
says to see how close he gets. It may also be that such norms
are simply imposed by society on occasion through the school
system. We all fluctuate from such norms to some extent with
some people being closer to the norm than others and
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consequently having greater authority. The main point about
accuracy, though, is that it is a sociolinguistic variable that
is external to the speaker either through generalization or
through imposition. It does not describe the way in which
knowledge is stored in the mind and to regard it as a
psycholinguistic variable would be an error.
The question now is: How would we expect accuracy
respond to increasing amounts and orders of information and the
known/unknown meaning and cloze/pseudoword distinctions?
Unfortunately, as pointed out, little seems to have been done
on the order variable or the meaning and cloze/pseudoword
distinctions and so I will focus on amount of information.
Peterson and Pitz (1988) designed an experiment in which
subjects were given cues which described the performance of
baseball teams.	 These cues were earned run average, team
batting average and number of home runs. These cues are
presented to subjects one at a time- they use a variety of
sequences but the order variable is not tested- and the
subjects are asked to guess how many games the team these cues
relate to, actually won in a season, They found that accuracy
increased as amount of information increased.
A second study in this area is by Oskamp (1965). Oskamp
is interested in clinical psychology and presents his subjects,
who are all psychologically informed, with increasing amounts
of information concerning a case history. With each successive
amount of information they are asked to make a decision about
the personality of the person described in the case history.
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Four amounts of information are given and there is no
significant increase in accuracy. Peterson and Pitz (1988),
commenting on this study, suggest that the effect is due to the
fact that people are unable to recognize when information is of
no value. That is, they sometimes think that information is
relevant when it is not and, conversely, are sometimes unaware
of when something actually is relevant. So accuracy can fail
to rise because subjects believe that a good cue has no value
and also that a poor cue actually has value. This, I think, Is
probably correct. I intend to avoid this factor In this study
by making all cues relevant and directive in the sense that
they will all point to the same, correct solution.
It's worth looking at the Oskamp (1965) study a little
more closely even though I intend to avoid the problem of
relevance. The above situation, I suspect, is being caused
by difficulty in the sense of a conflict of cues. In the
field of physical health, if spots of a certain size, shape and
colour arise we can say at once "measles!" since this condition
is well described. Possibly, a second indicator may be body
temperature, but It may further be known that body temperature
is not a terribly reliable indicator. If, then, the right
spots appear but the temperature is not quite what the doctor
expects, he can disregard this second cue and still diagnose
accurately. In clinical psychology, the various ailments and
symptoms are probably less well described, there tends not to
be one over-riding pointer and things are more subjective. It,
therefore, becomes difficult for subjects to decide which cue
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is relevant. For example, Oskamp relates that the person in
his case history is a World War 11 veteran, a college graduate
and an assistant in a floral decorating shop. When we come to
the questions, subjects are asked to say how this person would
behave in a congenial social situation. There are five
alternatives, but one suggests that he would try to dominate
and another that he would be withdrawn. Well, an intelligent
ex soldier might well dominate, but the job in a flower shop
might suggest a quiet sort of character. This is compounded by
the ambiguity in the cue about war. The person may suffer from
some sort of trauma. One cue might then point to one answer,
but a second cue might point to a different answer. The
situation is difficult, then, in that if a subject perceives
both cues as relevant but conflicting he can take only one.
Unlike the measles situation, he has no grounds on which to
dismiss one of the cues. The situation becomes, perhaps, both
difficult and dangerous should a subject have some preconceived
idea of how the person in the case history should behave. In
this case, the subject will take the cue that fits his
preconceived notion and dismiss anything else. I use the word
"dangerous" to describe this situation Involving preconceived
notions, since In the pot luck case the subject will probably
perceive the difficulty he is in. In the preconceived notion
case he probably will not. In either case there is a fifty
fifty chance of error so accuracy Isn't going to rise.
Granted, the example of information I've quoted Is from the
first amount of information given by Oskamp and which is
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designed not to give more than a chance level of success. But
since it is the only example of hard information Oskamp gives
this is all one has to go on. My suspicion is that when he
talks of a chance level he may simply mean that there is not
enough information to form a judgement and he may possibly be
overlooking the fact that the information is actually ambiguous
or "non-directive" in that it points to different solutions.
If so, as more information is given, this ambiguity may
continue to manifest itself with the resultant effect on
accuracy.
A third study is by Ryback (1967). Here subjects are
asked to compare some dimension or area of one geometrical
figure with another, for example, "Is the perimeter of figure
23 longer than the length of the line in figure 18?". There
were five comparable forms of the test so each subject was
given five tries. This kind of task repetition does not give
subjects more Information about the actual answer but rather
allows subjects to work out better ways of going about getting
an answer.	 That is, they acquire information about method
rather than target.	 Again accuracy fails to rise with
Increasing amounts of information. 	 Ryback explains it in the
following way:
	
"For example, a blindfolded individual, in
attempting to score a bull's eye on a target range, might be
misled by an observer falsely and arbitrarily reporting hits
and misses without reference to actual performance...No
learning would take place with regard to target performance,
yet some learning would occur with respect to how the rifle
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should be held ..."	 There's more to it than this division
between learning about task and learning about target, though.
The subjects aren't blindfolded and the information they
acquire about the task should help them increase their accuracy
with respect to the targets. Or, are the subjects blindfolded
in some way? Difficulty may be creating a blindfold effect In
the following way. Subjects may well in fact be able to gather
information about the task but this information doesn't send up
accuracy for the targets because, possibly, this task of
comparing different figures is a very difficult one. In other
words, the difficulty of the targets is high enough to wipe out
any gains in accuracy that should accrue through familiarity
with the task. We have then another example of where
information which could be used to improve accuracy fails to do
this again because of a psychological constraint. In this case
difficulty intervenes to negate the effect of potentially
helpful information. I intend to avoid this problem seen in
Ryback (1967) by trying to make all targets guessable.
To sum up. In using accuracy as a dependent variable,
society, or in this case an experimenter who assumes a kind of
social authority, will set a target and judge a subject's
response as to it's proximity to the target. Difficulty may
then enter perhaps through cues conflicting. But the
experimenter must continue to mark to a standard and so ignore
this difficulty. This is not a criticism of accuracy. It is a
description. (Granted this problem is complex. Teachers can
be sympathetic in marking or society can relax its standards
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where too high a standard has been set). This is not to say
that it is not a valuable dependent variable. Accuracy is
mainly what teachers are interested in and so it is of
practical importance. We can't ignore it.
A crucial point here, though, is that what we really must
try to discover is whether the subjects themselves are aware of
the difficulty of the situation they are in. If so, they will
probably be cautious about using any hypotheses they derive
from guessing in these situations. If not, they might well try
to use an erroneous hypothesis. As well as an external and
imposed measure of accuracy we need a subjective assessment of
how good or poor subjects feel their hypotheses to be.
Confidence
What the above comments suggest is that if we use
accuracy as a dependent variable we need to complement it's
weakness by using another dependent variable, in this case one
which is psycholinguistic and tells us more about a subject's
attitude to his hypotheses rather than society's. On a
practical note, it is important if teachers are to understand
learners, that they need to know about learners' subjective
accuracy.	 If, for example, learners are not aware of
difficulty,	 then it may be possible to raise their
consciousness in such a danger area.
I've used the word certainty in Chapter 1 with respect to
Li (1988). Carton (1971) also suggests that guessing should be
described in terms of certainty.	 In the main, though,
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linguistic studies of guessing have avoided this variable. In
psychological literature the term used to describe what the
above two researchers call certainty is confidence and this is
the term I will adopt. Peterson and Pitz (1988) define
confidence as a belief in factors which should affect the
accuracy of a hypothesis. Thus, if a subject thinks that
information is relevant then his confidence will go on
increasing as more of this information becomes available
regardless of the fact that this information may in fact be
quite irrelevant.	 Similarly, he might perceive some order of
information as more effective than another. 	 In the Peterson
and Pitz (1988) study confidence rises as does accuracy as more
information becomes available. This suggests that on low
amounts of information, subjects are not that accurate but also
that they are aware of the difficulty they face here. (Note
here that correlations aren't used so we don't know that if a
specific subject is less accurate he Is also less confident.
The statistic which is used Is the ANOVA on confidence and
accuracy separately so we are dealing with a group effect).
However, in the Oskamp (1965) study and the Ryback (1967)
study confidence rises whilst accuracy stays the same over
information. In other words, subjects believed the information
was relevant and used It so sending confidence up. But the
possibilities that some of the information was not relevant in
the Oskamp study (the Idea of a preconceived notion Is probably
at work) and probably relevant in the Ryback study but with its
positive effects being cancelled out by target difficulty, kept
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accuracy from increasing. We have a subtler form of difficulty
in these last two studies than that which applies simply to low
amounts of information and subjects found themselves in the
dangerous situation of not perceiving the difficulty they were
in. None of these studies deal with order as an independent
variable.
Uncertainty
Another interesting dependent variable one comes across
in the psychological literature which can be used to quantify
guessing is uncertainty, described by Peterson and Pitz (1988)
as the number of alternative hypotheses a subject holds when
asked to make a guess. If we look at 1:
1. The man went to work by ____
then not one but several alternative hypotheses are available:
car,motorbike, pushbike,__train etc. This variable should be
responsive to varying amounts of information and we would
expect to see uncertainty reduce as increasing amounts of
Information are made available. With 1, for example, if we
were told that the man started the engine this would exclude
the last two hypotheses. If we were told that he fastened his
seat belt this would also exclude the second.	 Peterson and
Pitz report the strange effect of uncertainty rising with
information.	 They say nothing about order.
	 This they
attribute to inconsistent information le. different cues
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suggesting different outcomes. In the environment of
consistent cues we can expect a decrease, I think, but it would
be interesting to see what would happen.
It would be interesting also to try and link uncertainty
with confidence. If we look at the histogram at 2 then the
relationship I suggest between confidence and uncertainty here
is that the fewer the hypotheses we hold the greater our
confidence. This is clearly not a logical statement. It is
possible to hold a large number of hypotheses and yet be very
confident in one or visa versa, to hold a few hypotheses yet
lack confidence in them all. Yet from a more pragmatic point
of view, one would expect the mind to behave in a reasonably
efficient manner and that if one were to be extremely
confident in one hypothesis then even if a lot of others were
possible the mind would exclude them. Also, if one held only a
few hypotheses and yet felt no confidence in any then one would
try to look for others. Peterson and Pitz argue against
viewing confidence and uncertainty as linked in this way and
view them as two distinct variables, but there Is, I think a
possible link based on a principle of efficiency which needs to
be explored.
We have, then, three dependent variables which can be
used to quantify guessing. If the reader asked me at this point
to revise my definition of guessing from Chapter 1, I would
have
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2. One possible relationship between confidence and
uncertainty
Confidence
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I	 I
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Number of hypotheses
to say that it is a method of hypothesis formation which is
determined primarily by amount and order and type of
information/cues on the one hand and which can be quantified in
terms of confidence, accuracy and uncertainty on the other. I
wouldn't be particularly happy with that definition since we'd
also need to say something about the directiveness of
information and relevance. But these factors are peripheral to
this study. What I am suggesting here is that we need to look
at all three dependent variables in so far as is possible.
With relevance to the topic of this thesis, we've seen
that the tendency of confidence In past work is to rise with
Increasing amounts of information. Will it, however, rise at
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the same rate for known and unknown meanings and in all orders?
What will happen with the cloze/pseudoword distinction? There
is little indication in the literature here. Uncertainty could
also reveal a contrast between guessing the two types of
meaning and other independent variables, this time by showing
movement in the number of hypotheses. As for accuracy, if
confidence and accuracy show similar movement or lack of
movement this suggests that subjects are aware of the degree of
difficulty attached to the situation they are in. Any
disparity, of course, suggests the reverse. As we have seen,
previous research has focussed mainly on the relationship
between these dependent variables and the independent variable
amount of information. Little is said about order, the
pseudoword/cloze distinction and the meaning distinction and
here we will be on our own.
Measuring the dependent variables
Measurement is always an important subject. Different
techniques can produce different results so we need to be
careful. What possibilities do we have then for measuring our
dependent variables. Specific details will be left to the
actual experiments, but it is possible here to point out some
general principles and some possible problems.
Measuring confidence
Confidence Is perhaps the easiest to deal with so I'll
start here.
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All we need to do is ask subjects to assign a confidence
value to a hypothesis each time they make a guess. Peterson
and Pitz (1988) use a scale from 0.33 to 1.0 with subjects
being told that 0.33 was the probability of being correct if
they guessed at random, so this value is equivalent to zero.
This was because they a three choice multiple choice task.
Ryback (1967) uses a scale from 1 to 10. There is a problem
here in that subjects aren't given the opportunity to express
zero confidence. I don't think this materially affects the
results of this study but it is a point to remember. I'm going
to use a scale from 0 to 6 in all experiments. The reason for
this is that Miller (1956) suggests that subjects can
effectively make choices only between up to seven categories.
One suspects in the Peterson and Pitz experiment that when a
subject says that he is 0.52 confident on one hypothesis and
then 0.57 confident on a second (and visa versa) he really
means he is 0.55 confident on both so there is no difference.
Again, this should not affect the results these researchers get
since such variation should be fairly evenly distributed
amongst the responses. A seven point scale, however, should
facilitate ease of decision making by removing the problem of
having to make over fine distinctions.
Measuring accuracy
With accuracy we're going to have to impose on the
responses some scheme that we consider to be fair. Given this,
it's probably better to wait until we see what kinds of
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response subjects give rather than try to anticipate. Accuracy
marking schemes will be left until the actual experiments,
then. The one principle I will try and retain is to make
accuracy decisions which are appropriate to the amount of
information given and that if, when all the amounts of
information are in place, a subject produces a response which
fits this information but which I hadn't anticipated then it
must score full accuracy marks.
Measuring uncertainty
Peterson and Pitz (1988) measured uncertainty in the
following way. Remember, subjects are being asked about the
number of wins a baseball team had in a season. They averaged
a set of predictions made by subjects on a previous experiment
regarding the number of wins a team had made and got an
estimate of say 84 wins for a team. Four was then added to and
subtracted from this value to get 88 and 80 wins. Each team
was presented to a subject three times with the subject being
asked on one occasion what the probability was that the team
won more than 88, on a second occasion, less than 80 and on a
third occasion, what the probability was that the number of
wins lay between 80 and 88. Presumably the order of
presentation and the number of cues seen on each occasion
varied. They found that the probabilities assigned to each of
the three regions, especially the extreme regions, increased
with more information which leads them to conclude that
uncertainty (the number of hypotheses) is increasing with
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information. That is, since the extreme regions are becoming
more plausible with information it suggests a gradual widening
in the number of hypotheses away from that central figure of
84.
The first point to note is that we can't use such a
scheme in any comparable experiment involving lexis. We can
see why if we plot Peterson and Pitz's (1988) idea for
measuring uncertainty. This is done at 3. We can see that the
most likely hypothesis in this example is 84 wins and that 80
and 88 wins are a little less likely and fall neatly to either
side of this central hypothesis of 84. The reason for this
neat ordering is that number of wins is a continuous scale, we
can place each hypothesis not only in terms of likelihood on
the y axis but also in terms of distance from each other on the
x axis. With words or phrases, representing meanings as
hypotheses, we might work out from a previous experiment that
rose is the most likely hypothesis and that bluebell and tulip
are the next two most likely hypotheses. We can, then, talk of
probability. What we can't talk of is distance. Words or
meanings are discrete hypotheses and don't have a continuous
scale. Any ordering of these items on the x axis would just be
arbitrary. It therefore becomes Impossible to ask a subject to
state what he thinks is the probability that the hypothesis is
less than bluebell. He may be able to attach a probability to
bluebell or any other hypothesis he might hold, but he won't
have any idea of how distant bluebell Is from rose or how
distant any
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3.	 The relationship between probability and number of wins
on a continuous scale.
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other hypothesis he might hold is from bluebell. So, whilst we
can ask a subject whether daffodil is less probable than
bluebell, we can't ask what the probability is of it being less
ie. further off, than bluebell. This aspect of the scale
doesn't exist for words and without it, it is not so easy to
get a picture of uncertainty increasing or decreasing.
A second point is this. When I first read the above
scheme for measuring uncertainty I thought it was over complex.
The trouble is that one realizes just how good a measure it is
when one considers the alternatives since these are pretty
crude. Given a careful explanation and a little practice,
there shouldn't really be a problem with the Peterson and Pitz
(1988) scheme. One alternative would be to simply ask subjects
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how many alternatives they can see to their guess: zero, one or
two, three or four etc. again using seven categories. We've
got to get the scale correct. If it finishes at ten but
subjects are holding twenty we'll be in trouble. Worse than
this, if we ask subjects to add in this way, they'll forget
some hypotheses that they were holding or it will actively get
them to think of more hypotheses, so we won't get a very good
measure. Also, one subject might get rose, tulip, and bluebell
and count 3, a second, flower and vegetable and count 2. But
we'd really want to say that the second subject's uncertainty
is the greater because his hypotheses are more general.
An alternative to the above scheme would be to try and
measure uncertainty through the degree to which guesses change
over information. Let's say a subject was given three Items of
information one at a time and asked to guess each time he saw a
cue. We might get for example: rose, rose,_rose. The second
guess Is the same as the first and we could argue that since
the subject is not changing his mind he Is focussing pretty
much on this single hypothesis, so we give an uncertainty of 0.
The same would apply to the third guess.	 If, however, a
subject changed the second guess to tulip we could argue that
he's changed his mind, but not to any great extent since he's
still thinking In terms of kinds of flower. Here, we might
score 1. If by chance a subject changed his second hypothesis
to a word completely outside the flower family then we might
score an uncertainty of 2.	 Note also that If on his third
hypothesis he comes back to rose,	 we have something like:
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rose, carrot, rose. The third hypothesis hasn't so much changed
again but has returned to an original value. Perhaps instead
of a 2 we should score a 1 here. As with accuracy we're
imposing a scheme and it's best to wait until we see actual
results before making hard decisions.
We can pick out the weak points of such a scheme though.
First, it gets increasingly subjective as it gets increasingly
complex. Also, by comparing hypothesis one in this way with
hypothesis two we get an uncertainty value for hypothesis two
only. The next comparison will give us the value for
hypothesis three. The result is we've lost the value for
hypothesis one. Worst of all we're using an overtly linguistic
technique to measure a psychological variable. The fact that
someone changes from rose to carrot gets him an uncertainty
of 2. In fact he might have perceived that carrot is the only
possible hypothesis and so his uncertainty is actually 0. We
are really now redefining uncertainty not as the number of
competing hypotheses but as changeability of hypotheses. As
far as I can see, however, these makeshift equivalents are the
only alternative to the measure of uncertainty Peterson and
Pitz (1988) use since we lack a continuous scale
Word Meaning
This study Is going to be empirical In nature and Is
concerned with the contrast between guessing known meanings and
unknown meanings from cues of different types in different
amounts and orders.
	
We must then have a way of representing
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known and unknown meanings in order to construct targets.
Let's look at what possibilities are open to us for the
construction of meaning.
Dictionary definitions: If we were to look in a dictionary to
find the meaning of the word man we would find something like
4:
4. A human being, esp. an adult male.
The definition at 4 can be broken down traditionally into the
components of genus and differentia given at 5.
5. man = human being (genus)
male adult (differentia)
Here the genus is a general category of meaning and
superordinate of words which are semantically related to man:
woman, child,__boy,__girl since all these share the same genus.
The differentia is a more specific item which shows how the
term man differs from the closely related items listed above.
The genus would also serve to differentiate members of this
family from those of another
Semantic primitives: Researchers like Katz (1971) would say
that meanings are made up from a set of semantic primitives in
much the same way that chemical compounds are made up from
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elements. There is a limited set of these primitives and they
combine and recombine to give us all the words in our language.
These components are somehow more basic than words, which is,
after all, what we've used to describe meaning at 4 and 5.
To quote Katz, these semantic units "...represent the
conceptual elements into which a reading decomposes a sense".
The term man then will decompose into the primitives at 6:
6. HUMAN ADULT
	 MALE
This looks suspiciously like the definition at 4 and leads to
the criticism that these primitives are just words and not
something that lie behind words. 	 Leech (1974 p.95) rejects
such a criticism: "I choose English words as my symbols
because I want the notation to suggest the meanings I have in
mind, so that the formula will not be completely opaque. But
any other graphic symbols will do." We could, then, present
meanings in the form of semantic primitives.
Prototypes: Another way of representing meaning is in terms of
prototypes. A prototype is essentially a good exemplar of a
category. For example, we might think that an alsatian is a
better exemplar of the category than say pekinese. See
Rosch (1975) who pioneered this work.
Which of these forms shall we choose:
	
dictionary
definitions, primitives or prototypes?
As to semantic primitives, these only really mean
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anything to the theoretical semantist, and are intended for
analysis not presentation of cues. (See Finn (1977) for an
interpretation of guessing in terms of primitives). I intend,
therefore to avoid this theory.
As to prototypes, A way in which this kind of
representation of meaning might be used in guessing Is
suggested to me by a comment by Aitchison (1987 p.51): "...if
they saw a pterodactyl, they would decide whether It was
likely to be a bird by matching It against the features of a
bird-like bird, or, in fashionable terminology, a
'prototypical' bird". We could then present meanings through
pictures and ask subjects to guess. The question being whether
or not they would match the target against a prototype and if
so how they would deal with the non-prototypal residual. The
trouble is that much work on prototypes does not involve
pictures and this might be of questionable validity. Also, in
real life, except for cartoons and children's books, it is rare
for pictures to give information about word meaning.
In this study I am concerned with how words in the text
act as cues and for this purpose, presenting meaning in terms
of the fragments of dictionary definitions rather than
prototypes or primitives is the relevant one.
In addition to the components of genus and differentia,
we should also consider one further aspect of word meaning
here, this being meaning through associations or as it is
sometimes termed collocation. As Martin (1983) and many other
researchers point out this phenomenon is based on co
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occurrence. We expect one word to appear within the
environment of another. If we see cow then milk and farm are
much more likely to occur in the vicinity of this word than
housing estate. So much so that we see as part of the meaning
of cow the ideas that it lives on a farm and gives milk. These
associations are not a part of the meaning of cow in the way
that animal is. It is perfectly possible for a cow to give no
milk and be kept on a housing estate, its just not that
likely. We have, in association, another important aspect of
word meaning. However, associations are not essential features
of word meaning as are genus and differentia.
Also, there has in fact in the past been some debate as
to whether the differentia should be seen as an essential
feature of word meaning. Following Jackendoff (1983 p.114) I'd
say we have to include it or regard such sentences as 7:
7. ? The man gave birth.
as semantically well formed. In a science fiction context they
may be, but not normally.
We can use the idea of genus and differentia and
association to point up a contrast between known and unknown
meanings. Take the two words: sky light and kolper and their
meanings given at 8. We can see that sky light is made up of a
combination of genus, differentia and association that is
familiar. With kolper, whilst we understand what the genus,
differentia and association mean, the combination of the three
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is unfamiliar. In fact, this is an unknown word meaning taken
from the study by van Daalen-Kapteijns and Elshout-Nohr (1981)
to which I've added an association.
8. sky light	 ko 1 per
window	 window	 (genus)
in the	 that transmits (differentia)
roof
	
little light
can be	 is often found
smashed
	 in Holland
In terms of defining what we mean by known and
particularly unknown meanings, then, we can see that a meaning
is not unknown because its components of genus, differentia and
association are unknown. If this was the case we really
couldn't talk of guessing since we can't guess something
outside of our store of knowledge. Rather, whilst the
individual components are known it's the combination of
components which is unknown and In terms of guessing known and
unknown meanings I'm referring to guessing familiar and
unfamiliar lexical combinations.
One final point here. I have simplified things when
talking of genus, differentia and association. For example, we
could sub-classify the link between genus and differentia by
noting that differentias can be opposites, functions, locations
etc. with respect to the genus. In kolper the differentia is a
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function and in sky light a location. We can do the same thing
with association and Carter (1987), for example, mentions
associations which are syntagmatic eg.->bark and
associations which are paradigmatic eg. 
.2&-> cat. We do need
to remember, however, that we will need to use the genus,
differentia and association categories in experiments and from
this point of view we do not want to make things too complex.
I am therefore, going to avoid the various sub-divisions
mentioned here though we should remember that in so doing I
have simplified things.
Cues
I have decided to focus on contextual cues. The
main problem with these cues is that we have a large number of
of such types within this category. Ames (1966) lists fourteen
types and Sternberg et al (1982) list eight types. If we
can't limit this number it becomes extremely difficult to deal
with the variable of amount and impossible to deal with order.
We must simplify this situation and the method I'm going
to use is as follows. We have three components making up the
meaning of targets: genus, differentia and association.
Ideally, a guess obtained from the context should be one of
these meaning components. We can use this idea to classify and
therefore talk only of cues to the genus, cues to the
differentia and cues to the association and ignore possible
manifestations in various types of cue as given by Ames (1966)
and factors like cohesion which interfere with their
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effectiveness. To give an idea of what I mean, let's look at
the made up meaning To crell:_This is to worship in a frenzy
and is often done by primitive tribes. Possible cues are given
at 9. 9a is the genus, 9b the differentia and 9c the
association.
In one of their experiments, van Daalen-Kapteijns and
Elshout-Mohr (1981) simply give the genus to their subjects on
the assumption that they have obtained it from context cues and
assume that they will hold this cue intact and not guess from
it. We could follow them here andextend the approach to cover
differentia and association. (There is a problem here with
associations. They could be held as part of a target's meaning
or they could be used as cues to the core meaning. So there is
ambiguity: Are associations meaning components or cues? The
answer is that they are a bit of both. Where they are cues we
can view the hypotheses formed as part of the lexicon. Where
they are held as part of a target's meaning we can view this as
an entry in the encyclopaedia). This approach is exemplified
by giving the information In the first column at 9. 	 The
association could be marked by a frequency adverb to show it is
not an essential part of the definition. This method of
presentation Is important since it is straightforward and
allows us to systematically manipulate amount and order of cues
of three types. It does, however, open up criticisms. It is a
very explicit and unreal method of giving information,
bordering on a situation where guessing does not apply.	 In
real life subjects would have to do a reasonable amount of work
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on a text before they arrive at this stage of holding genus,
differentia and association. In real life, also, there may be
less or more cues available and different guessers may spot
9. Guess ideally	 Cue giving implicit
	 Cue giving implicit
Obtained from	 definitional	 associational
Context	 information	 information
a. To worship	 Some people are non-	 in a Temple
I believers but others
crell
b. In a frenzy	 When you pray you are
	 I Bath of sweat
calm when you crell	 Drugs
you are not	 I
c. Primitive tribes I Those who pray are	 Loin cloth
often do this	 I thought to be civilized	 Spears
I those who crell are not
different numbers of them in different orders. And there will
be factors like cohesion at work. But we must eliminate these
factors to try and get a reasonably clear picture of order and
amount of information.	 This ãoes, however, leaà. to
artificiality.
There Is one direction in which we can at least partially
escape this artificiality.	 In Chapter 1 we spoke of a
classification based on the kinds of information cues gave. We
had, for example, implicit definitional cues. Examples are in
the second column at 9. At 9a) the contrast with non-believers
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gives the genus worship and so on. We also spoke of implicit
associational cues. These are shown in the third column at 9.
We could suggest worship by the association in a temple and so
on. It's this kind of cue van Daalen-Kapteijns and Elshout-
Mohr rely on in their first experiment. By using these cues we
make subjects work to get the genus, differentia and
association and so we can remove the criticism that cues are
explicit and so unreal. Probably in real life most information
comes through Implicit associational cues. We still use the
idea of the guess ideally obtained: genus, differentia and
association but we can cross classify in terms of the kind of
information a cue gives le. implicit definitional/implicit
associational. Wherever an implicit definitional or implicit
associational cue occurs it is always of the type which gives
or allows a subject to obtain a genus or a differentia or an
association. We still keep an artificial control on order and
amount of information by excluding a large but realistic number
of cue types.
Our main interest here is to see how these three elements
of word meaning: genus, differentia and association combine to
form a hypothesis. In terms of any experiment, these three cue
types give us three amounts of Information and six possible
orders of Information (3 factorial).
One final point. If we bring word class in terms of
nouns and verbs into the experiments It may be possible to
reveal a distinction between two types of association cue in
terms of the dependent variables.
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Mackin (1978) and Cowie (1978 & 1981) talk of collocation
in terms of selection restrictions. Other researchers,
however, such as Halliday and Hasan (1976 p.286), Halliday
(1985 p.312) and Berry (1977) lay stress mainly on the idea of
co-occurrence and play down the idea of any semantic
relationship in collocation.
It could be, however, that we might have two situations.
Co-occurence and selection restriction as opposed to simply co-
occurrence. The first having an advantage over the second in
terms of the dependent variables used because the selection
restriction will create a fairly homogeneous set of hypotheses
when guessing whereas the absence of such a restriction might
create a more disparate set./
We can get at this distinction by using the noun verb
distinctions. Verbs tend to impose selection restrictions,
nouns tend not to. So a verb collocation/association cue on a
noun target imposes a selection restriction. We might call
this intra selectional collocation. A noun association cue on
a verb target won't impose a selection restriction. We might
call this extra selectional collocation. The intra selectional
cues should be the more powerful because of homogeneity of
response ie. nouns should be easier to guess than verbs.
We can see something of this in the example at 10.
10. a) He____ the car.
b) He drove the ____
c) He washed the ____
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We can see at lOa) that the extra selectional collocation car
can give a wide range of verbs that have little in common:
drive, wash,crash etc.
	 At lob) the intra selectional
collocation drive, however,
	 suggests that all possible
hypotheses must have the factor vehicle in common. Granted,
things are not quite this simple because of the polysemy on
drive- there's the other meaning of driving sheep- but polysemy
is a factor which would affect all types of cue and will be
common to both types of collocation. There, is a suggestion,
then that intra selectional collocation mig,ht be stronr thati
extra selectional.	 This must just be considered a tendency,
however. When we come to lOc) the intra selectional
collocation wash gives rise to a set of hypotheses window, car
etc. just as disparate as those at lOa) so we are not really
talking of some binding rule here.
It is, however,	 just possible that	 we have an
interesting subdivision in association cues and a word class
difference based on this tenãency.
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Chapter 3
In Search of a Model
We now have a question: 	 Does the guessing of known
meanings differ in terms of process from guessing unknown
meanings? We have an experiment design which can be used to
try and answer this question, this design consisting of the
independent variables amount of information and order. There
are three amounts of information and also because there are
three different types of information, we will have six orders.
We also have three dependent variables: accuracy, confidence
and uncertainty which can be used to measure the effect of the
independent variables. We've also noted some possible
hypotheses for the effect of amount of information on these
dependent variables. What we need to do now is try and pull
things together and construct a model to describe the guessing
process. Something which might be used to make predictions arid.
analyse results, such a model itself possibly being modified by
results.
I will divide this description of a model into the
following sections: Single word hypotheses versus complex
hypotheses, the Cost/Benefit Principle, the guessing of known
meanings, the guessing of unknown meanings, the effect of form
(pseudoword/cloze) remembering that this cross classifies with
meaning and finally order.
	 I'll clarify some of the above
terminology when I come to the appropriate section.
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Single Word vs Complex Hypotheses
I want to look at possible types of responses when
guessing and introduce the idea of single word hypotheses and
complex hypotheses. A subject, on receiving a series of cues
may work out a genus, This is a kind of barrier and a
differentia, This is made up of bricks. He might lexicalise
these components of meaning and give the response wall. Where
such lexicalisation takes place, I will refer to these
responses as single word hypotheses. However, a subject might
choose not to lexicalise his response. He could keep genus and
dj.fferentia intact so we have two discrete but related
hypotheses: This is a barrier made up of bricks. I will refer
to such phrasal responses as complex hypotheses. Associations,
whilst they can serve as cues to such a complex hypothesis can
also be added. We might add the idea of Children often climb
these here.
Typically, one would expect responses on known meanings
to be single word hypotheses and responses on unknown meanings
to be complex hypotheses.
The Cost/Benefit Principle
The cost/benefit idea has been widely used to describe
decision making/hypothesis formation.	 Payne (1982) gives a
good description of the principle.	 "The idea is that any
decision strategy has certain benefits associated with its use
and also certain costs.	 The benefits would include the
probability that the strategy will lead to a 'correct'
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decision,	 the	 speed of making the decision and its
justifiability.	 Costs	 might	 include	 the	 information
acquisition and computational effort involved in using the
strategy. Decision rule selection would then involve
consideration of both the costs and benefits associated with
each possible strategy".
Why introduce this principle? First, it seems plausible
to describe the workings of the mind in such terms. As Sperber
and Wilson (1986) point out, "Mental processes, like all
biological processes, involve a certain effort, a certain
expenditure of energy". In return it is not unreasonable to
expect some reward. If an adequate reward is not forthcoming
then processing effort might well be curtailed or redirected.
Secondly, the principle seems relevant to this study since we
are talking of information processing so there will be costs.
The are also potential benefits not only in terms of high
accuracy but also high confidence and low uncertainty.
Known meanings
With known meanings, costs might be increased by factors
like inconsistent information, polysemy and ambiguity in cues
and poor cohesion. As pointed out, I intend to remove such
problems. Cues will be consistent and as clear as I can make
them.	 Processing costs will be straightforward and benefits
will be appropriate. So on known meanings, the cost/benefit
principle will be in balance and we will have an efficient
guessing system to compare unknown meanings with.
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As to how this system will operate, Peterson and Pitz
(1988) make some interesting points with respect to confidence
and amount of information and I'll base my comments on these.
If we received a cue: This is an institution, then we might
guess church and give perhaps a confidence of 2. If we get a
second cue: This helps educate people then we would probably
guess school and give a confidence of 5. Note that confidence
goes up even though the guess has been changed. This is
because although we went wrong initially, our new guess is
based not just on the second cue but also on the first. We are
able to recognize the familiar combination between the cues and
put them together. In the guessing of known quantities then,
confidence seems to rise with increasing amounts of
information, provided of course we pick up only the relevant
information.	 If a subject managed to guess school off the
first cue and maintain this guess with subsequent cues, the
effect should be the same. (We could ask if changing will
produce the same kind of gain in confidence as holding guesses.
The former might involve more processing in that new hypotheses
have to be examined and this might undermine confidence to a
degree in contrast to the latter, 	 I would expect such an
effect to be negligible in an efficient system)
Accuracy should follow confidence and rise across
information as there will be no problem in terms of consistency
with the information.
With uncertainty, the following should happen. The first
cue: This is an institution will generate hypotheses like:
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school, church, the monarchy, and the second cue: This helps
educate will generate hypotheses like: text book, school,
teacher. The first cue in isolation would generate all 3
hypotheses. But the second cue in combination with the first
would not be allowed to generate it's full range of possible
hypotheses. Also, when the second cue appears, many of the
hypotheses considered at cue 1 would also now be rejected. In
fact, when the familiar combination of the second cue with the
first is recognised, then school is probably the only
hypothesis which will be considered. That is only hypotheses
which can be lexicalised will form a part of uncertainty where
information is consistent. So uncertainty will decline as
information increases going from 3 to 1 in the example above.
Peterson and Pitz (1988) do, however, record a rising
uncertainty even in the context of a rising confidence. They
suggest that this is because there is an element of
inconsistence in the information they use and "...it is
inconsistent information, with features which suggest different
outcomes, that is responsible for the increase in uncertainty".
This suggests that where a familiar relationship can't be seen
between cues then each cue adds hypotheses to those generated
by previous cues. This problem with inconsistency should not
affect our model.
Unknown Meanings
With unknown meanings, we would expect the typical
response to be a complex hypothesis.	 One cue might suggest
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barrier and a second made up of bushes but if the subject does
not know the word hedge he can't lexicalise the target and must
give a phrasal response consisting of genus and differentia:
This is a barrier made up of bushes. One very important point.
The fact that we might not be able to lexicalise information
here does not make that information inconsistent. Cues do in
fact point consistently to a new meaning. Rather,
inconsistency here would be the product of two inconsistent
cues on the genus and the same on the differentia. 	 We are
still then looking at consistent information.
The trouble with unknown meanings is that whilst we might
expect complex hypotheses as responses we appear to some extent
to get single word responses instead. We see some examples of
this in the study by van Daalen-Kapteijns and Elshout-Mohr
(1981).	 They see word meaning as consisting of genus and
differentia.	 (They don't use the terms genus and differentia
but this distinction is clearly present). 	 There are two
experiments. The main difference being that in the first
experiment subjects guess genus and differentia whereas in the
second they are given the genus and need only to guess a
differentia.	 Subjects are foreign speaker undergraduates.
Five cues are given in all to each target.
	 I'll give the
first three cues at 1 for the target kolper:	 A window that
transmits little light because there is something in front of
it.	 The last two cues serve a reinforcing function so I'll
omit them.
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1. a) When you're used to a broad view it is quite depressing
when you come to live in a room with with one or two kolpers
fronting a courtyard.
b) He virtually always studied in the library, as at home
he had to work by artificial light all day because of those
kolpers.
c) During a heat wave a lot of people all of a sudden want
to have kolpers, so the sales of sunblinds then reach a peak.
The first cue gives the genus and the others the differentia.
Subjects are also given a lot of support and are told carefully
to work out an aspect of the target's meaning from each
sentence before moving to the next. They are also told that
there is no synonym for the target. It's interesting that the
authors feel the need to give this last piece of advice.
Responses are scored in total and not across information so we
don't see a development across information.
One thing we can do here is to look at some examples of
responses given by these authors. Subjects do use phrases to
describe complex hypotheses. But some subjects give window
only and refuse to enlarge on this, or they give something like
shutter or nuisance. They appear to be using single word
hypotheses. The authors don't give the frequencies of these
response types but it seems reasonable to assume that if this
single word response is occurring where a lot of support is
being given in terms of pushing subjects towards complex
hypotheses, then this single word hypothesis might well be a
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fairly frequent response to an unknown meaning.
Is there a logical reason why single word hypotheses
should be given as responses on unknown meaning?
We might try to argue here that subjects do not have
knowledge of genus and differentia. As a result, they fail to
recognise meaning components like genus and differentia so we
get a word response like window given above because the subject
fails to recognise the differentia cues as relevant. With the
shutter response it would be the genus cue which is not
recognised. I am reluctant to use this argument. That people,
or at least adults, have such knowledge is borne out by word
association experiments. Brown and Berko (1960) find that
whilst children give syntagmatic responses: send->letter
adults respond with words from within the same syntactic
category: send->__deliver ie. paradigmatic responses. Wiegel-
Crump and Dennis (1986) support this in that they suggest the
more paradigmatic organisation of the adult lexicon is a factor
in the speed with which adults access words. We do need to be
careful here since as Meara (1982) points out: "Personally, I
have always found that this distinction is very difficult to
work in practice, especially when you cannot refer back to the
testee for elucidation, but this difficulty is not generally
commented on in the literature". However, in that many of
these adult paradigmatic responses seem to reflect a semantic
link with the stimulus in the sense that they are synonyms,
opposites, co-ordinates etc., Aitchison (1987 pp 75, 95), we
might argue that they betray a knowledge of genus and
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differentia.
Since I don't want to argue that subjects do not have the
ability to recognise the components of meaning we need to think
again here. First, I would appeal to intuition and ask the
reader to identify which of the four guessing situations noted
in Chapter 1 seems to be the most straight forward or closest
to the norm of what we would call "guessing". My answer here
would be a doze gap over a known meaning since there is no
interference from added factors like pseudowords or unfamiliar
combinations of information.
We have seen how this situation develops in the section
on known meanings. We might get a cue which suggests the genus
barrier and another which suggests the differentia made up of
bushes but these are not held, rather these meaning components
are lexicalised to give hedge.
If cues to meaning components act as cues to word forms
in this known meaning situation then presumably the same will
be true in the unknown meaning situation. We're still dealing
with the same meaning component cues. What we really need to
know as we move from guessing known to unknown meanings is
whether some factor will intervene to prevent the cues
suggesting words so that we end up not using genus, differentia
and association, but retaining them to form a new meaning.
One such factor might be the presence of an unfamiliar
form or pseudoword. It is possible that the presence of an
unfamiliar form might block lexicalisation and direct subjects
to build complex hypotheses. However, the balance of evidence
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suggests that pseudoword would not have a drastic effect on
their own. Studies like Ames (1966) where pseudowords are used
over known meanings seem to elicit in the main single word
responses on targets. Whilst I would not discount the effect
of unknown forms completely, it does not appear that they
provide a strong check on the process of lexicalising
information. Substitute the form bilk over a series of cues to
hedge and the subject will still spot the familiar combination
and lexicalise correctly. I'll return to pseudowords later.
A second factor of more relevance here which might
intervene is the realisation that genus and differentia can't
be lexicalised ie. a single word hypothesis can't be obtained.
A subject might learn initially that the target is a window but
when he learns it let's in little light he realises that there
is no word in English for this and is forced to give a phrasal
answer consisting of genus and differentia.
However, as the responses recorded by van Daalen-
Kapteijns and Elshout-Nohr (1981) suggest, this process of
spotting that cues can't be lexicalised again doesn't produce
that strong an effect in terms of blocking lexicalisation. Some
subjects, even when told there is no synonym, do appear to end
up guessing words which they think could act to some degree as
synonyms for the target.
The effect here is to treat new meanings as though they
were combinations of inconsistent information. In other words,
when genus, differentia and association can't be lexicalised
they tend not to view this situation as requiring a complex
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hypothesis, but rather treat it as an inconsistency. We see
from the Oskamp (1965) study mentioned in Chapter 2 one
possible course of action when inconsistency is present.
Subjects reject or abandon some of the cues. This also seems
to be what is happening to some extent in the van Daalen-
Kapteijns and Elshout-Mohr study with the window response.
Here the differentia cues are rejected. With the nuisance
response some of the genus information seems to be rejected.
There is a possible second type of solution mentioned by
Peterson an Pitz (1988). If one cue suggested a team did well
and another that it did poorly subjects guess its performance
was about average. They seem to force cues together into a
compromise solution. This seems to be what is happening when
subjects give the response shutter in the van Daalen-Kapteijns
and Elshout-Mohr study. Here cue la seems to be distorted so
that it suggests not window but something in front of a window
and so it is made to fit cues lb and c. A key question here
will be to note whether subjects are aware that they are
rejecting or forcing. 	 With Oskamp confidence rose which
suggests subjects were not aware.
However, this idea of treating new meanings/complex
hypotheses as combinations of inconsistent information is a
description of what happens not a cause. For the latter we can
turn to the cost/benefit principle.
First, let's ask what rules might govern the combination
of genus and differentia. A linguist would look at examples.
If we take 
.2!- a tame animal, or weed- a flower which is a
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nuisance, we can see that the differentias contradict the
associative meanings the genus would have were this to be a
word form. Flowers are thought to be nice things and animals
are usually wild.	 But things don't end with this pragmatic
opposition. We can get logical contradiction. Zombies and
vampires are living corpses, a busman's holiday is a working
holiday. The moral seems to be that there is little in the way
of pragmatic or semantic constraints on combinations. But I
have strong doubts that someone not linguistically aware would
come to this conclusion. My feeling here Is that plausibility
would be a major factor in accepting a genus differentia
combination. I suspect that if we found someone who didn't
know the meaning of zombie we would have a lot of trouble in
getting him to guess that meaning as genus and differentia
emerged from textual cues. 	 The need for plausibility might
send him in the direction of thinking that this was someone
mortally wounded but not yet dead. Perhaps the only way we
might get the correct definition across would be to mark genus
and differentia as definitional by phrases such as This means.
Perhaps the virtue of a dictionary is that it speaks with
authority and so leads subjects to accept new combinations as
complex hypotheses.
In terms of guessing, however, the subject will have to
rely on his own Intuitions and he will question the
plausibility of new combinations. It is not difficult to see
how plausibility can push subjects towards single word guesses.
In any complex hypothesis, taking kolper as an example,
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subjects are going to assess the link between the components in
terms of plausibility.	 "Is this combination of window and
let's in little light sensible". They will be suspicious of
the link between the components and this sense of suspicion
will undermine confidence so that information is being
processed for limited reward. In fact, suspicion is quite
probably so strong that in many cases the new combination of
meaning components can't be accepted and there is no reward at
all. Subjects, then, might well be deflected from this course
by lack of benefits. Information can still be processed,
however, by transforming the unknown meaning into a known one.
This could be done as pointed out by abandoning information.
Here they might retain window and abandon let's in little
light. It could also be done by forcing information: "Well,
perhaps what he means is that it's dirty". That is they
distort information by turning the differentia into an
association so excluding it from the core of the definition and
are left with the word window. When they guess shutter they
seem to have decided that cue la refers not to window but to
something In front of a window and can force this together with
other cues to get a common denominator. So In the formation of
complex hypotheses benefits, notably confidence, is undermined
to such an extent that subjects are deflected into viewing such
hypotheses as inconsistent. This gives them some kind of
reward, a single word hypothesis, and has the advantage that
they are now dealing with something familiar. A known word.
A point to be kept firmly In mind here is that if
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subjects do respond to unknown combinations as they would to
inconsistency they are in error. Unknown meanings cues in
this study, as pointed are not inconsistent, they point
consistently to a new meaning. To look at the idea of
inconsistency within unknown meanings we would have to look at
inconsistency on each of the three meaning components and on
combinations thereof. An ultra complex subject which I quickly
exclude from this study in that we need to understand something
of guessing at a more basic level first. Another point to
remember is that I am not suggesting that subjects will never
guess complex hypotheses. Simply that they will tend not to.
The guessing of complex hypotheses is of Interest to this study
and I will make an attempt to get at this phenomenon.
Since we are likely to get quite a high frequency of
single word responses on unknown meanings, let's consider how
this response type might fit Into our model.
With respect to accuracy, I would not expect such single
word responses to show any Increase in accuracy across
information.	 In forcing information the subject Is after an
increasingly precise synonym. Good synonyms are rare in
English so the pursuit of a possible synonym for the target is
not likely to pay off. We see also with the nuisance response
given above, subjects are forced to give something so general
we might criticise it as vague. If Information is abandoned
then clearly accuracy will again not increase. On the whole,
accuracy is likely to be static across information.
If accuracy is damaged, this means that subjects are only
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achieving a limited benefit. They are also reducing processing
costs most clearly in terms of abandoning but also In terms of
forcing since cues are distorted into a more easily manageable
form than the unknown combination. Payne (1982) does suggest
that the tendency to minimise effort is greater than the
tendency to minimise error. How many of us decide to count
when playing cards or plan well ahead in chess though such
strategies clearly will maximise success?
What about confidence? Will it rise showing that
subjects have no intuitions about' aácuracy and the difficulty
they are in? I would suggest not. I've argued that subjects
have knowledge of meaning components. So they in the position
of forcing and abandoning information they have an awareness
and understanding of. This must have an impact on confidence
and probably this variable will remain static across
information.	 So subjects not only tolerate error but an
awareness of error which is the more important point.
With uncertainty, subjects are responding to cues as
though they were inconsistent and given what I've said In the
known meaning section this opens the possibility that
uncertainty might rise. The diversity of responses noted
above: window, shutter, nuisance suggests that there is Indeed
a possibility of this happening. 	 On the other hand, some
subjects do seem to take a response like window and simply
repeat it.
	 This lack of changeability suggests the subject
might not be prepared to consider many hypotheses In this
difficult situation. 	 With these two forces counterbalancing
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each other we may get a static uncertainty.
In all probability, single word hypotheses will be the
most prevalent and so the most important aspect of the unknown
meaning model will be that relevant to these hypotheses. But
what about where complex hypotheses are formed? We can expect
this to happen some of the time and we need to try and model
this response to some extent also. Nothing really seems to
have been done on the idea of how dependent variables might
behave where we have a series of related hypotheses joining to
create a complex hypothesis.
With respect to confidence, if a subject is able to form
a complex hypothesis then information is being used so
confidence should rise.
	 But the subject will now have a
combination of two hypotheses which is new.
	 Even though
intense suspicion has been overcome, a degree of suspicion in
the combination of components is still going to be factor which
is present even if such a complex hypothesis is formed. The
subject is going to examine such a combination to see if it
"makes sense" and this suspicion of the combination is going to
weaken confidence particularly in relation to the situation
where genus and differentia can both be lexicalised in the
known meaning condition. So whilst confidence will rise across
information it will do so at a lower level for unknowns as
opposed to knowns. Also we need to ask what might happen where
associations are added to the meaning core of genus and
differentia to form an encyclopaedic entry.
	 In all
probability, confidence will now improve since the subject Is
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now becoming familiar with the new meaning.
With respect to accuracy there is every opportunity to
use information successfully just as in known meanings. So we
are in the paradoxical situation of achieving a high accuracy
but with a limited confidence in our hypothesis.
With respect to uncertainty on unknown meanings we are
dealing with two hypotheses where we have a genus and a
differentia combination. So if we consider the genus of kolper
we might think of window and skylight and so have an
uncertainty of 2. If we think of the differentia we might get
blind and shutter as elements which might be attached to the
genus in this case. Again uncertainty is 2. Does this mean
that we now have a large uncertainty distribution of 4 also
reflecting increasing uncertainty across information since we
are moving from an uncertainty of 2 on the genus at cue 1 to 4
on the genus differentia combination on cue 2. This Is
unlikely. Mixing genuses and differentias like this does not
make decision making easy In that we'd have to consider all
possible combinations. Rather, on the genus cue we would
probably think of several hypotheses and then select one before
tackling the differentla cue which would then suggest a series
of possible hypotheses which could be added to the genus. If
there Is a difficulty in getting a match then the subject would
access the genus uncertainty distribution again. So, if we
assume a subject thinks of 3 hypotheses when he gets a cue, the
genus cue will produce an uncertainty of 3. A selection of a
genus will then be made so disposing of this uncertainty
-102-
distribution but the differentia cue will now generate a new
uncertainty of 3. That is to say, uncertainty should stay
static across information.
Form (Pseudoword/Cloze)
It could be that a pseudoword acts as a trigger, telling
subjects right from cue 1 that a complex hypothesis and not a
single word hypothesis is present. A doze gap, on the other
hand, should persuade subjects that only a single word
hypothesis is present. This contrast should cut across the
meaning distinction. Where a pseudoword occurs over an unknown
meaning, subjects are appropriately made aware that a complex
hypothesis is present but where it occurs over a known meaning
they will be deceived into thinking a complex hypothesis is
present. Similarly, where a doze occurs over a known meaning
subjects are appropriately made aware that a single word
hypothesis is present but that when It occurs over an unknown
meaning they are deceived.
Whilst I would not deny that a pseudoword or unfamiliar
form can act as a stimulus to complex hypothesis formation I
doubt that It will do so frequently. It is much more likely
that subjects will replace them with single word hypothesis and
in doing so will effectively reduce the pseudoword condition to
the same status as that of the doze space.
Why should this be so? Let's assume the subject sees the
form belk and get's one of the meaning components, say a genus,
barrier. If the subject wants to consider a complex hypothesis
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he must now think in terms of "This is some kind of barrier".
That is, he will see the hypothesis as incomplete. This
awareness of incompleteness will damage confidence, probably
reducing it by 50% in contrast to the comparable known
meaning/doze situation. The sense of suspicion mentioned
earlier will again be aroused since the subject will know that
the differentia can't be bushes or bricks since these relate to
the familiar forms hedge and wall. Again, benefits are reduced
and it would be easier to think not in terms of a kind of
barrier but reduce the genus to a single word ie. barrier or
perhaps wall since this is a fairly typical barrier. Thus the
sense of incompleteness and with it a source of difficulty is
removed.
If the subject goes on guessing in the unknown meaning
situation and spots a differentia he may be able to attach it
to the initial guess to form a complex hypothesis but now he is
going to have trouble accepting this new combination due to
suspicion and the tendency will be to lexicalise.
In effect, the pseudoword condition will be reduced to a
doze gap. In terms of overall results I would not expect a
difference between doze and pseudoword on any of the dependent
variables.
Order
Remember, I Intend to force subjects to operate in all
six orders identified. Order, however, is a complex phenomenon
and I am not going to make predictions. Rather, I intend to
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await the outcome of experiments. For the sake of convenience
I will assume that there is no difference between the orders
until statistics show otherwise.
One important point Is that we can use the cost benefit
principle to generalise from experiments to what might happen
in real life. We would probably need a large benefit for a
particular order to balance the high processing costs involved
to see an order based strategy used in real life.
Word Class
Noun targets should produce more confidence and accuracy
and less uncertainty than verb targets in both meaning
conditions. This links to intra selectional collocatlons being
superior to extra selectional collocations.
A final point. The proposed model is complex. In order
to simplify we could view the experiments which are to come in
terms of the following points.
The description of guessing known meanings across
information is worthwhile since nothing has really been done
along these lines in terms of linguistics. However, given the
psychological studies, I would be surprised if the proposed
model did not turn out to be quite accurate. The main Interest
of the known meaning condition will be to provide a description
of an "efficient" guessing system against which the Intricacies
of the unknown meaning condition can be compared.
With respect to the unknown meaning condition, I will be
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concerned with the following questions:
Is there evidence to back up my assertion that subjects
will try to lexicalise targets and go for single word
hypotheses rather than complex hypotheses?
What are the consequences of lexicalisation on the
dependent variables and what strategies are best followed when
this occurs?
Also, since lexicalisation is a tendency not a rule, we
can assume that there will be some instances of complex
hypothesis construction. So we also need to ask: What are
the consequences of complex hypothesis construction on the
dependent variables? What strategies are best followed where
this occurs?
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Chapter 4
Testing the Ruler
I've divided this chapter into two sections. The first
is a general Introduction to all the experiments carried out,
the second deals with the first two experiments which
constitute a pilot study.
General Introduction
What I've tried to do here is to construct a series of
experiments. This is done partly for the usual reason of
developing one's ideas in the light of what experiments reveal.
Another reason is that I want to create a dine running from
very controlled experiments to more naturalistic ones. In the
former, we can look for and examine very specific effects which
we think might obtain in a real life situation. In the latter,
since it is difficult to get a very clear picture in a
realistic situation since it is not easy to exclude Interfering
variables and conflicting hypotheses we can simply seek
confirmation that the effects observed in the controlled
experiments do in fact obtain in a more realistic setting.
This would then provide some justification for accepting the
greater detail given in controlled experiments as a valii
description of guessing meanings.
Just to give an overall picture, the series of
experiments carried out is given at 1.
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	1. Experiment 1
	 June 1989
	
Experiment 2
	 June 1989
	
Experiment 3	 October 1989
	
Experiment 4
	 January 1990
	
Experiment 5	 April 1990
Experiments 1 and 2 are brief pilot studies. Experiments 3 and
4 are reasonably powerful studies which try to exploit the
pilot studies. Experiment 5 is in attempt to capture some of
the results of these previous experiments in a more
naturalistic setting.
A brief word should also be said about the subjects who
participated in these experiments. The subjects were almost
exclusively students, judged to be of similar intelligence and
educational level, at University of Wales, Bangor:
undergraduates or MA students, and were native speakers.
Foreign students would undoubtedly have made an interesting
group, but a sufficiently large, homogenous group did not exist
at the university. To have used four or five African subjects,
four or five from Arab countries etc. would bave been asking
for trouble in that intra group variation might have obscured
any general result. Another type of subject of interest would
have been children at say the more advanced primary school
level. It is with such subjects that learning through guessing
is thought to occur and they might possibly be more inclined to
guess than adults who have fairly extensive vocabularies.
Children are, however, more difficult to deal with in terms of
controlled experimentation than adults and my feeling is that
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it's better, if possible, to try and get a picture of what
might be happening from an intelligent adult group and leave
children for the future.
None of the subjects who took part in the experiments
received any form of payment or incentive.
Pilot study
This pilot study consists of Experiments I and 2. The
linguistic literature on guessing says very little about
confidence and nothing about uncertainty. Rather, it relies
almost exclusively on accuracy. What I want to do here is take
a tentative look at how the first two of these dependent
variables behave in a linguistic setting in preparation for
future experiments.
Experiment 1
Introduction
Purpose of experiment: The purpose of this experiment is
to contrast the guessing of known and unknown meanings across
increasing amounts of information and between different orders
of cues in terms of the dependent variable confidence. Being a
pilot study, I really want to test the measuring instrument,
procedure and some of the ideas mentioned in the model etc. in
preparation for future experiments.
With known meanings the cues should lead to the guessing
of words. What I have termed single hypotheses. As more cues
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are given it doesn't matter whether the hypothesis changes or
remains the same. Confidence should be a product of amount of
information and as this independent variable increases so
confidence should increase. So we could give a subject 3 cues
in succession: This Is a kind of barrier, This is made up of
shrubs, This is trimmed sometimes and the subject should
eventually give the hypothesis hedge at quite high confidence,
perhaps after rejecting and changing from hypotheses like wall.
With unknown meanings, we have identified two situations.
Subjects might try and use the cues to guess a single word
hypothesis by treating cues as inconsistent. Or subjects might
try to construct a new meaning or what I have termed a complex
hypothesis. It is the latter of these two situations that I
want to focus on in this experiment and I want to look at the
process in terms of subjects building a complex right from the
start on cue I and not when they realise that information can
not be lexicalised. This is equivalent to the situation where
a pseudoword or unknown form acts as a clear indicator that a
complex hypothesis Is present.
The main difficulty with trying to look at this Idea of
guessing new meanings complex! hypotheses right from the start
on cue 1 in the unknown meaning condition is that we can't
simply rely on the presence of a pseudoword to persuade
subjects to build a complex hypothesis. Subjects might try to
go for single word guesses. I'm, therefore, going to force
subjects into the situation of building a complex hypothesis
right from cue 1 by giving them a cue to one of the meaning
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components and telling them to add a second. Such a situation
is artificial especially since I've indicated that complex
hypothesis formation might not be that frequent in real life.
But it should have the benefit of giving us a fairly clear view
of complex hypothesis formation and it is relevant to look at
this phenomenon to see if factors like incompleteness and
suspicion noted in the model do undermine confidence.
Confidence for unknown meanings should rise as information is
made available since subjects are being forced to use the
information, but it should rise at a lower level for unknown
meanings as opposed to known.
Just to illustrate this "adding" instruction. We could
give these cues in succession: This is to carry, This Is done
on the head, African women usually do this. On seeing the
first cue and being told to add an idea the subject Is
forbidden to take this initial cue as the whole meaning.
Although a subject might add on the back this is not done on
the basis of hard information. There is no retreat to a single
word guess and target must be viewed as incomplete: "To carry
in some fashion possibly on the back". This should reduce a
subject's confidence on cue 1 unknown in contrast to cue 1
known where a single word can be given. Also, together with
this incompleteness, subjects should realise that whatever is
added can't form a combination which can be lexicalised because
of the strange form. So there is also suspicion of anything
that is added. This Is comparable to the real life situation
where a subject sees an unfamiliar form and gets one of the
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meaning components of the complex hypothesis but has not yet
read on and recovered the second. (That more cues are going to
be made available will be made clear to subjects in the
instructions in that they will be told that they will see more
than one cue).
When the next cue becomes available, he will probably
abandon this first guess on the back and accept This Is done on
the head.	 He will also add another hypothesis, perhaps
balancing. But he will now have to test the link between To
carry and On the head and suspicion in the combination should
decrease confidence with respect to known meaning cue 2.
Confidence will still rise because the adding instruction
forces subjects to process information but it will not rise so
sharply for the unknowns as opposed to the knowns. When the
third cue comes in, subjects are now becoming more familiar
with the new meaning and confidence on the unknown targets
might start to catch up with that on the knowns.
The lower confidence on cues 1 and 2 on the unknowns In
contrast to the knowns will illustrate the reduced benefits due
to incompleteness and suspicion noted in the model.
Predictions: Predictions are given at 2.
2. a) Confidence will be lower overall for unknown meanings
as opposed to known meanings.
b) Confidence will rise with increasing amounts of
information.
c) Confidence will rise more slowly for unknown meanings
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across information as opposed to known meanings possibly with
the gap closing on cue 3 so we may get an interaction here.
d) There will be no effect for order.
Method
Cases: Six subjects took part in the experiment. Four
of the subjects were students at St. Mary's College, Bangor and
were doing the post graduate certificate of education course:
Teaching English as a Foreign Language. One subject was a
lecturer at the above college. The final subject was an
employee in the university canteen. A convenience sample.
Also not a very homogeneous sample. This experiment took place
in June and since students were preparing to sit exams it was
difficult to get subjects.
Independent variables: The independent variable of word
meaning was dealt with by creating twelve targets, all verbs,
six representing known meanings and six representing unknown
meanings. These targets are given in Appendix 1. An example of
a known and unknown meaning is given at 3. The genus is
represented at a), the differentia at b) and the association at
c). Known meanings were characterized by having a doze space
set above them and unknown meanings had a pseudoword.
We are using only two of the four possible situations
mentioned in Chapter 1: a doze gap over a known meaning and a
pseudoword over an unknown meaning.
	 This was done to keep the
pilot study simple.	 The reason for choosing these two
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situations out of our four possibilities is that they represent
extreme cases. I mentioned in Chapter 3 the possibility that
the presence of a pseudoword might lead a subject to believe
3. Known meaning
To
a) This is to clean
b) This is done with
a broom
c) Rooms sometimes have
this done to them
Unknown meaning
To kiarim
This is to worship
This is done in a
frenzy
Primitive tribes
sometimes do this
that he was in the position of dealing with an unknown meaning.
Therefore, if this is the case, we need a pseudoword in the
unknown condition since it looks a bit more natural. Note that
I'm not relying on the pseudoword here to trigger the guessing
of complex hypotheses but on an adding instruction.
Known meanings were obtained by using a list of random
numbers to identify page numbers in a dictionary (the actual
dictionary varied as to what was available) and the first item
with a reasonably clear genus, differentia and familiar
association was chosen. These known meanings were then tested
on friends to see if a reasonable guess could be made. Unknown
meanings were simply constructed by myself and then checked
through to make sure that no single word form existed which
could take as it's definition this combination of genus,
differentia and association.
	 The six known meanings were
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randomized using a table of random numbers, but this random
order of targets was kept the same for each subject. The same
thing was done for unknown meanings. The first subject to sit
the experiment saw the six known meanings first followed by the
six unknown meanings. This was reversed for the second subject
and so on.
The independent variable of amount of Information was
dealt with as follows. The genus, differentia and association
were used to provide cues. They were presented to subjects in
the forms given at 3 ie. they were presented directly and no
attempt was made to camouflage or describe them indirectly. In
seeing one of these cues, subjects received one amount of
information, in seeing two they received that plus a second
(two amounts of information) and in seeing three, that plus a
third cue (three amounts of information).
All cues were tried out on friends to ensure that factors
like polysemy did not cause any serious problem and that all
cues could elicit fairly reasonable responses.
A criticism here is that subjects will realise quickly
that there are going to be no more nor less than three cues.
So confidence on cue 1 might be coloured by the expectation
that more will follow. In real life one would not be able to
assume a fixed number of cues.
A second criticism is that all cues are compatible in
that they point consistently to a word or a new meaning. In
real life one might get two genus cues etc. which were
inconsistent. This is too complex a subject to deal with here,
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A third criticism is that the presentation of cues is
reminiscent of the way teachers used to set mathematical
problems. Every item of information given will probably be
seen as relevant. In real life, subjects might simply ignore
some Items of information and there would be a greater freedom
to discard information.	 I will try to move towards more
naturalistic experiments.
As to the Independent variable of order, there are six
possible orders of genus, differentia and association. For the
known meanings there are six targets. The first subject saw a
different order for each target so that all six orders were
covered by that subject. The second subject also saw all six
orders, but not on the same targets as the first subject and
this variation was repeated until all six subjects had sat the
experiment. The result was that each subject saw all six
orders and each target was also seen with cues in all six
orders. The sequence in which subjects saw these orders is
given in a grid in Appendix 1. The reason for varying orders
for each subject was to remove any effects related to
individual targets.
Procedure: The experiment was conducted in a sound proof
room in the phonetics laboratory where subjects were free from
interruption. Subjects sat the experiment one at a time and
spent approximately thirty minutes doing so, proceeding at
their own pace. When the first subject entered the experiment
room, he was given an answer sheet which was relevant only to
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the known meaning condition and asked to read the instructions.
An example of the answer sheet is given in Appendix 1. The
instructions are at 4.
4. You will see a number of items of information describing
an English word. Can you guess what that word is? Each time
you see an item of information, note down what you think the
word being described is and also how confident you feel in your
guess. Measure your confidence on a scale from 0 to 6. 0 = no
confidence, 6 = maximum confidence. You may change your guess
if you wish.
After the subject had read the instructions and asked any
questions he had, the computer file containing the information
on the words in the known condition was accessed. The subject
was asked to press the DOC PAGE key and the word EXAMPLE came
up on the screen. The subject was told that the first word was
an example just to give practice. This example was seen in the
order: genus, differentia and association. The subject was
asked to press the same key again, the next page then came up
on the screen with the first item of information typed at the
bottom left of the page (all information appeared In this
position) in the form given at 5. The subject noted his guess
and confidence on the answer sheet. He then pressed the key
again and received the second cue in the same format. Subjects
had no trouble completing the example. When the example had
been completed, the prompt NEW WORD In reverse (highlighted)
came up when the DOC PAGE key was pressed. The subject was
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told that this prompt would appear each time he had completed a
word. The subject was also told that the prompt THE END would
5. To ______
This is to make a copy
appear when he had completed the experiment. He was then to
call me since there was a second section to the experiment. I
then left the room.
When the subject called, I returned and gave the subject
a new answer sheet for the unknown targets. The instructions
are given at 6.
6. You will see a number of items of information describing
an infrequent English word. Can you guess what it is? Do
this by adding a piece of information which you think fits the
word to the item of information you will see on the screen.
Note down your guess and your confidence in it at each step.
Measure your confidence on a scale from 0 to 6. 0 = no
confidence, 6 = maximum confidence.
The response of subjects to these instructions was: "What do
you mean by add?" I asked them to wait for the example. The
first cue to appear is at 7. If a subject still had
difficulty, I urged him to try, but if there was still
difficulty I gave the prompt: How help to grow? This seemed to
solve the problem. If a subject asked for help on the second
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cue I simply told them to go ahead and try. 	 The unknown
meaning condition then proceeded in the same way as the
7. To losk
This is to help to grow
known. All the subjects were able to carry out the experiment
under these conditions. For the second subject the known and
unknown conditions were reversed and so on.
There is an element of clumsiness in these instructions.
If a subject sees, for example, a genus, he might add a
differentia. When he sees the correct differentia, he will
then have to abandon his guess and accept the differentia he is
given. He will also need to add something, probably an
association now. He will then see another association and must
add something again, most probably another association.
Also note that we are not just talking of a complex
hypothesis consisting only of the two hypotheses of genus and
differentia, but we see the complex hypothesis in this instance
as something being constantly added to. Both these views of
the complex hypothesis are relevant to real life. The first is
relevant to how we might build up lexical entries in our
memory. The second is relevant to how we might go on and build
up encyclopaedic entries.
Scorin: The dependent variable of confidence was scored
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on a scale from 0 to 6. The reasons for adopting this scale
are given in Chapter 2. On the surface this looks like an
interval scale and for practical purposes will be treated as
such. But we have no guarantee that the interval between 0 and
1 confidence is the same as that between 5 and 6. 	 Aspects of
this scale, at least are ordinal, 1 simply being higher than 0,
2 simply being higher than 1. Also, different subjects might
not attach the same value to a score.
	
One might view 3 as
highish confidence another as lowish. So we could have a
situation where a score of 3 for one subject might be higher
than a score of 4 given by a different subject. In practical
terms little can be done about this and I would hope that any
confidence trend within subjects would be strong enough to bury
this between subject variation. 	 Subjects' responses are
recorded in Appendix 1.
Apparatus: The computer used in this experiment was an
Amstrad 9512 word processor.
There was a problem presenting cues to the subjects on
the computer. When a subject saw the second cue, the first
cue was no longer present. So on two amounts of information a
subject did not see, for example: This is to worship and This
is done in a frenzy but only This is done in a frenzy. ie. cues
one and two were not present together. 	 Similarly, when a
subject saw the third cue, cues one and two were no longer
available.	 This meant that subjects had the extra burden of
trying to recall the first cue on two amounts of information
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and the first and second cues on three amounts. The reason for
this was that if one typed three cues at the bottom of the
page, then when a subject pressed the DOC PAGE key and the page
scrolled up, some of the old information was now displayed at
the top of the page together with the new information at the
bottom. An attempt was made to write a programme in BASIC to
present cues, but the version of this language used in the
Amstrad does not appear to have a straightforward command to
clear the screen and cues were always presented in the
environment of the programme itself
Experiment Design:	 The experiment design is one of
repeated measures. Each subject performed In the known and
unknown meaning condition, each subject saw all three amounts
of Information and each subject saw all the orders- though on
different targets. The design can also be termed factorial
since we have more than one Independent variable with different
levels on each: meaning x 2, information x 3, order x 6.
We should also note that the experiment is small and this
has serious consequences for the order variable. We have six
orders and each of the six subjects saw each order twice- once
in the known meaning condition and once for unknown meanings.
This means we have only twelve responses on each order to
discriminate between six orders. It really isn't powerful
enough and the variance Is probably going to obscure any
possible result.
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Results and Discussion
Three ANOVA tests were run on each dependent variable
using the SPSSX package on the university mainframe computer.
ANOVA 1 looked at the effect for the three amounts of
information, order and the interaction of information by order
for known meanings.
ANOVA 2 looked at the same factors but with relevance to
unknown meanings.
ANOVA 3 combined both sets of data used in ANOVAS 1 and 2
and looked at the effects for known and unknown meanings, the
three amounts of information, order and any possible
interactions.
One further point is that the Nauchly Sphericity test
which SPSSX computes automatically where there are more than
two levels on a repeated measures independent variable often
reaches significance. This test assesses similarity of
variance. On, for example, the three levels of information the
means could turn out to be significantly different- in fact we
are hoping that this happens. But the variance about each mean
should be similar for each amount; this being because they are
amounts of the same thing, namely confidence. What has
happened if the Mauchly Sphericity test reaches significance is
that the variances about each amount of information are
significantly different and that rather than treat our
differing amounts of information as three levels of the same
independent variable it is safer to treat them for statistical
purposes as three separate independent variables.
	
All this
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means in practical terms is that where this test reaches
significance, we take the multivariate ANOVA results and not
the univariate. This protects against any significant
differences being caused by differences in variance rather than
differences in means.
Also, in terms of multivarlate tests, SPSSX uses three:
Pillais, Hotellings and Wilks. Since their results were always
in agreement, I will simply quote a result once using the
heading multivarlate. Where an independent variable has three
or more levels but the Nauchly Sphericlty test is not
significant I will use the heading univariate. Where an
independent variable has only two levels the result is always
univariate and I will use no heading.
	 I will also give the
Mauchly Sphericity result whenever there are three or more
levels by stating Mauchly =. The vale for F and the
significance of F will always be stated. Means will also be
given if a result reaches significance. Whenever means are
larger than the original scale used. to measure the dependent
variable in any experiment they will always be reduced back to
the original scale in this case 0-6 for clarity of
presentation. Not all possible results will be given. This
applies to the more detailed interactions which sometimes don't
figure in the discussion. That is, only relevant results and
not every single result I obtained will be given. Results
which reach the 0.05 level of significance will be marked with
a single asterisk, those that reach 0.01 with a double
asterisk.
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Also, where the Mauchly sphericity test reaches
significance it will clearly be worth looking at the
differences between standard deviations as well as means. I
won't do this consistently but just where there Is something
interesting happening. Where standard deviations are given a
heading standard deviation will appear. One final point. For
convenience, it will often be necessary to use a shorthand for
referring to the different orders. Here the letters abc will
be used:
Genus	 a
Differentia = b
Association = c
so the order of: genus, differentia, association will be abc
and so on. The above policy applies to the remainder of the
thesis.
Results:
ANOVA 1 Known meanings
Result 1: INFORMATION x 3
Mauchly .008 **
Nultivariate	 F= 9.295 Sig of F .031 *
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
2.472	 3.278	 4.500
Standard Deviation
1.980	 1.611	 1.486
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Result 2: ORDER x 6
Mauchly .826
Univariate	 F= 1.41 Sig of F= .256
(Computer warning: too few degrees of freedom)
ANOVA 2 Unknown meanings
Result 3: INFORMATION x 3
Mauchly.017 *
Multivariate	 F 7.530 Sig of F= .044 *
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
1.195	 2.083	 3.389
Standard Deviation
1.437	 1.630	 1.956
Result 4: ORDER x 6
Mauchly .119
Univariate	 F= .28 Sig of F= .922
ANOVA 3 Known and unknown meanings combined
Result 5: MEANINGS x 2
F= 5.28 SIg of F= .070
Result 6: INFORMATION x 3
Mauchly .051
Univariate	 F= 26.52 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
1.834	 2.681	 3.945
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Result 7: MEANING by INFORMATION
Mauchly .004 *
Multivariate	 F= .045 Sig of F= .956
Result 8: ORDER x 6
Mauchly= .000 **
Multivariate	 F= 1134.905 Sig of F = .023 *
Means
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
2.917	 2.833	 3.000	 2.917	 2.445	 2.806
(Comment: The equivalent univariate result carried
a warning that there were too few degrees of freedom. This
result was clearly not significant at .822).
Confidence discussion:
We see at Result 6 that confidence increases
significantly as information increases. This is much as we
expected in prediction 2b. More interesting is the possibility
that known and unknown meanings show different rates of
increase. Result 1, significance of F= .031, shows that there
is a significant difference between the information means on
the known targets and Result 3, significance of F= .044, shows
the same for the unknowns. The means are displayed on graph 1.
Looking at graph 1, we can see that confidence is in fact
consistently lower across information for unknown meanings as
opposed to known meanings. It looks as though prediction 2c
might be correct.	 Unfortunately, Result 5 shows that there
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S
Un know,	 5
Is no significant difference between known and unknown meanings
in terms of the overall confidence they generate so prediction
Graph 1
Confidences Meaning x Info
2	 3
Amount of Info
2a fails. This in fact suggests that the two lines on graph 1
could be interchangeable. 	 However, result 5 is not that far
off significance, F= .070 especially since we have so few
subjects, and it could be that we have a foundation to build on
here.	 In a more powerful experiment we might find a real
difference between known and unknown meanings so confirming the
first part of prediction 2c Result 5 is suggestive and though
not significant it is in accordance with predictions. 	 Also
Result 7 shows no interaction between the two meaning
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conditions across information. We might have expected one from
what was said In the second part of prediction 2c. The gap
between known and unknown meanings does appear to be closing on
cue 3 and again it might be a case of too few subjects.
Confidence increases apparently as information increases.
Let's begin by describing what happens in terms of known
meanings.
Cues and responses are given for subject 1 word 4 at 8
below in the order bca. Subject 1 sees the first cue, comes up
with the hypothesis chew which appears to fit the information,
and gives It a confidence of 3. Cue 2 seems to fit this
hypothesis which is retained and confidence rises. The third
8.	 Cues	 Responses	 Confidence
b) This Is done by taking 	 chew
	
3
something into the mouth
c) Food sometimes has this	 chew	 4
done to It
a) This Is to discriminate 	 taste	 6
cue then comes in. He now changes his hypothesis from chew to
taste, but confidence continues to rise despite this change.
The reason for this seems to be that although cue 8a) forces a
change, cues 8b and c) are still appropriate. It's a question
of putting the cues together rather than rejecting one or more.
There's nothing new in such a description. Peterson and PItz
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(1988) say something very similar. The moral is that if
information is used and it is consistent then confidence goes
up. Subject's may use it "wrongly", but they won't know this.
If they think it is relevant they will 	 probably use it so
increasing confidence.	 The basis on which subjects combine
cues is that they fall into familiar and recognizable
relationships with each other. If cues are used "wrongly" then
a subject has mistaken the relationship between them, but this
is infrequent. The reader, however, should not get the idea
that this is some kind of perfect system. There are factors
which interfere. Look at the responses of subject 5,
particularly at target 5. He starts off very overconfident and
even though he's using information decides to reduce his
confidence and be a little more cautious.
If we turn now to confidence for the unknown meanings,
then confidence also rises, but it appears to do so at a lower
level than for the known meanings. It's worth pausing here
to look at the responses for unknown meanings and to note how
they differ from those for the knowns. Any speculation
concerning this contrast must be taken very tentatively since
we don't have significant difference at Result 5 to support the
points made.
If we look at target 4, To hersk, for subject 2 the cues
in the order this subject saw them and the responses are given
at 9. Here the subject seems to be behaving in the way we
expected. A possible genus is added to cue 1, which is the
differentia.	 On cue 2 when the correct genus is given this
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genus guess on cue 1 is seen as erroneous and is rejected. We
can see that the correct genus is held now as it shows up in
the response at cue 2 as carry. The idea of 
.22! is added and
looks like an association. At the third cue an additional
association is added. It seems we have a complex hypothesis:
To carry something on the head. Usually done to pots of water.
9.	 Response Confidence
hit
	
1
carry large	 2
pots
of water
	 4
b) This is done on the
head
a) This is to carry
c) African women sometimes
do this
Confidence is rising, but the way in which the hypothesis is
seen as incomplete at cue 1 and then suspicion of the
combination on cue 2 leads to a lower rise as compared with the
known meaning at 8. This might might lead ultimately to an
overall difference between the meaning conditions on a more
powerful experiment. Note also that the gap between meaning
conditions is at it's widest at the first cue and closes slowly
but consistently at successive cues (See graph 1). Perhaps as
hypotheses are added, particularly associations, our growing
understanding of the concept negates the effect of suspicion.
There might be the basis for an interaction of meaning by
information here though the the way In which this result does
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not come at all near significance in this study suggests that
we would need a very powerful experiment to test whether or not
such an effect might occur.
However, things are not this simple. On the third and
final cue we have a total of thirty six responses and of these
approximately sixteen, slightly less than half, could possibly
be taken as single, familiar word hypotheses used as a synonym
for the target and not complex hypotheses despite the fact that
I've tried to force subjects into complex hypotheses. I use
the word "possibly" here since it is not always easy to
determine whether a single word is part of an "adding" response
and so represents a complex hypothesis or whether it is a
lexical common denominator between cues ie. a single word
hypothesis. Subjects are, however, to some extent applying
the process of guessing known meanings to the guessing of
unknown meanings despite my attempts to block this.
Let's just look at a few examples of these possible
single word responses. Subject 1 gives the responses at 10 on
target 1, To mutle. Here we can see confidence rise and then
fall. The subject seems to be aware that he is forcing the
cues together to generate a single known word. If, however, we
look at the same subject's responses on target 4 given at 11,
we see that confidence rises with information. It is this
pattern of rising confidence which seems most frequent amongst
what seem to be single word responses. The subject is deceived
and has found what he thinks to be a good single word common
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denominator between the cues.
There is the possibility I mentioned that the subject is
10.	 Response
	 Confidence
c) Handicapped people sometimes
do this
b) This is done because one
can't use one's hands
a) This is to use one's feet
lie
b) This is done on the head
c) African women sometimes
do this
a) This is to carry
Drop
Tumble
Grasp
Response
Groom
Plat
Balance
0
2
0
Confidence
0
1
3
adding an hypothesis but simply using a single word to do so.
I	 suspect that this might be the case in some of these single
word responses but it is not at all easy to tell. With 11 we'd
expect balancing not balance at ha) as an abbreviation of
balancing if the response had been added to this cue. On the
other hand balance might have been added to cue llb) as balance
on the head.
So, jt t S not always easy to Interpret whether a single
word response is an addition ie. a complex hypothesis or a
common denominator le. a single hypothesis. 	 It must be
admitted that there are single word responses present in the
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unknown condition despite my attempt to block them. So we have
to be very cautious of the difference between the two
confidence lines on graph 1 since we are not getting uniform
contrast between single word hypotheses on knowns and complex
hypotheses on unknowns. We could try and extract all the
complex and single word hypotheses and analyse them
Independently but since it's not easy to discriminate between
them I won't do this.
Could it be these single word responses on unknown
meanings which are causing the unknown meaning line to rise
more slowly than the known on graph 1? As I've mentioned, the
trend on this single word response type is for .ottfidet.e to
rise with information. I find this rising confidence as seen
at 11 suspicious. If subjects were simply giving a single word
hypothesis then they should run into trouble and realise that
they are forcing the cues so confidence should stay static. So
the adding instruction is probably having some kind of
beneficial effect on confidence where single word hypotheses
are constructed. Perhaps at 11 the target could have been
better constructed since balance is a fairly reasonable single
word response. So the target might be at fault. But we do,
however, get a response like usury to target 6 on cue 3: This
is to Invest against the law. The Mafia do this sometimes. The
subject should see that this response is not really a good fit
since usury is not really thought of as a form of investment.
Yet confidence rises across information here as with 11. Other
subjects give single word answers like extort or blackmail on
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this target at cue 3 which are even worse fits than usury.
Subjects should see this but these responses still exhibit a
rising confidence. It could be that when subjects are giving
single word responses on unknown targets, they are interpreting
the adding Instruction as "add cues together as best you can"
and this might tend to mitigate the difficulty Involved in
forcing the cues together. It might also be that this does
not completely mitigate the problem and forming single word
hypotheses involves a bit more of a struggle on the unknowns as
opposed to the knowns, So confidence is held back on the
unknowns across information in comparison to the nowns 'but
with this being due to the formation of single word hypotheses
on the unknowns.
It is possible that the above accounts in part for the
contrast on Graph 1 on cues 2 and 3. But not on cue 1. If
subjects were giving single word hypotheses here then one would
expect confidence for knowns and unknowns to start at pretty
much the same point on cue 1 since there would be no difficulty
in giving a single word guess here on the unknowns. On cue 1,
the perception of the hypothesis as Incomplete must be
undermining confidence. What happens on subsequent cues is
that subjects sometimes go on to form complex hypotheses. On
other Instances having encountered a problem with
incompleteness on cue 1 and then a second problem In terms of
suspicion on cue 2 they abandon the idea of complex hypotheses
and go for single word hypotheses.
Remember also that this is a somewhat artificial
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situation in that an attempt has been made to force subjects
into forming new meanings. In that we do tend to see
incompleteness on cue 1 and to some extent suspicion on cue 3
undermine confidence, I suspect that In real life subjects
might well avoid the building of new meanings and go for single
word hypotheses. We do see this happen to an extent In this
experiment which is favourable to the formation of new
meanings.	 We also have an useful indicator for future
experiments at cue 1. If pseudowords cause subjects to view
hypotheses as incomplete we can expect a substantial reduction
(about 50%) in confidence in comparison to the comparable known
meaning/doze situation. If they simply replace the pseudoword
with a synonym then there should be no such reduction.
It is also interesting to look at the standard deviations
for both meaning conditions across Information.
For known meanings Result 1 shows a significant
difference and the standard deviation is quite large on cue I
but progressively reduces on the other two cues. Variations in
confidence seem to decrease across information. Probably what
happens on cue 1 is that there is a lot of disagreement between
subjects. Some are very confident, others less so. As
information increases, there Is more consensus.
For unknown meanings, Result 3, the standard deviation is
lower on cue 1 in comparison to the standard deviation on that
cue for known meanings. Possibly, the effect of viewing the
hypothesis as incomplete at this point not only reduces
confidence but makes subjects who might normally be very
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confident, very cautious. Possibly, lower confidence subjects
are not so drastically affected and so there is more agreement.
Noticeably, however, variation increases with information here
in contrast to known meanings. We have noted that on unknown
meanings, single word responses occur as well as complex
hypotheses. These differing responses might well create
differing levels of confidence so accounting for the increase
in variation.
With respect to order. There is only one order result
that we need to pay attention to, this being Result 8 where the
significance of F= .023 and suggests that one or more of the
orders is significantly different from the others but only in
the situation where known and unknown meanings are combined.
If we look at the means at Result 8. I don't think we need
dwell on this. Given we have only twelve scores to distinguish
six orders, what we have is a chance result. The equivalent
univariate result was not significant and there was a computer
warning about too few degrees of freedom. Apart from this, I
can't offer an explanation of why cab should stand out as a bit
lower. A c first sequence may be less powerful than the others
since this cue is not part of the definition. But then cba
should also be weak which not the case.
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Experiment 2
Introduction
Purpose of Experiment: This experiment deals with uncertainty
rather than confidence as a dependent variable. I intend to
contrast the two situations of guessing known meanings and
unknown meanings across amounts of information and In terms of
orders as represented in Experiment 1. I would make the
following predictions at 12 based on the model in Chapter 4.
12. a) Uncertainty will decline across information for known
meanings.
b) Uncertainty should remain static across information for
unknown meanings.
c) There will be no effect for order.
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except in the
following details.
Method
Subjects: The subjects used on Experiment 2 were different
from those on Experiment 1, but from a similar background.
Four were PGCE students at St. Mary's College, Bangor, one was
an MA student doing Applied Linguistics at the university and
one was an university employee working In the canteen.
Task:	 The instructions which were given to subjects for the
known meaning condition are at 13. The instructions for the
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unknown meaning condition are at 14. The tasks involving the
description of uncertainty described at 13 and 14 were made to
parallel their confidence equivalents with respect to known and
unknown meanings as much as possible.
13. You will see a number of items of information on a word
in English. When you see an item of information, try and think
of as many words as you can that this item of information
describes, Don't add up all the words you can think of.
Measure them like this at each step.
A=0
B = 1 or 2
C = 3 or 4
D = 5 or 6
E = 7 or 8
F = 9 or 10
G = more than 10
14. You will see a number of Items of Information which
describe an unfamiliar word In English. When you see an Item
of information, try and think of anything you could add to it
which might describe the word. Give me a rough idea of the
number of alternative items you could add by using the
following scale. (The scale at 13 was repeated here).
Scoring: The letters A-G given at 9 were converted to
uncertainty scores by making A=0, B1...G=6. We, therefore end
up with a scale from 0-6 just as for confidence and the
comments I made concerning confidence on Experiment 1 would
also hold here.
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The general criticisms I made of Experiment I also hold
here.
Results and Discussion
ANOVA 1 Known Meanings
RESULT 9: INFORMATION x 3
Mauchly .549
Univariate	 F 5.84 F .021 *
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
2.278	 1.722	 1.334
RESULT 10: ORDER x 6
Mauchly = . 866
Univariate	 F= .63 SIg of F= .680
(Computer warning: too few degrees of freedom)
ANOVA 2 Unknown Meanings
RESULT 11: INFORMATION x 3
Mauchly= .649
Univariate	 F= 1.73 Sig of F= .227
RESULT 12: ORDER x 6
Mauchly= .118
Univariate	 F= 1.30 Sig of F= .294
(Computer warning: too few degrees of freedom)
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ANOVA 3 Known and Unknown Meanings Combined
RESULT 13: MEANINGS x 2
F= .95 Sig of F= .375
Result 14: INFORMATION x 3
Mauchly= .057
Univariate	 F= 1.20 Sig of F= .342
RESULT 15: ORDER x 6
Mauchly= .389
Univariate	 F= 1.36 Sig of F= .271
(Computer warning: too few degrees of freedom)
Result 16: MEANING by INFORMATION
Mauchly .418
Univariate	 F= 9.08 Sig of F =.O06 **
Means
1 amount
	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Knowns
	 2.278	 1.722	 1.334
Unknowns	 1.389	 1.361	 1.778
Uncertainty Discussion
In terms of the combined data for known and unknown
meanings, Result 14 shows there is no significant difference
between the information means. Uncertainty seems to be static
across information. Similarly, there is no effect across
information for unknowns (see Result 11) but amount of
Information does reach significance in the known meaning
condition. Result 9 shows the significance of F to be .021.
This suggests the possibility of an Interaction and we do
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indeed get one. Result 16 where the significance of F= .006
shows that meaning and information interact. The means from
Result 16 are displayed on graph 2.
We can see that uncertainty in known meanings is falling
significantly across information (Result 9) and prediction 12a
is confirmed.	 In the unknown condition, although there Is a
slight rise at three amounts, uncertainty is essentially static
so prediction 12b does seem to work. The rise In uncertainty
on cue 3 should not be ignored though. 	 Result 13 also needs
to be noted here. Although known and unknown meanings interact
Graph 2
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across information, the amount of uncertainty generated by
known meanings is not significantly different from that
generated by unknown meanings (Result 13) at about 1.6 or 2 to
3 alternative responses
For the known targets uncertainty decreases. If we take
the three cues for target 2: This is to clean, Done with a
broom, Rooms sometimes have this done to them then each of
these cues in Isolation could generate a number of possible
hypotheses or individual uncertainty ranges as shown by all the
items recorded In each line at 15 a, b and c.
15.	 UNCERTAINTY RANGE
a) polish, wash, sweep, brush, scrub, dust
b) sweep, brush
c) decorate 'N sweep	 Vpaint
But the cues combine. At cue a) all the hypotheses lie within
the V of the uncertainty range. When cue b) combines with cue
a) the full range of hypotheses which could be generated by cue
b) are not considered. So items like fly at cue b) are not
considered and also Items like polish and wash from cue a) are
discarded. The uncertainty range at b) shrinks to sweep and
brush. In the same way cue c) combines with the other two and
the uncertainty range now shrinks to sweep as the only item
supported by the combination of these cues. What we have is
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not an expansion of the uncertainty range with each cue
contributing the total number of hypotheses that a subject can
think of, but a contraction across information based on the way
cues combine to lexicalise hypotheses until we come, hopefully,
to the situation where we have only one hypothesis within the
uncertainty range. Granted the representation at 15 may be
simplistic. We might fail to include a relevant hypothesis at
a), realise that this is the case at b) and discard the entire
uncertainty range at a). The principle of combination of cues
is the same though.
If we turn now to the unknown meaning line on graph 2,
three points emerge.
First, uncertainty on the unknown line is lower at cue 1
than for the knowns. (1 to 2 hypotheses as opposed to 3 to 4).
The reason that there is no overall difference between the two
meaning conditions is because uncertainty decreases quite
rapidly for the knowns. There seems to be a degree of
difficulty in generating hypotheses in the unknown meaning
condition on cue I and also at cue 2 which is at the same level
as cue 1. Second, uncertainty is static at cues 1 and 2 for
unknowns.	 Third uncertainty appears to increase slightly at
cue 3 for the unknowns.
What might be causing difficulty on the unknowns? With
unknown meanings the instruction is to describe a target by
recording the number of hypotheses which could be added at each
cue. When a subject sees a cue like This is to invest and is
asked to add an hypotheses to it then in theory the
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possibilities are unlimited. One could add just about anything.
We can invest aggressively, in stocks, on Monday mornings etc.
Whilst in theory the possibilities are limitless, in reality
"anything" may not be too far removed from "nothing" and faced
with a wide range of possibilities subjects tend to be very
conservative ie. the processing effort is prohibitive.
Another possibility is that with known meanings we are
recovering hypotheses from the lexicon but that with building
new meanings we need to obtain more propositional information
from the encyclopaedia or store of general knowledge. It could
be that the latter is more difficult than the former. There is
discussion as to whether one can divide the memory In to
categories like lexicon and encyclopaedia: see Sperber and
Wilson (1986 p.88). Given that we can, the lexicon would not
only be smaller than the encyclopaedia but might also be better
organised. Altchison (1987 chpt.7) describes research on the
idea of words organised in semantic fields ie. words with
similar meanings lie close together. This seems ideally suited
to the generation of uncertainty. A meaning cue would lead
directly into a number of closely grouped hypotheses. The
organisation of the encyclopaedia may be based on schema. But
one may need to search through a number of schema such as
stocks and shares, property, criminal Investment etc. to get
hypotheses and this takes more effort than accessing the
lexicon.
Second, why is uncertainty static on cues 1 and 2? This
is accounted for in the model. 	 Subjects access a new
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uncertainty distribution each time a cue is given.
Third, why does uncertainty rise for the unknowns at cue
3? The answer here must be that hypotheses from the
uncertainty range of one cue are being added to those of
another. What can we say about adding.
I have pointed out in Chapter 3 that it is unlikely that
we would add genuses generated by one cue to differentias
generated by a second. We'd select one such hypothesis before
looking for the second. Also we can't be adding a genus from
the uncertainty distribution of one cue to a genus in the
uncertainty distribution of a second cue. The same applies to
the differentia. This is obvious because we only give one
genus cue and one differentla cue. We'd have to give two cues
on each meaning component for this to happen and they would
probably have to be inconsistent. We could get this In real
life though. If such cues were consistent then uncertainty
would reduce as with known meanings. If they were Inconsistent
it might expand with information but this doesn't apply here.
By default we come to associations, and It must be these
hypotheses which are added. This seems reasonable. Words have
only one genus or one differentia (though we might argue that
they are made up of a variety of components) but they have
lot's of associations. Also, the various meaning cues might
suggest some associations which might then be added together.
Let's take target 6 as an example. The cues are given
at 16.
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16. a) This is to invest
b) This is done against the law
c) The Mafia sometimes do this
The subjects in Experiment 2 did not note down their guesses,
but we can see from the confidence responses what is happening
to uncertainty. This is shown at 17 and I've based this
roughly on the responses of Subject 2.
At 17a, cue 1, the subject gets a genus and seems to try
to add a differentia time. This single hypothesis may probably
be the only one he can think of. This guess has been made on
the basis of the genus cue though and not the differentia.
When Cue b) comes Into play, it gives the correct differentia
which the subject probably recognises and so the previous guess
time is probably eliminated. This is the only item of
information the subject has relevant to the differentia so he
must eliminate any previous guess. We don't add differentia to
differentia in this context. Also, uncertainty doesn't
17. UNCERTAINTY RANGE
a) / time
b) /'in prostitution'NN
c) 77prostitution, gamblin
increase by the adding of differentia to genus. A genus has
been selected and uncertainty no longer exists with respect to
this cue. The subject does appear to think of an association
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at this point: in prostitution. Again, graph 2 suggests that
this might be the only hypothesis in the uncertainty range at
this point. The third cue gives him another chance at an
association. Again he seems only to think of one In gambling
but this is added to the previous association sending
uncertainty up to 2. It is probably this build up of
associations which is the cause of the rise in uncertainty on
cue 3. If we gave another cue he would probably add another
association.
Note also that we do not need associations in last place
in the sequence for this to happen. If they come initially
they would act as cues to the core. Once the core Is in place
whatever cue comes at position 3 would probably generate some
associations
I'll illustrate expanding uncertainty on unknowns with an
example at 18.
18. Dale, seated on the edge of her plyochair pointed in the
direction of the control panels. "How serious is it Flash?"
The genus Is clearly chair so uncertainty is 1. As a
differentia, I thought plastic or flexible. Realised I'd made
a mistake on the morphology with plastic so rejected this and
took flexible. Uncertainty is 1 agaIn. I didn't want to add
the genus to the differentia to give an uncertainty of 2. Then
I saw control panels and started adding associations like:
flexible in order to reach controls, high tech, made of
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advanced plastic etc. What we seem to see is a fairly static
uncertainty as the lexical component of the complex hypothesis
is built up and then an expansion as the encyclopaedic
component is turned to. Perhaps the expansion is part of a
need to tie the new hypothesis in with other relevant schematic
representations of knowledge.
Finally, with respect to order.
	
No significant results
emerged on the order variable. 	 Given the low power of the
experiment we can't draw conclusions either way
General Conclusion
In these experiments I think that we have been able to
produce a fairly reasonable picture of what might happen when
guessing known meanings in terms of both confidence and
uncertainty. As to unknown meanings, two points do, I think,
stand out. Uncertainty does appear to remain static then
starts to rise across information. It seems to be associations
ie. the encyclopaedic part of the complex hypothesis which
involves this rise. Confidence also appears to rise but seems
to do so more slowly for unknown meanings as opposed to known
meanings. So there is difficulty In constructing new meanings
even in this situation which is favourable. Also, even in a
situation on unknowns which is favourable, perhaps artificially
so, to the guessing of complex hypotheses through the use of
the instruction to add hypotheses to a cue, subjects seem to
some extent to form single word hypotheses. That is to say,
they use the process for guessing known meanings when in fact
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they are in the unknown meaning position. Probably, the
problem of incompleteness followed by the problem of suspicion
ie. one problem after another in complex hypothesis formation
proves too much and they go for a single word.
With respect to the order variable, the experiments were
really not powerful enough to show anything of interest.
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Chapter 5
Using the Ruler Part 1
In terms of contents, this chapter deals with the setting
up and results of Experiment 3.
	 Chapter 6 discusses these
results and Chapter 7 pursues a correlational analysis of the
same data.
Experiment 3
Introduction
Purpose of the experiment: In this experiment, I intend
to look at the effect of the independent variables meaning
(known and unknown), amount of information (3 cues), order (6),
form (doze space and pseudoword) and part of speech (noun and
verb) on the dependent variables of confidence, accuracy and
uncertainty.
In the last two experiments, we saw that there are some
grounds for suggesting that the guessing of known and unknown
meanings differ. However, a somewhat artificial and "clumsy"
instruction format was used for the unknowns where subjects
were told to add hypotheses together. Here I want to abandon
this instruction and put both known and unknown meanings on the
same footing by telling subjects to simply to "guess" in both
conditions. Since in Experiment 1, subjects still lexicalised
unknown meaning targets and gave single word hypotheses to a
degree despite this "adding" instruction, I would expect the
-150-
removal of this instruction to make single word hypotheses the
dominant response type on unknown meanings. We must take this
into account when making predictions. Also we shouldn' have
such a severe problem with variety of responses.
Also, when subjects used single word hypotheses on
unknown meanings in Experiment 1, two points emerged. First,
subjects forced cues together. 	 The strategy of abandoning
information was not present. Secondly, confidence seemed to
rise despite this forcing. The first result might be caused by
the "adding" instruction in the sense that it encourages
subjects to think that a hypothesis is possible and keeps them
using information. The second result might also be a
consequence of this instruction since it might distract
subjects from the sense of inconsistency which should be the
consequence of building up single word hypotheses in the
unknown condition. They interpret this instruction as "add
cues together as best you can". My opinion is that we will noe
see more in the way of abandoning information and where both
this strategy and forcing cues together are used to form single
word hypotheses on the unknown meanings, confidence will
suffer.
One final point worth making here is that the experiment
was in four parts and Involved subjects returning once a week
for four weeks to sit each part. I'll give details of this
later.
Predictions: Bearing in mind the above points concerning
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lexicalisation of unknown meanings, I would make the following
predictions based on the model.
1.	 Confidence
a. There will be a significant interaction between known and
unknown meanings across information. Confidence will increase
for known meanings but it will remain static for unknown
meanings.
b. There will not be a significant difference overall between
doze gap and pseudoword. Subjects will simply substitute a
known word for the pseudoword rather than see the hypothesis as
incomplete. This factor of form should also not play a role in
any Interactions.
c. Noun targets should generate more confidence than verb
targets due to the verb association cues enforcing selection
restrictions on noun targets. This difference should occur
equally well in both meaning conditions and across information
so no interactions are expected.
d. There will be no significant effects for order. This
prediction Is made for convenience as I have decided to await
the results of experiments.
2.	 Accuracy
Predictions for accuracy are identical to those for confidence
so predictions I a, b, c and d should be seen as repeated here
as 2 a, b, c and d.
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3.	 Uncertainty
(Measured in terms of changing guesses)
a. There should be a significant interaction between known and
unknown meanings across information. In the model, I predicted
uncertainty would fall across information for known meanings.
For unknown meanings there will be a mixture of holding and
fairly large scale changes as a response to difficulty and thiR
should leave uncertainty fairly static.
b. There will not be a significant difference overall between
doze gap and pseudoword. This factor of form should also not
play a role in any interactions.
c. Noun targets should produce less uncertainty than verb
targets. This is simply the reverse of prediction ic.
d. There should be no significant effects for order.
Method
Cases:	 Forty six subjects sat the experiment.
Approximately thirty were undergraduates from the Linguistics
Department at the University. The remainder were post
graduates attending either MA courses in the same department or
the PGCE course at the College of Education. There is an age
disparity in that whilst most subjects were between twenty to
thirty years of age, two were in their forties and one in his
fifties. Still, we have a fairly homogeneous sample in that we
can say all are native speaker adults who have been successful
In terms of the educational system.
I recruited subjects by going to the various lectures and
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asking for volunteers. When a subject volunteered, we
arranged a time on which he would attend each week to sit the
four parts of the experiment. I also asked for a name to avoid
confusion in terms of timetabling. An assurance was given that
no names would be retained.
Of the forty six subjects who started the experiment
forty one completed It. Given that subjects had to return once
every week for four weeks this, I would suggest, is quite a low
drop out rate. Also it shows a high level of commitment. One
subject who dropped out did not seem to be terribly happy doing
the experiment so I immediately let this subject go after he
had expressed a wish not to continue. The others were caught
by timetable changes since this experiment took place at the
beginning of the first term. All turned up and asked to be
rescheduled. Unfortunately, since the room I was using had
other commitments and since I'd had to reschedule about six
other subjects for the same reason it became impossible to fit
these in and they had to be let go. All these subjects
completed at least one section of the experiment, but the data
was unuseable since the ANOVA programme ignores incomplete
results.
Independent variables: 	 The independent variable of
meaning was dealt with in exactly the same way as in previous
experiments.	 A known meaning was a familiar combination of
genus, differentia and association and an unknown meaning was
an unfamiliar combination of these elements.
	 By now I'd
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developed an item bank of such targets and had been trying them
out on friends fairly persistently. 	 I chose the targets for
this experiment on the basis of these trials. The factors
influencing the choice of known meanings was that the meaning
components were reasonably clear to subjects and that factors
like polysemy or ambiguity didn't create problems. I doubt if
it's possible to remove potential polysemy completely. What I
was looking for was whether it would confuse subjects or send
them In the wrong direction. In other words, the targets I
selected were those which seemed to lead fairly consistently to
the guess I hypothesised they should make, With the unknowns,
I was likewise concerned with polysemy. I also asked whether
these meaning components could be represented by a single word.
Any target where there was a tendency for this to happen was
rejected.	 Phil Scholfield kindly also reviewed targets with
this respect to this point. Twenty four such targets were
selected In all, twelve knowns and twelve unknowns. They were,
somewhat subjectively, the "best" twenty four.
The independent variable of amount of information was
also dealt with in the same way as Experiment 1. The genus,
differentia and association were given as cues and In seeing
one of these cues a subject got one amount of information, two
gave two amounts and three, three amounts. These cues were
given directly and no attempt to camouflage or give them
indirectly was made. Also, all cues point consistently to a
know meaning or in the case of unknown meanings, to a new
meaning.
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A criticism is that subjects would quickly understand
that they will get no more nor less than three cues. In real
life one could not make this assumption that there would always
be a fixed number of cues. It is possible that a subject's
guess on cue 1 might be coloured by this knowledge that more
cues are to come and he might be conservative perhaps in his
confidence.
The independent variable order consisted of six orders
based on all the possible combinations of the three cue types:
genus, differentia and association.
A criticism is that we are forcing subjects to operate in
all six orders. In real life, a subject might select only one
order or perhaps not all the cue types will be present.
Another criticism is the way that we present information
is reminiscent of how teachers used to set mathematical
problems. Every item of Information we give will be seen as
relevant by subjects. Whilst this clearly distances the
experiment from real reading, It is essential if we are to
retain control over the number of cues used by subjects and
their order of exploitation.
The Independent variable of form involves either a doze
gap or pseudoword. Each time a subject saw a cue then above
this cue there either appeared a doze gap or pseudoword.
The independent variable of part of speech involved a
noun/verb distinction. For nouns, the pseudoword or doze was
preceded be an indefinite article except where it was
uncountable, for verbs by an infinitive. The noun genus was
-156-
marked by the phrase This is a kind of. The verb genus by This
is to. The association for the nouns was verbal and so tended
to	 carry	 a	 selection	 restriction	 (intra	 selectional
collocation) and for the verbs was nominal and so didn't carry
a selection restriction (extra selectional collocation).
In order to make this more concrete for the reader, I've
given some examples at 4.
4. A) Known meaning	 B) Unknown meaning
To_______	 A flen
a) This is to walk
b) This is done in a
measured or regular
fashion
c) Soldiers usually do this
This is a kind of holiday
This follows a divorce
This is usually looked
forward to
Also, it was necessary to take precautions to control for
unwanted order and item specific effects and ensure subjects
worked on any given target only once. There were twenty four
targets in all (see Appendix 2). The known and unknown meaning
combinations the reader is now familiar with. Twelve of the
targets were knowns, twelve unknowns. Six of the knowns were
nouns and cues were presented in the form shown at 4 A). Six
were verbs and cues were presented in the form shown at 4 B).
Unknowns were treated in exactly the same way. This gave a
total of twelve verbs, six knowns six unknowns and the same
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held for nouns. The twelve verbs were written down in the
sequence they were taken from the data bank, the first known
target being written first and the first unknown target
following it. The knowns and unknowns were then further
jumbled by using a table of random numbers to order them. This
removed the problem of subjects knowing that targets were
knowns or unknowns. All subjects saw the verb targets in this
sequence. Exactly the same thing was then done for the nouns.
So we have two groups of targets, one of twelve verbs and one
of twelve nouns.	 Each group contained six knowns and six
unknowns.	 Targets, in the sequence subjects saw them, are
given in Appendix 2. 	 Each group of targets was seen by
subjects in the pseudoword condition (see 4B). Here a
pseudoword appeared each time a subject saw a cue or
combination of cues. Each group of targets was seen in the
doze condition (see 4A) with a doze gap appearing above the
cues. I'll elaborate on this in the procedure section.
As to the Independent variable of order. Each subject
saw each of the six known verb targets in one of the orders.
Each subject saw each of six unknown verb targets in one of
the orders. So each subject saw all the orders twice, once for
known verbs and once for unknown verbs. Exactly the same thing
happened for the nouns. Also, whilst the first subject to
sit the experiment saw one known and one unknown target under
each order the second saw these targets under different orders.
This variation was repeated for the first six subjects so that
each known and each unknown target had been seen under each
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order. The same set of variations was repeated every block of
six subjects until I ran out of subjects. The sequence in
which subjects saw these orders is given in a grid in Appendix
2.	 Note also that each subject saw each order twice in the
verb condition. This was repeated twice more in the noun
condition and twice more in the cloze/pseudoword condition. So
each subject saw each order eight times. Given that there are
forty one subjects we now have 328 responses for each order.
This should give us enough power to distinguish between the six
orders if a difference does in fact exist. Also if we multiply
this figure by six for the six orders and by three for the
amounts of information we get a total of 5904 responses which
makes this a reasonably powerful experiment. The responses are
in Appendix 2.
Cues were presented to subjects on cards which were 5" by
3". (The computer used in Experiments 1 and 2 was abandoned as
a way of presenting information due to the difficulties
mentioned). These cards were constructed by typing out cues on
sheets of paper. These cues were then cut out and stuck on
cards. Cues were then covered with a strip of clear sticking
tape to protect them. Holes were punched in the edge of the
cards so that they could be placed in a file. When subjects
sat the experiment they were given a file containing a sequence
of cues and could turn over one card at a time. On the first
card they saw one cue. On the next, a second cue combined with
the first and on the third, a third cue combined with the first
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two.	 This removed the problem of subjects seeing the cues
singly at two and three amounts of information.
Procedure:	 The experiment was conducted in the same
sound proof room in the phonetics laboratory as the first two
experiments. The room could accommodate four subjects at a
time although the usual number to attend one sitting was three.
Occasionally, subjects came singly or in pairs especially where
they'd been rescheduled. When a group of subjects entered the
experiment room they were asked to sit at one of four desks.
On the desk they found a file, an answer sheet consisting of
four pages stapled together and a set of instructions. They
were first asked verbally to do the experiment individually and
not help each other. Since subjects seemed well motivated I
felt this was reasonably safe. Next they were asked to read
the instructions. The instructions are too long to give here
so they have been Included with the answer sheet in Appendix 2.
There were two sets of Instructions, one for the doze
condition and one for the pseudoword, and both asked subjects
to guess the meaning of the unknown word and write their guess,
either as a word or a phrase on the answer sheet together with
an estimate of their confidence on a scale from 0 to 6 as used
previously.	 The doze set of instructions drew attention to
the doze gap and the pseudoword set to the word form.
A criticism here is that in the pseudoword condition the
opening to the instructions read: "Guess the unknown word. You
will see a word followed by	 an item of Information. Look
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first at the word and then use the item of information to try
and guess It." My worry here Is that was that I was telling
subjects to guess words and not meanings of words and that this
might push them towards single word responses on unkowns.
Later in the instructions the option of giving an answer as a
phrase was made explicit and, looking forwards to the
experiment, this option was used to some extent so it was not
being ignored. Two subjects did pick up on this problem in the
instructions and point out that I'd asked them to guess a word
when there was a word form present in the pseudoword condition.
I asked them to finish reading the instructions and try the
examples. This seemed to remove the difficulty.
It's worth stopping for a moment to consider the task
required by these instructions. The option of being able to
use a phrase Is most important. Where there is a known
combination of genus, differentia and association covered by a
doze gap I would expect subjects to guess words as in
Experiment 1. Where a pseudoword intervenes a subject can
reject the single word option If he so chooses and simple write
down the genus, differentia and association to form a complex
hypothesis. This could occur in either meaning condition. If
the pseudoword fails to have an Influence and subjects begin by
guessing words, they might realise in the unknown condition
that the target can not be lexicalised and resort again to
noting down the genus, differentia and association as a complex
hypothesis.	 To try an clarify this point an example of a
possible phrasal answer was given using the format of genus and
-161-
differentia (see instructions).
Again, a criticism here is that writing down in the sense
of simply repeating the information subjects are given to
produce a phrasal answer might be seen by subjects as vacuous
and the need to actually do something with the Information
might push them into guessing single word hypotheses in the
unknown meaning condition. 	 In trials, some subjects were
prepared to repeat information. What tended to emerge,
however, was that subjects were still able to form complex
hypotheses by operating at a more specific level. If they saw
the cues This Is to worship, This is done in a frenzy they were
able to say something like: A religious dance with subjects In
a trance state due to drugs.	 It Is Important to note that
complex hypothesis formation Is still quite possible.
Subjects were now asked to write their names on the
answer sheets. They were told that this was necessary since
they would need to have the same sheet back on the next
occasion. An assurance was given that no names would be kept.
Subjects then opened their files and found a set of cards. To
understand what each subject saw look at 5. The first subject
saw twelve targets, six known and six unknowns, in the
Verb/Pseudoword condition. The other three subjects saw their
respective conditions at Part 1. There were two examples for
each part of speech condition. The first was a known meaning
and the second an unknown meaning. This was the same for all
subjects on all occasions. The first three cards subject 1 saw
are given at 6.	 Examples were always given In the order:
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genus, differentia, association. After subjects had completed
the two examples I left the room and subjects were left to work
at their own pace. Each time they turned a card they noted
their guess and confidence. The average time taken was about
thirty five minutes.
5. Key: Run = The set of orders a subject saw the targets
under. See the grid in Appendix 2.
S = Subject	 ps = pseudoword
V = Verb	 ci = doze
N = Noun	 P = Part. Subjects returned each
week to do a part.
P1	 P2	 P3	 P4
Si	 Run 1	 Vps	 Nps	 Vcl	 Nd
S2	 Run 2	 Nps	 Vps	 Nc!	 Vcl
S3	 Run 3	 Vcl	 Nd	 Vps	 Nps
S4	 Run 4	 Nc!	 Vci	 Nps	 Vps
S5	 Run 5	 Vps	 Nps	 Vcl	 Nc!
S6	 Run 6	 Nps	 Vps	 Nc!	 Vcl
S7	 Run 1	 Vci	 Nc!	 Vps	 Nps
S8	 Run 2	 Nc!	 Vc!	 Nps	 Vps
and so on until all subjects have sat the experiment. Note
that each subject sees a different run until each target has
been seen in all orders. This happens at subject seven which
comes back to run 1.
Incidentally, the first cue was always marked a) whether it
was genus, d.ifferentia or association. b) was always used for
the second cue and c) for the third. Subjects sat the
experiment in the cycle shown at 5 and it took one week to
-163-
process all forty six through Part 1.	 Subjects returned the
next week to do Part 2 and so on. When subjects returned for
Parts 3 and 4 they were seeing the same targets but in a doze
format if they had seen the targets previously in a pseudoword
6. Example 1 (card 1)
To rinip:
a) This is to make a copy
Example 1 (card 2)
To rimp:
a) This is to make a copy
b) This is done to ensure permanence
Example 1 (card 3)
To rimp:
a) This is to make a copy
b) This is done to ensure permanence
c) This is done to music sometimes
format and visa versa.	 A criticism here is that they might
have recalled some of the cues before they saw them so boosting
confidence.	 However,since this factor applies across all
conditions, one will not stand out as biased. 	 If a subject
could not carry on with the experiment this left a gap in the
cycle. No attempt was made to fill this gap as things were
already complex.	 It resulted in slightly unequal amounts of
data in some of the conditions, but this was not a problem as
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all conditions had sufficient data. Note also that the cycle
at 3 counterbalances the noun/verb and the cloze/pseudoword
conditions both within and between subjects.
No attempt was made to disguise the fact that subjects
were guessing the meaning of words. I don't think this would
have worked. I relied on the fact that subjects just wouldn't
see that I was after movement in the dependent variables in
terms of amount of information and variations due to order.
Subjects were told after the experiments what I had been
looking for and I also took this opportunity to "pump" them for
their reactions to the experiment for later use In analysis.
A final criticism is that this experiment is large and
complex with plenty of room for experimenter error. All moves
were planned in detail on paper before the experiment began to
avoid this problem.	 To the best of my knowledge, all went
well. It might have been better to brake this experiment up
into a series of smaller ones but there was difficulty in
getting subjects and this determined me to get as much as
possible out of this experiment once I had collected a
reasonable number of volunteers.
Scoring: The dependent variable of confidence was scored in
exactly the same way as in previous experiments.
Accuracy was dealt with by grading subjects' responses on
a scale from 0 to 2. If the exact target word, a reasonable
synonym or a reasonable paraphrase was given, the response got
2. If any of the above responses got reasonably close to the
target, the rule of thumb I used here was family relationships
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based on the idea of hyponomy, I gave 1. For example, if the
target was march but a subject put stride or stroll etc. he
scored 1. Anything else was graded 0.
Uncertainty, scores were not obtained directly from
subjects but like accuracy the subjects' responses were graded
to give some indication of how this variable might be behaving.
If a second response repeated the same word or phrase as the
first response then this was given 0. The same held for the
relationship between the second and third responses. If the
second response was held to be roughly in the same family as
the first then a 1 was given. The same held for the second and
third response. With the unknown meanings, there is a problem
here in that subjects can add hypotheses. If an initial
response was instrument and a subject then added an eastern
instrument, this was seen as still in the same family and
scored 1. AnythIng else was given 2. This included instances
where subjects gave up and made no response on the assumption
that they felt the answer could have been anything. Also, if a
second response received a 2 and the third response, although
it was outside the family of the second response, returned to
the same word or family as the first response, it was given 1
and not 2 since it seemed that uncertainty might be increasing
but not as rapidly as to warrant a score of 2. It was
necessary to redefine uncertainty from the original Idea of the
number of alternative hypotheses a subject could think of to
this idea of changeability since we would have had to run the
experiment a second time to measure the original notion of
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uncertainty. Given the scale and complexity of the experiment,
this was clearly not possible.
As to the reliability of these schemes, there were too
many responses to ask another marker to check. We therefore
have no intra-judge reliability here. To compensate for this
I went through the responses four times to try and iron out any
inconsistencies within my own marking. Whilst this idea of
family relationship might look nice on paper there is
undoubtedly a subjective element in deciding what is close
enough to be within a family and also as to what constitutes a
reasonable paraphrase. I therefore found myself quite
frequently quarrelling with myself over grades that I'd given
perhaps in the same way that different judges might disagree.
By doing this it was possible to get reliability/consistency In
the marking of responses. Phil Scholfield also kindly checked
over a small sample of five subjects and found that he could
accept the grades.
As to validity, whether this notion of being inside a
family leads to Increasing accuracy and decreasing uncertainty
would require a research project in it's own right. 	 They
seemed reasonable ideas to adopt. As far as uncertainty is
concerned, I would have preferred to tap subjects' intuitions
directly since, however rough the measure, It's better than
trying to second guess the subject. This would have required
running the experiment twice which was not feasible.
To give the reader a more concrete Idea of how this
system worked I'll give the responses and grades for Subject 9
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on Item 7 (Unknown- This is to worship, It's done in a frenzy,
Primitive tribes do this sometimes) at 7. Chanting and dancing
can be forms of worship so it seemed right to give these an
accuracy of 1. On the third response there seems to be a
reasonable paraphrase in that ritual with prayer suggests
worship and dance suggests frenzy, so I've given 2, With
uncertainty, the second response repeats the first exactly but
adds dance so I've given 1. The third response repeats the
7. Response	 Accuracy	 Uncertainty
a) chant	 1
b) chant & dance	 1.	 1
c) chant & dance a	 2	 1
special ritual with
prayer etc.
second but adds that bit about ritual so I've given 1 again
rather than 0.
On both accuracy and uncertainty we have scales from 0 to
2 for individual items. Of course, in any specific condition,
more than one item is Involved. Each order, for example, is
seen eight times so any one order, for one bit of information,
is out of 16. These scales are always averaged back to the
original scale of 0-2. (The same applies to confidence scores)
These look like very narrow interval scales. As with
confidence, however, we don't know whether the interval between
0 and 1 is the same as the interval between 1 and 2. Added to
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this is that the intervals between 0 an 1 and 1 and 2 might
differ for known and unknown meanings. What we have are really
ordinal scales which show us whether accuracy and uncertainty
are simply increasing or decreasing and for the sake of
convenience we pretend that they are interval. The same holds
for the confidence scale although it has the advantage of being
wider than the others. One further point to remember is that
we've only got values for two and. three amounts of information
for uncertainty and have lost one third of our responses.
Experiment design: The design is repeated measures. Each
subject performed in all the conditions with the sequences in
which subjects saw the conditions being counterbalanced or
randomised, as described above, to remove any form of biassing.
We can also term the experiment factorial since we have five
crossed independent variables with different levels on each.
What we have is: Form x 2 (cloze/pseudoword), Part of speech x
2 (noun/verb), Meaning x 2 (Known/Unknown), Information x 3 (1,
2, and 3 amounts), order x 6. The statistical test used was
ANOVA and it was run using the SPSSX package on the university
mainframe computer (MANOVA command).
Results and Discussion
The programs to do a five way repeated measures ANOVA on
ordinal category dependent variables were not available. The
experiment,	 therefore, had to be broken down into three
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smaller ANOVAS with consequent loss of data. The three ANOVAs
were:
ANOVA 1 Meaning x 2 (known/unknown), Form x 2
(pseudoword/cloze), Part of speech x 2 (noun/verb), Information
x 3 (3 amounts).
ANOVA 2 Meaning x 2, Part of speech x 2, Order x 6.
ANOVA 3 Meaning x 2, Information x 3, Order x 6.
These covered what I thought would be the most relevant
results. These ANOVA results are given below under the
headings of: confidence, accuracy and uncertainty. All results
marked A apply to confidence. Similarly, B applies to accuracy
and C to uncertainty. Standard deviations will be given where
they are of interest.
Results:	 CONFIDENCE
ANOVA 1
RESULT 1A: MEANING x 2
F= 213.08	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknowns Knovns
2.085	 3.586
RESULT 2A: Form x 2
F= 8.22	 Sig of F= .007 **
Means
Pseudoword	 Cloze
2.678	 2.994
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RESULT 3A: Part of speech x 2
F= 4.77	 Sig of F= . 035 *
Means
Nouns	 Verbs
2.906	 2.766
RESULT 4A: Information x 3
Mauchly= .000 **
Multivariate F= 67.290	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
2.075	 2.903	 3.529
RESULT 5A: Meaning by Information
Mauchly= .000 **
Multivariate	 F= 97.054	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknowns	 1.918	 2.152	 2.186
Knowns	 2.232	 3.653	 4.873
Standard Deviations
Unknowns	 1.110	 1.067	 1.330
Knowns	 1.111	 .939	 .780
RESULT 6A: Form by Information
Mauchly= . 007 **
Multivarlate	 F= 1.286	 Sig of F= .288
RESULT 7A: Part of speech by information
Mauchly= .005 **
Multivariate	 F= 6.248	 Sig of F= .004 **
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Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Nouns	 2.056	 2.975	 3.687
Verbs	 2.094	 2.831	 3.372
RESULT 8A: Meaning by Part of Speech
F= 1.64 Sig of F = .208
RESULT 9A: Meaning by Part of speech by Information
Mauchly .178
Univariate F= 7.56 Sig of F= .001 **
Means
3 amounts
2.455
1.917
4.919
4.827
1 amount	 2 amounts
Unknown nouns	 1.878	 2.254
Unknown verbs	 1.957	 2.051
Known nouns	 2.234	 3.695
Known verbs
	
2.230	 3.612
RESULT 1OA: Meaning by Form
F= .00 Sig of F= .955
RESULT hA: Meaning by Form by Information
Mauchly= .005 **
Multivariate F= .694 Sig of F= .505
RESULT 12A: Meaning by Part of speech by Form by Information
Mauchly= .056
Univariate	 F= .34 Sig of F= .710
ANOVA 2
RESULT 13A: Order x 6
Mauchly= .275
Univariate F= .28 Sig of F= .922
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RESULT 14A: Meaning by Order
Mauchly .118
Univariate F= 3.02 Sig of F= .012 *
Means
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
Unknowns 2.083 2.146 1.900 2.167 2.118 2.098
Knowns	 3.518 3.435 3.801 3.571 3.516 3.675
ANOVA 3
RESULT 15A: Information by Order
Mauchly .003 **
Multivariate F= 2.365 Sig of F = .033 *
Means
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
I amount 2.116 2.055 2.107 2.055 2.019 2.098
2 amounts 2.857 2.938 2.897 2.878 2.976 2.860
3 amounts 3.430 3.366 3.549 3.674 3.458 3.702
RESULT 16A: Meaning by Information by Order
Mauchly= .000 **
Multivariate F= 7.330 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab cba
I amount
Unknowns 2.146 2.176 1.768 1.787 1.811 1.817
Knowns	 2.085 1.933 2.445 2.323 2.226 2.378
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2 amounts
Unknowns 2.061 2.396 1.884 2.140 2.439 1.994
Kriowns	 3.653 3.506 3.909 3.616 3.512 3.726
3 amounts
Unknowns 2.043 1.866 2.049 2.573 2.104 2.482
Knowns	 4.817 4.866 5.049 4.775 4.811 4.921
Accuracy
ANOVA 1
RESULT 1B: Meaning x 2
F= 547.62	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknowns	 Knowns
.474	 1.356
RESULT 2B: Form x 2
F= 5.65	 Sig of F= .022 *
Means
Pseudoword Cloze
.894	 .936
RESULT 3B: Part of speech x 2
F= 9.45	 Sig of F= .044 *
Means
Nouns Verbs
.953	 .877
RESULT 4B: Information x 3
Mauchly= .001 **
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Multivariate F= 207.689
	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
.632	 .995	 1.117
RESULT 5B: Meaning by information
Mauchly= .093
Univariate F= 175.12	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknowns	 .376	 .494	 .551
Knowns	 .887
	
1.496
	
1.684
RESULT 6B: Form by Information
Mauchly= .000 **
Multivariate	 F= .744 Sig of F= .482
RESULT 7B: Part of speech by Information
Mauchly= .043 *
Multivariate F= 2.019 Sig of F= .146
RESULT 8B: Meaning by Part of speech
F= .03 Sig of F= .875
RESULT 9B: Meaning by Part of speech by Information
Mauchly= .004 **
Multivariate F= 2.170 Sig of F= .128
RESULT lOB: Meaning by Form
F= .10 Sig of F= .754
RESULT 11B: Meaning by Form by Information
Mauchly= .000 **
Nultivariate F= 2.549 Sig of F= .091
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RESULT 12B: Meaning by Part of speech by Form by Information
Mauchly .008 **
Multivariate F= .555 Sig of F= .578
ANOVA 2
RESULT 13B: Order x 6
Mauchly .001 **
Multivariate F= 5.007 SIg of F= .001 **
Means
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
	
1.010 1.010 .929	 .827	 .828	 .883
RESULT 14B: Meaning by Order
Mauchly= .007 **
Multivariate F= .6.687 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
Unknowns	 .648	 .642	 .398	 .329	 .429	 .394
Knowns
	 1.372 1.378 1.459 1.325 1.228 1.372
ANOVA 3
RESULT 15B: Information by Order
Mauchly= .016 *
Multivariate F= 15.531 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
1 amount	 .885	 .876	 .563	 .488	 .412	 .573
2 amounts 1.052 1.025 1.116
	 .857 1.022	 .900
3 amounts 1.095 1.132 1.113 1.137 1.052 1.177
RESULT 16: Meaning by Information by Order
Mauchly= .000 **
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Multivariate F= 15.233 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknowns
Knowns
Unknowns
Known S
Unknowns
Known S
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca
I amount
.848	 .775	 .113	 .098
.921	 .976 1.012	 .878
2 amounts
	
.555	 .610	 .604	 .250
1.549 1.439 1.628 1.464
3 amounts
	
.543	 .543	 .488	 .640
1.646 1.720 1.738 1.634
cab	 cba
	
.171	 .262
	
.653	 .884
.659	 .287
1.384 1.512
.457	 .634
1.646 1.720
Unc e r taint y
ANOVA 1
RESULT 1C: Meaning x 2
F= 261.24 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknown	 Known
1.359	 .712
RESULT 2C: Form x 2
F= 5.59	 Sig of F= .023 *
Means
Pseudoword	 Cloze
1.080	 .991
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RESULT 3C: Part of speech x 2
F= 6.11	 Sig of F = .018 *
Means
Nouns	 Verbs
.982	 1.089
RESULT 4C: Information x 2
F 166.22	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
2 amounts	 3 amounts
1.220	 .851
RESULT 5C: Meaning by Information
F= 52.04	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknowns	 1.423
	
1.295
Knowns
	 1.017	 .407
RESULT 6C: Form by Information
F= .76	 Sig of F= .388
RESULT 7C: Part of speech by Information
F= 4.71	 Sig of F .048 *
Means
2 amounts	 3 amounts
Nouns	 1.192	 .771
Verbs	 1.248	 .930
RESULT 8C: Meaning by Part of speech
F= .77	 Sig of F= .387
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RESULT 9C: Meaning by Part of speech by Information
F= 3.12	 Sig of F= .085
RESULT 10C: Meaning by Form
F 2.26	 Sig of F = .141
Result 11C: Meaning by Form by Information
F= .00	 Sig of F= .983
RESULT 12C: Meaning by Part of speech by Form by Information
F= .03	 Sig of F= .867
ANOVA 2
RESULT 13C: Order x 6
Mauchly .287
Univariate F 3.39	 Sig of F= .006 **
Means
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
.950	 .951 1.017 1.075 1.131 1.088
RESULT 14C: Meaning by Order
Mauchly .067
Univariate	 F= 3.89	 Sig of F= .002 **
Means
abc	 acb
	
bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
Unknowns	 1.198 1.223 1.430 1.375 1.433 1.494
Knowns	 .701	 .680	 .604	 .774	 .829	 .683
ANOVA 3
RESULT 15C: Information by Order
Mauchly .133
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Univariate	 F= 6.39	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
2 amounts	 1.143 1.006 1.281 1.238 1.360 1.293
3 amounts	 .756	 .897	 .753	 .912	 .903	 .884
RESULT 16C: Meaning by Information by Order
Mauchly= .091
Univariate	 F= 4.14	 Sig of F= .001 **
Means
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
2 amounts
Unknowns 1.329	 1.061 1.622 1.366 1.555 1.604
Knowns	 .957	 .951	 .939 1.110 1.165	 .982
3 amounts
Unknowns 1.067	 1.384 1.238 1.384 1.311 1.384
Knowns	 .445	 .409	 .268	 .439	 .494	 .384
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Chapter 6
Using the Ruler Part 2
This chapter interprets and discusses the results of
Experiment 3 and will do so for the three dependent variables
under the following headings: Amount of information, Known and
unknown meanings, Form, Order, Part of Speech.
Discussion
Information:	 We have three cues representing three
amounts of information.	 How do confidence, accuracy and
uncertainty behave across information? Result 4 (Information x
3) is significant for confidence, for accuracy	 and for
uncertainty.	 So the dependent variables are showing
significant differences with respect to increasing amounts of
information.	 Means are given in table 1 as percentages to
allow comparison between the dependent variables. 	 These
percentage means are plotted on graph 1.
Table 1
Main effect for information means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Confidence	 34. 583%
	
48. 383%
	
58. 817%
Accuracy	 31.600%
	
49. 750%
	
55.850%
Uncertainty	 61.000%
	
42.550%
Using percentages here assumes that the three scales used
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for the dependent variables have some absolute validity and run
from zero to whatever. Hence the ends of the scales can be
equated. This is a bold assumption so one can't read to much
into the exact positioning of dependent variable lines
vertically on graphs where this is done.
We see on graph 1 that confidence and accuracy rise and
uncertainty falls as increasing amounts of information are
given. One might speculate as to why accuracy criss crosses
the confidence line, but as I've said we can't read too much
into the exact positioning of these lines. The point, here, is
that we have movement in the dependent variables across
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information.	 Can we now use this factor to help point up
differences between the other independent variables?
Meaning: There are two levels on the meaning variable:
known meanings and unknown meanings. Is there a main effect
here ie. are these two types of meaning significantly
different? Remember that on the last two experiments this
difference did not reach significance for confidence and
uncertainty but there was a suggestion that It might become
significant on a more powerful experiment. Result I shows that
there are significant main effect differences between known and
unknown meanings for confidence, accuracy and uncertainty.
Looking at the means given in Result 1, we can see that unknown
meanings generate less confidence and accuracy and more
uncertainty than known meanings which is what we'd expect as a
foundation for predictions la), 2a) and 3a).
The question now is whether meaning interacts with
information as predictions la), 2a) and 3a) propose. If so we
can look at how guessing develops as increasing amounts of
Information become available in each meaning condition.
Result 5a) gives the interaction of meaning by
information for confidence. We have a significant interaction
and powerfully so. The means at Result 5a are displayed on
graph 2.
We can see on graph 2 that whilst confidence rises quite
steeply for known meanings, for unknowns, after a small initial
rise it remains static. Prediction la) seems to be met.
Result 5b) gives the interaction of meaning by
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information for accuracy. Again we have a significant and
powerful interaction. The means are displayed on graph 3.
Graph 2
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Looking at graph 3, we again see a very similar interaction on
accuracy as with confidence. There Is a very slight rise for
unknown meanings but a much steeper one for known meanings so
prediction 2a is met.
It's worth plotting the means for confidence and accuracy
for this interaction of meaning by information on the same
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graph. Table 2 gives the means expressed as percentages.
Table 2
Confidence and accuracy means as % for the meaning by
information interaction
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Confidence
Unknown meanings	 31.967	 35.867	 36.433
Known meanings	 37.200	 60.883	 81.217
Accuracy
Unknown meanings	 18.800	 24.700	 27.550
Known meanings	 44.350	 74.800	 84.200
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These means are displayed on graph 4.
Let's look at graph 4. As to guessing the known targets
there is, I think, little to add to what was said in Experiment
1. As subjects use more
2	 3
Amount of Information
information to track down single word hypotheses their
confidence goes up. Even if they change a guess their new
hypothesis is a product of both old and new information with a
subsequent rise in confidence.	 We also see here that the
accuracy line tends to follow the confidence line.
	
Subjects
have pretty good intuitions as to the correctness of their
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guesses in the known meaning condition. (Remember, these are
expert native speaker subjects). There is, however, one
notable point of departure at two amounts of information. Here
accuracy seems to rise quite some distance above confidence.
What seems to be happening is that the first two cues do most
of the work for accuracy, but subjects are a little cautious of
committing themselves. Also, as the experiment progresses,
they become aware that they will get a third cue so they become
a little reluctant to commit themselves on confidence until
they have seen it. The Increase in accuracy does fall off at
the third cue. Some subjects (a minority) have got confused
even on the knowns, which is only to be expected. I suspect
their confidence does mirror their difficulty. If we look at
Subject 4 on target 4 nouns which is effigy he gives the
responses at 1.
1.	 Cue	 Response	 Confidence
b) This is made to	 photograph	 3
represent a person
c) This is hanged sometimes painting 	 4
a) This Is a kind of	 bust	 1
stuffed figure
Basically, the subject has gone off on the wrong tack on cue
one, made a fine recovery ie. preserved a familiar relationship
between cues, through use of polysemy on hanged, so confidence
has gone up, but finally can't properly integrate cue 3, has a
wild stab at the answer but as his confidence reflects, he
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knows he's gone wrong. Essentially, his third guess suggests
that he hasn't been able to use the third cue. Notice that the
increase in confidence is also not quite so sharp between cues
two and three compared to cues one and two. Possibly the
realization in some subjects that they've gone wrong is making
itself felt. The trouble is that confidence is still rising at
cue three quite strongly despite this. Probably, the effect of
subjects committing themselves fully Is to some extent drowning
out the lesser effect of subjects realizing they have gone
wrong.
The lesson to be draw is that when information Is used
confidence goes up. Also, as the example at 1 shows, if a
subject perceives a cue to be relevant but has trouble using
it, confidence goes down. Any other information which the
guesser fails to use because he perceives it as not relevant,
would leave confidence static. This is not likely to happen in
this experiment since the method of presentation tends to force
subjects to see all cues as relevant.
If we come now to the confidence line on unknowns- I'll
leave accuracy alone for the moment since this Is fairly easily
dealt with once confidence Is explained- then there is a slight
rise between cues one and two and the line Is static between
cues two and three. Does this mean that subjects are
perceiving cues as not relevant? I think not. In the method
of presentation we are forcing one cue after another on
subjects. They will see them all as relevant just as students
tend to see every item of Information given in a mathematical
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problem as relevant. What is keeping the unknown line pretty
much static is that it is held in place by counteracting forces
some of which try to push confidence up whilst others hold it
back.
We can see what I mean by this idea of counteracting
forces by looking at examples. If we look at target 7 verbs:
This is to worship, This is done in a frenzy, Primitive tribes
do this sometimes, then subject 7 who gets the cues in the
order acb gives the responses -at 2.
2.	 Cue
a) This is to worship
c) Primitive tribes do
this sometimes
b) This is done in
a frenzy
	
Response	 Confidence Accuracy
	
idolize	 3	 1
idolize
	
3	 1
	
- (No response) 0	 0
The genus cue has been used to get idolize. The association
reinforces this though confidence stays static. Possibly the
subject started a little too high and now corrects by keeping
it the same.	 Then, when the differentia comes along the
subject decides that although it is relevant he won't process
it since he can't lexicalise it properly and confidence goes to
0. Abandoning information forces confidence down to 0. One
might speculate here whether in real life a subject might end
up being unable to give any form of guess in the situation
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represented at 2 on the third cue. Personally, I don't think
this is likely. Having gone to the trouble Of getting some
distance along the road to guessing the target, I don't think
that a subject would throw a valuable hypothesis away. My
feeling is that in real life, whilst the subject could perceive
the third cue as relevant yet be forced to reject it he would
still give idolize rather than nothing as his guess perhaps
with a reduced confidence. (This leaves a problem in grading
third guesses of this type in terms of accuracy. Since nothing
is given, I think we must give 0 accuracy and maximum
uncertainty, 2, since giving nothing suggests that anything
could fit).
	
Thus, whilst abandoning information he would
retain his guess. There is of course the possibility that
subjects might not perceive this third cue, the differentia in
this case, as at all relevant in real life. We are forcing
cues on subjects here.	 This is something I will check out
later, but personally I do think that in real life all three
cue types will be perceived as relevant.
	
Here then we see
abandoning information as one force which brings confidence
down.
On the same item, Subject 13 gives the responses at 3.
The order is again acb. 	 Here, the subject has used the
association to switch guesses and confidence has risen. But
then, at guess three, the differentia is used; the same guess
is kept but confidence falls. The differentia cue This is done
in a frenzy does not fit sacrifice that well since it is not a
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3. Response	 Confidence Accuracy
a) idolize	 3	 1
c) sacrifice	 6	 1
b) sacrifice	 3	 1
necessary feature in that not all sacrifices are frenzied. In
fact, frenzy might be a perfectly good association of
sacrifice, but the way in which confidence declines suggests
that the subject has recognised this cue as part of the
target's core meaning but has forced it into a relationship
with the genus by treating it as an association (sometimes done
in a frenzy) to lexicalise the target. What we see is that
forcing information to fit into a hypothesis In order to try
and get a common denominator between all the cues can also
damage confidence.
What's really happening in these two examples? The
process used to obtain hypotheses at 2 and 3 above on unknown
meanings is essentially the same as that used for known
meanings. Subjects are after a single hypothesis, in this case
a word. They make such a guess off the first cue and try to
increase confidence by supporting or changing this hypothesis
off subsequent cues. However, either on the second or more
likely on the third cue they find that the unfamiliar
combination of cues can not be lexicalised to give a single
word hypothesis. The correct option now would be to abandon
the pursuit of a single hypothesis and go for a complex one
consisting of genus, differentia and association.	 However,
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subjects do not switch to this alternative process probably
because they are extremely suspicious of the unfamiliar
combination. They stay within the process of guessing single
hypotheses/known meanings and do this by treating the cues as
inconsistent when they fail to lexicalise. The ways in which
inconsistent information can be treated, as we have noted
earlier, are by abandoning cues or by trying to force them into
a familiar pattern. Example 2 shows the former and example 3
the latter.	 A feature of forcing worth pointing up is the
deliberate distortion or downgrading of a cue.
	 Usually the
differentia is turned into an association. Thus it is the
mistaken treatment of unknown meanings as combinations of
inconsistent Information which forces confidence down.
We should also note that when dealing with what appears
to be inconsistent Information the genus cue is almost
invariably used. It seems to be the dominant cue type. The
differentia is the most frequently abandoned though it can be
forced into a relationship with the genus. This suggests that
it is really the differentia which creates the inconsistent
relationship and it seems to be next in strength to the genus.
The association can be abandoned though it seems to be more
easily assimilated into the genus guess than the differentla.
The association thus seems to be third In terms of power.
Unlike the Oskamp (1965) study subjects seem both to be able to
recognise the different cue types- if dlfferentlas were simply
mistaken as associations there would be no awareness of
inconsistency- and to have fairly good knowledge about which
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cues to use and which to abandon in the face of inconsistency.
Probably this is a consequence of the difference in
knowledge/subject area. 	 Remember that Oskamp dealt with
clinical psychology.
Something, however, must be sending confidence up for the
confidence line across information to be static. 	 We do get
responses like that given at 4 to noun target 12 (a. This isa
kind of fear, b. This is caused by being robbed, c. People
suffer from this sometimes) in the order bca for subject 16.
4. Response	 Confidence	 Accuracy
poverty	 0	 0
fear	 2	 1
paranoia	 5	 1
where the subject seems to have perceived what he thought to be
a familiar pattern in the cues leading to the single, known
word paranoia In which he has high confidence. The subject is
still using the process for guessing known meanings on an
unknown meaning but in this instance he has failed to spot any
inconsistency in the cues- always a possible danger. The
subject has, then, been deceived and his confidence does not
reflect his accuracy. I don't think this means that the
subject has failed to recognise the various cue categories.
Rather, I suspect that the subject has perhaps decided that
paranoia is a good enough guess under the circumstances and
that "people will know what he means1' if he used this word in
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place of the target. Also, I suspect that whilst confidence
rises quite well at example 4, on most guesses where subjects
are deceived confidence does not rise so sharply as for the
known targets and so there is some awareness of inconsistency
which reflects a recognition of categories. This type of
response together with the way in which subjects seem to retain
some confidence on the third cue when forcing cues together as
in example three helps keep the confidence line from falling.
We have, then, three types of single word response. The
type at example 2 involves abandoning information, the type at
example 3 involves forcing and the type at example 4 involves
not spotting inconsistency. Counting on the final response
given on cue three for unknown targets, these single word
responses account for approximately 83% of the number of
responses given. The type involving abandoning information is
the most prevalent accounting for about 31% of the total
responses. The remaining types involving forcing and not
spotting Inconsistency are roughly equal accounting for about
26% of the total responses each. In Experiment 1 it was the
type which involved not spotting Inconsistency which was most
prevalent. Probably the difference in Instructions between the
two experiments has caused this different emphasis in response
type. Since the instruction format In this experiment Is the
more neutral, it is the one I would tend to trust.
We can now see why the confidence line Is fairy static.
Subjects are Invariably able to make a guess off cue one with a
measure of confidence. Then on cue two and more certainly on
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cue three it becomes difficult to lexicalise information. The
technique of abandoning information sends confidence down here
whilst failing to spot inconsistency sends confidence back up.
When cues are forced together, although confidence falls there
can still be some confidence retained on the third guess as we
see at example 3 and this would help keep confidence up.
There is an additional, though limited, force which
prevents confidence falling by creating an upward trend,
particularly on later cues. This is the use of the phrasal
option to construct new meanings/complex hypotheses which
accounts for about 17% of the responses.
	 At the third cue, as
an alternative to treating information as inconsistent so
sending confidence down, the phrasal option can come into use
creating an upward trend for confidence. Subject 45's
responses on the same target in the order cba are given at 5 as
an example of the use of phrases. At 5 we've got the strange
picture of the
5. Response	 Confidence Accuracy.
c) to perform fertility rites	 1	 1
b) to perform tribal dances
	 3	 1
a) to perform tribal dances/rites
	 4	 2
to the gods
differentia being built up first with dance. Then when the
genus comes In, the idea of tribal dancing is linked to worship
with rites to gods.
	 It's interesting to note here that the
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genus, differentia and association are not held in the form in
which they were given in the cues but guesses seem to have been
made from them.	 So the various components of meaning are
represented in the responses. This method of building new
meanings was mentioned in the introduction and is used in
preference to simply restating the cues which have been given.
I'll give one more example of a phrasal response. If we
look at noun target 7: This is a kind of musical instrument,
This has one string, This is usually strummed, we get responses
like that of subject 6 recorded at 6.
6. Response	 Confidence Accuracy
c) lute	 2	 1
a) lute	 2	 1
b) an Eastern instrument 4 	 1
Here the subject has given single word guesses on the first two
cues and then unlike the subject at 3 has not held on to this
very specific single word but has realized that instrument is
the genus and has restated the cue. He then uses the
differentla to try and describe what kind of instrument. The
subject has abandoned a single word hypothesis in favour of a
complex one when he realises that he can't lexicalise the
information.	 Interesting here is that the genus has been
retained in the form in which It was given but guesses seem to
be made from the other cues. More frequently, all components
of meaning seem to be changed or guessed from in these complex
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hypothesis responses as seen at 5. Confidence is rising at 6
but in terms of accuracy this does not guarantee a score of 2.
I gave the third response at 6 an accuracy of 1 since I thought
at the time the differentia was a little vague. I wasn't too
sure about this accuracy score at the time, there is some kind
of a differentia there, and I'm still not sure. It could be
I've undervalued accuracy. What I think this shows is that the
kind of uncertainty which can affect subjects when they try to
guess a differentia can also affect the marker.
To sum up then, confidence is held fairly static on
unknown meanings by a set of counterbalancing forces. However,
it is single word hypothesis type of responses which
predominate. This in turn explains the accuracy line on graph
4 for unknown meanings. Accuracy does rise slightly, but it
can't get above a score of 1 (50% on the graph) because of
these single word responses. Prediction 2a is borne out.
Without a statement of genus and differentia, subjects can't
score accuracy 2 on unknowns. Over cue 1 accuracy is lower
than over cue three probably because there is more chance of
making an error on low amounts of information. The rise at cue
3 is probably helped by the use of the phrasal option to build
new meanings as well as subjects realring errors made on cue 1,
all be it with single word responses. On the whole the
confidence and accuracy lines do correspond to each other
suggesting that subjects do realise that they are in difficulty
unlike with the Oskamp (1965) study. 	 The main point of
difficulty being caused by the attempt to treat unknown
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meanings as combinations of inconsistent information so
producing single word hypotheses.
A final point concerns the confidence standard deviations
given at Result 5a for the meaning by information interaction.
Standard deviations decrease across information for knowns.
For unknowns, though there is a small decrease at cue 2, the
contrast between cues 1 and 3 shows the standard deviations
increasing. This Is the same picture as on Experiment 1 and
the cause is the same. On known meanings, there is probably a
lot of fluctuation between subjects with some giving high and
others low confidence scores on initial cues. Increasing
amounts of information create a greater consensus and subjects
who have given too high a confidence correct this (within an
overall context of Increasing confidence) and visa versa. For
unknowns, on cue 1, the great majority of subjects think they
are guessing a familiar single word. What variance there is
reflects the use of this one strategy. Note that the standard
deviation here is very similar to that of the known meaning on
cue 1. As increasing amounts of Information become available a
variety of strategies: abandoning, forcing and the formation of
complex hypotheses come into play. Each strategy generates a
different finishing point on cue 3 in terms of confidence so
increasing the standard deviation at this cue for unknowns.
Incidentally, we are also still faced with the problem of
whether the guessing of unknown meanings, when successful, is
more difficult in terms of confidence than the guessing of
known meanings because of factors like suspicion. The best way
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to look at this problem would be to correlate confidence with
accuracy for the two meaning conditions so that we can compare
the confidence of those who score an accuracy of two on the
unknowns, and so are considered to have formed some kind of new
meaning, with those who score a similar accuracy on the knowns.
There should be some form of drag effect on unknowns.
To finish this section we need to look at the interaction
of meaning by information for uncertainty. The statistics are
at Result 5c and we have a powerful interaction. The means at
Result 5c are displayed on on graph 5.
Looking at graph 5, uncertainty for known meanings falls
sharply. Cues are combining to knock out any options which
cues in isolation might suggest as described in Experiment 2.
For the unknown meanings I would have expected uncertainty to
remain static (see prediction 3a) in that holding and changing
would cancel each other out. Uncertainty on the unknowns is
simply a much gentler fall than for the knowns. What we have
is a mixture of abandoning and holding. In terms of the former
subjects give up around cue three and get 2. That is, failing
to give a guess is interpreted in terms of saying "anything is
possible here" and is taken as expressing a wide uncertainty so
it scores maximum. (I've argued that subjects might in fact
hold on to these guesses in real life so It is possible to
score 0 uncertainty here so this is an element of arbitrariness
in my marking scheme). As to holding probably coupled with
small scale changes, they are clearly strong enough to
counteract abandoning on cue 3 and make initial uncertainty
-199-
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fall somewhat. But remember that all these are responses to
difficulty and reflect a degree of "confusion" so the main
point is that uncertainty is higher for unknowns than knowns
and this is borne out.
Graph 5
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Where subjects are able to construct new meanings by
building complex hypotheses we do seem to get static and
possibly rising uncertainty as with Experiment 2. The response
recorded for Subject 9 on cue three noted at 7 below seems to
support this. The order is cba
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7. c) Chant
b) Chant & Dance
a) Chant and dance. A specific ritual with prayer etc.
Note the high uncertainty on the response. Three ideas: chant,
dance and prayer are added to ritual with the subject finishing
with etc. Grated It is "small scale" uncertainty with the
hypotheses falling within the general category of religion.
At face value we can say cautiously that a lot more uncertainty
surrounds the successful guessing of unknown meanings as
opposed to guessing known meanings. This expansion of
uncertainty suggests the adding of associations to the core
meaning so as to build up a new schematic or encyclopaedic
representation and reflects an increasing familiarity and
confidence with the new meaning.
Form: We have two different forms: pseudowords and
doze gaps. Predictions ib), 2b) and 3b) state that there will
be no difference between these conditions on all three
dependent variables.
If we look at Result 2 we see there is a significant
difference on form for confidence, for accuracy and for
uncertainty. All three predictions fail. The means are given
at Result 2 and are expressed as percentages in table 3. These
means, using the percentage figures, are displayed on graph 6.
Looking at graph 6, doze gaps generate more confidence and
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accuracy and less uncertainty than pseudowords which Is to say,
the doze condition is easier than the pseudoword. Note that
Table 3
Means for pseudowords and doze
Pseudoword	 Cloze
Confidence	 45%
	
50%
Accuracy
	
45%
	
47%
Uncertainty	 54%
	
50%
the differences are small, but they must be quite consistent or
they wouldn't have shown up. This was a surprising result.
I'd expected subjects to treat pseudowords In the same way as
doze gaps ie. ignore the pseudowords. This Is not the case.
Why do we get this effect? My first thought was that the
pseudoword acts as a signal, telling subjects that a target is
unknown and that they must be careful since an unknown meaning
might exist. This would mean that on cue 1 they are holding
cues like This is a kind of barrier and thinking in terms of
the hypothesis being incomplete rather than backing away from
this and using barrier or wall as single word responses. There
are two points here. First, there Is very little evidence
amongst the actual responses that subjects are thinking in
terms of This is some kind of. Responses are in the main
single words both on cue 1 and subsequent cues. Second, if
subjects were regarding the pseudoword as a stimulus to build a
complex hypothesis we would expect a substantial difference in
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confidence between the two forms on the basis of experiment 1,
with pseudowords being the lower.
Graph 6
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The difference here, whilst significant, is tiny.
Whilst subjects might initially try to build a new
meaning on the basis of an unknown form they are quickly forced
away from this option by incompletness and the sense that
whatever they add must form an unfamiliar combination which
can't be lexicalised and so will arouse suspicion. The result
is single word hypotheses from cue I on and whatever we are
dealing with in terms of the results In table 3 must be
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explained in terms of single word hypotheses.
Another possibility for this pseudoword/cloze distinction
is that the pseudoword requires extra processing effort.
Subjects have to stop and decode it, perhaps check
pronunciation and maybe even check to see if there is some kind
of morphological cue. This extra processing effort detracts
from the guessing task and creates a drain on confidence since
effort which should be going into guessing is now going into
decoding. We might explain the confidence difference thus, but
what about the accuracy difference. Dechert (1983) shows that
high processing costs can be a source of error. But decoding a
pseudoword is not going to impose any large scale processing
effort. A small increase in effort might undermine confidence
since it is the more sensitive of the variables but we would
not expect It to encourage error unless It were more
substantial.	 I can't see this problem manifesting itself in
the data.	 Neither would I expect It to cause subjects to
change guesses more frequently. The opposite would be more
likely since it should be less of a drain to hang onto an old
guess than think of a new one.
Another way that pseudowords may be influencing accuracy
and uncertainty as well as confidence is through encouraging
subjects to give up guessing by adding one more difficulty
which simply overloads subjects. Where they give up they get 0
accuracy so this suppresses accuracy for pseudowords. The same
applies to confidence. They also get 2 uncertainty and this
increases uncertainty on the pseudowords.
	 There is one
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problem.	 The tendency to give up exists on unknown targets
rather than knowns and is caused by the tendency to treat the
cues as inconsistent. Accuracy on the pseudoword unknowns
would be forced lower than on the doze unknowns whereas there
won't be much difference between the pseudoword and doze
knowns. In other words we'd get an interaction on meaning by
form. But Result 10 is not significant. Also, the tendency
to give up on unknowns seems to be manifesting most at three
amounts of information. This means we would get an interaction
on form by information with pseudowords bending away from doze
at three amounts, but again this doesn't happen (see Result 6
on all dependent variables) More particularly perhaps we'd
get an interaction on meaning by form by information, but (see
Result 11 a b & c), we don't get this.
A point to remember here is that the doze pseudoword
distinction is slight. If it is caused by giving up then some
of the above interactions could exist in embryo and simply not
be strong enough to show up in the statistics. The place to
look is on the possible interaction of meaning by form by
information. There should not be much difference between
pseudoword and doze on the known meanings but we should see
pseudowords fall away from doze at three amounts of
information on the unknowns. The dependent variable to look at
is accuracy since this comes the closest to significance and so
is the most likely to shed some light. The confidence result
is not near significance and simply from a very pragmatic point
of view won't give much help since the lines are fairly
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parallel. The uncertainty result has no score at one amount of
information so we lose one part of the interaction and the
picture is not clear. The means for meaning by form by
information on accuracy are given at table 4.
Table 4
Means for the meaning by form by information interaction on
accuracy
Unknown pseudoword
Unknown doze
Known pseudoword
Known doze
1 amount
.362
.390
.872
.902
2 amounts
.480
.508
1.453
1.539
3 amounts
.524
.577
1.671
1.697
It's difficult to display these means on a graph since they are
so close. We can see that the differences are so slight that
there Is no difference between the two forms on knowns across
information If means are given correct to one decimal place.
The same happens on unknowns between one and two amounts of
information but then on the third amount the pseudoword line
dips just where we would expect it to. The cause is that
pseudowords are encouraging subjects to give up on unknown
meanings at cue 3 presumably because they create some extra
difficulty and that this helps create an overall difference
between doze and pseudoword on all three dependent variables.
However, what kind of extra difficulty can pseudowords
create? I don't think that extra processing effort in terms of
decoding the form would really tip the balance.
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Looking at table 4, there are differences between
pseudoword and doze on the known meanings and again on the
unknown meanings at cues one and two which, though minute,
might give us a clue as to why pseudowords encourage abandoning
information and further explain the overall differences between
doze and pseudoword. Here, pseudowords are slightly lower
than doze. What might cause this? There is no morphological
information in the pseudowords, but remember we noted how
subjects could make a guess to a similar word in terms of sound
or spelling to the target form: implication -> application.
The point is that the surface form seems to be attractive even
when it contains no hard Information. There is no indication
that my subjects are making errors of the type noted above.
Remember that they seem to associate with low ability subjects.
But they are being, I suspect, attracted to the pseudoform In
the following way. A subject at noun target 4 might give doll
or dummy in the doze condition.
	 But where a strange
pseudoword appears they might go for a slightly more unorthodox
answer like manikin. 	 The former conventional responses gets
them a 1 for accuracy, the latter a 0.
Subjects are trying to get something out of the
pseudoword on cues 1 and 2. This leads them to slightly
"offbeat" responses which they are not too sure about since the
hypothesis is generated on the very flimsy basis that there
must be something vaguely unusual about this target so overall
confidence suffers. Overall accuracy also clearly suffers and
overall uncertainty also rises since larger scale changes are
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needed to get out of this problem.
So on Unknowns, subjects are struggling to get something
out of the pseudoword on cues one and two, but when the problem
of inconsistent information makes itself felt on cue three
subjects find it too much and give up. That is they now view
the pseudoform as a doze space and take their last guess as a
rough synonym for the target. On the known meanings note that
we have a small gap at table 4 between doze and pseudoword at
cue 1, it opens wider at cue two and then on cue 3 returns to
the same value as the gap at cue I. My suspicion is that the
way in which the gap at cue three closes suggests that subjects
finally start to regard the pseudoword as a fake. The way the
third cue fits a known word convinces them to substitute this
known form for the pseudoword. That is, they again eventually
see the pseudoword as a doze space.
Ultimately, I would suggest that predictions Ib, 2b and
3b on all dependent variables are correct in essence. Subjects
do disregard pseudoforms. The word I should have included in
the prediction is that they disregard them eventually and that
a strange form containing no hard information does have an
initial attraction before being disregarded.
It should be remembered here that the interaction of
meaning by form by information given in table 4 is not
significant. Also the differences at cues 1 and 2 for both
types of meaning in the form contrast are minute. The above
arguments should therefore be treated with great caution.
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Order: Here we are concerned with whether one or more
orders stand out as more effective than others. I've made the
prediction of no difference between orders at 1, 2 and 3d) as a
matter of convenience.	 It may well be that we will see
differences. If so we can use the cost/benefit principle to
try and generalise from this experiment to the use of order in
real life guessing.
Let's begin with the overall results for order.
	 The
relevant statistics are at Result 13. For confidence the Sig
of F= .922.	 There is no difference between the orders.
Prediction id works. For accuracy and uncertainty the Sig of F
respectively are .001 and .006. 	 There are significant
differences between the orders. It looks like prediction 2d
and 3d fail. But order, as pointed out, is complex, so let's
try and go into this variable In some detail.
The means for the orders from result 13 for all the
dependent variables are given at table 5 as percentages.
Table 5
Means for order on confidence, accuracy and uncertainty
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
Confidence 46.6	 46.5	 47.5	 47.8	 46.9	 48.1
Accuracy	 50.5	 50.5	 46.4	 41.3	 41.4	 44.1
Uncertainty 47.5	 47.5	 50.8	 53.7	 56.5	 54.4
Let's put these means on graphs using the percentage figures.
Graph 7 shows the means for the orders for confidence and
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accuracy	 and graph 8	 shows the means for the orders on
confidence and uncertainty.
Graph 7
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If we look at graph 7 then we see that the orders for
confidence are all very similar. In fact the genus a first
orders are in fact amongst the weakest though not significantly
so. If we turn now to accuracy then the genus first orders are
strongest and there is a gradual falling off with a slight
upturn for cba. The point here, though is that the confidence
line doesn't in any way respond to the	 movement in the
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accuracy line.	 If some orders are better than others the
subjects don't seem to be aware of that fact.
Graph 8
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If we look now at graph 8 we can see that uncertainty
for the orders is the mirror image of accuracy. The genus
first orders generate less uncertainty and there Is a gradual
increase for the other orders with a down turn at cba.
Although the two lines are close for the genus first orders the
confidence line doesn't follow the rise In the uncertainty line
and guessers again aren't aware of increasing uncertainty.
Again subjects are not aware, this time that orders which do
not have the genus in first place create higher uncertainty
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than others.
If we turn now to the interaction of meaning by order,
what we are in fact looking at is not so much a contrast
between known and unknown meanings. Given what I have said
earlier, then we really have a contrast between the processing
of Information which is consistent in known meanings and the
processing of information which is thought to be inconsistent
In unknown meanings though in the latter case subjects might be
regarded as in error when viewing this information as
inconsistent.
On the meaning by order interaction, Result 14, we get
significant results on all dependent variables. Could it be
that for confidence on the unknowns the genus first orders are
the best, but that in the main effect their power has been
obscured by something strange happening in the known orders.
The means for confidence for the meaning by order interaction
are displayed on graph 9. We do, in fact, see that something
strange is happening. The main points of interaction Is at
bac with this order being helpful on known meanings and bac
being unhelpful on unknowns. In terms of known meanings we
might have a dine In terms of the power of cue. The
differentia, b might be the strongest and most helpful since
not many potential words in a language share the same
differentia. The genus, a, might be the next most powerful
since more words share this feature and the association, C
might be the weakest since it is non criterial. So the
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differentia in first place might fine down the number of
possible hypotheses quite a lot and the gena thec cL it.
Thus the combination of differentia followed by genus in first
two places gives bac its superiority. On the unknowns,
interestingly, the reverse has happened. I'll return to this
later. On the whole, however, on the unknown meanings, there
seems to be little difference between the orders In confidence
apart from this one small feature. The order bac has a mean of
1.9 and the others have means of 2.1 or 2.2 so it doesn't stand
out by much.
If we go on and look now at the same interaction of
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meaning by order for accuracy, the Result at 14 is significant.
The means are displayed on graph 10. If we look at graph 10
Graph 10
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for the known orders then bac again is the most powerful order
for the reason given above. On the unknowns, however, the
genus first orders dominate the picture and stand out as
strongest with the other orders falling away from them. This
is a picture which we did not get on confidence where all
orders are pretty similar. The uncertainty results on the
meaning by order interaction duplicate this result for accuracy
surprisingly closely, but I won't draw graphs for them here as
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I want to push on. The point to note is that on known
meanings, ba initially is strong. On unknowns for confidence
we don't get much difference between orders in terms of
confidence but we do get a very coherent patterning for
accuracy and uncertainty where genus first orders are
strongest.
It is worth converting the means for confidence and
accuracy to percentages just for unknowns. These are given at
table 6 and displayed at graph 11. What we see on graph 11 is
that whilst the confidence and accuracy lines are close for the
genus first
Table 6
Unknown Order means as % for confidence and accuracy
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
Confidence	 34.7	 35.7	 31.6	 36.1	 35,3	 34.9
Accuracy	 32.4	 32.1	 19.9	 16.4	 21.4	 19.7
orders the accuracy line then falls away from the confidence.
In other words, subjects are not aware that the non genus first
orders are causing difficulty (this seems to be purely an
unknown meaning rather than known meaning problem). This Is
strange since at graph 4 we saw that across amount of
Information the accuracy line seemed to follow the confidence
line suggesting subjects had rather decent Intuitions about
their accuracy.	 I don't think that what we will see in terms
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of order will contradict this result. 	 Rather, order should
help clarify it by showing where such intuitions come from and.
Graph 11
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what problems frustrate, to a limited extent, such intuitions.
We can do exactly the same thing for the known orders.
The percentage means for confidence and accuracy are given at
table 7 and displayed on graph 12. On graph 12 we see
confidence respond to accuracy, rising over orders bac and cba
on knowns.	 We can now carry the discussion forward on two
fronts.	 First, we can check that the reason for bac's
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superiority on knowns is borne out by meaning by order by
information results. Also we can ask why subjects seem not to.
Table 7
Known order means as % for confidence and accuracy
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
Confidence	 58.6	 57.2	 63.3	 59.5	 58.6
	
61.2
Accuracy
	
68,6
	 68.9	 72.9	 66.2	 61.4
	
68.6
Graph 12
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be aware that some orders are not as good as others on the
unknowns.	 One could pursue this further by looking at
uncertainty and bringing in the interaction of information by
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order, but I'm going to go directly to the interactions of
meaning by information by order.
If we look at the interaction of meaning by information
by order for accuracy, Result 16b is significant. The
interaction between known and unknown meanings is that the
former rises whilst the latter is largely static. I'm going to
ignore this aspect and look first at the interactions which
occur within the known group of orders. The complete set of
means is given at Result 16 and displayed on graph 13 for known
meanings.
Looking at graph 13, for known orders, I had hoped to be
able to look at 1 amount of information and say from the points
noted above that b was the strongest cue, since not many words
share the same differentia, a the next strongest since the
genus is common to many words and C the weakest since the
association is not criterial. Clearly we can't say this with
any certainty since there is some confusion at cue 1 with the
two b first orders not starting at the same point and other
orders intervening and the same problem applying to the other
orders. What we can see at graph 13 is that the orders bac and
cab stand out across information, the first being strong and
the second weak and lower than bac and almost parallel to it.
It looks as though an initial ba combination is strong in that
b restricts the number of options and a following it quickly
leads to the right guess even if we can't get a clear picture
of the respective power of each cue in the combination
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individually at cue 1 and it seems that the b on bac might have
a fortunately high starting point.	 Likewise, an initial ca
Graph 13
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combination is misleading because c is not criterial and a Is
common to many words although, again, the initial c on cab
might be unfortunately low. These Initial combinations also
lead to differences in finishing points with bac maintaining
Its superiority at cue 3.
Note also that at cue 3 on graph 13 cba and acb catch
up with bac. The first of these has a ba combination in last
place which probably helps it. (The Initial c also has a lucky
-219-
high start). The reason why acb catches up, I'll return to.
Also note that orders abc and bca finish lower at cue 3, in the
same place as cab. The second of these has a ca combination
last and this might confuse. Again, abc finishes lower.
Let's look finally at the the two genus first orders: acb and
abc. Perhaps here we can see the power of individual cues at
work. The first order does have a high start and the second a
low start at cue 1 which must be seen as accidents. On cue 2
they reverse showing the weakness of c and the strength of b
and then they reverse again for the same reason.
Order Is complex, but it does appear to be that order bac
is the one to exploit when guessing and cab is the order to
stay away from. Granted, two other orders do eventually catch
up to bac and finish at the same point, but we do get accurate
more quickly by exploiting this order. If we look at
uncertainty for the known meanings at Result l6c) then bac
again generates least uncertainty and decreases most sharply
across information whilst the reverse is true of cab. For
confidence, Result l6a) then bac gives the sharpest rise across
information although cab is not clearly inferior here. There
is a reasonable mirroring of the accuracy result.
An interesting question to ask Is whether or not subjects
would exploit the order bac in real life guessing because of
its advantage. We'd need experiments here. However,
remembering the principle of costs and benefits mentioned
earlier, I would say it is unlikely even though the high
confidence In bac betrays an awareness of its advantage. The
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advantage to be gained in terms of accuracy and confidence and
even uncertainty, if we compare the scores on cue 3, is not
that great for bac. In return, processing costs are high in
that subjects will have to collect all the cues, hold those
they spot in memory while others are searched for and then put
them in this order since these cues are likely to be scattered
through a text in whole or even worse in part. In real life it
makes more sense to process information as it comes unless
perhaps some kind of problem or the need for speed makes itself
felt. It would be interesting to check this out In more real
life experiments, though.
	 Unfortunately, this Is beyond the
scope of this study.
With the unknown orders subjects seem not to be aware
that non genus first orders cause problems and confidence does
not respond to accuracy on graph 11. It is because of this
problem on unknowns that confidence fails to respond to
accuracy on graph 7.
	 On the knowns, subjects seem aware of
their accuracy. Turning to the unknown side of the
interaction, the accuracy means for these orders given at
Result 16b) are displayed on graph 14 . What we see is the
following.	 The genus a is the strong point of the
interactions.	 Wherever it comes, accuracy is highest.
	 Not
surprising since the genus will almost always get us into the
correct family.	 But at all points before the genus appears
accuracy is low. In other words the differentia or association
appearing either in isolation or combination before the genus
comes in has sent subjects in the wrong direction. It is the
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2differentia which emerges clearly as causing the most serious
problem as we see at cue 1 on graph 14.
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The association is not always as misleading. Why should there
be this contrast with known meaning cues? We have almost the
reverse of the known situation.
On the unknown orders where the combination of cues is
strange and a subject is trying to lexicalise a target as is
generally the case, the differentla, which is strong in a known
combination, might well send the subject in the wrong
direction. For example, if we take unknown target 7: To reif:
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This is to worship, This is done In a frenzy, Primitive tribes
do this sometimes, we can see that the differentia is likely to
send the subject into single word options like kill, attack
etc. which are not related to worship. Also, a similar but
perhaps not so drastic effect is produced by the association.
Any association has to be compatible with the differentia as
well as the genus. It would be strange to suggest monks and
nuns as associations of reif. As we see above, the idea of
primitive tribes which is compatible with the differentia is
more likely to suggest war dance or hunt than forms of worship
and again the subject is misdirected. With some of the unknown
targets, however, the association can be helpful. On unknown
noun target 7 the association usually strummed can suggest
single word guesses relevant to the genus musical instrument.
So the association is less misleading than the differentia
prior to the genus. The genus will now be the strongest cue
since it gets subjects into the correct family. So on unknowns
we have a dine of genus-> association-> differentia with the
first cue being the most effective.
Let's now bring confidence into play. On the interaction
of meaning by information by order for confidence, Result l6a)
is significant. Let's focus on the unknown side of the
interaction and compare the behaviour of the orders In terms of
confidence and accuracy by turning their means into
percentages. Means as percentages are given at table 8.
Let's put some of these orders on graphs. The unknown
order abc is on graph 15. What we see at graph 15 is a gradual
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decline in confidence and a sharper decline in accuracy, but we
can say that the two dependent variables seem to be responding
to each other roughly and do so from cue 1 which is the genus.
Table 8
The means as % for unknown orders across information
Order	 1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
abc
Accuracy	 42.4	 27.7	 27.1
Confidence	 35.7	 34.3	 34.0
acb
Accuracy
	 38.8
	
30.5
	
27.2
Confidence	 36.2
	
39.9
	
31.1
bac
Accuracy
	 5.2
	
31.4
	
24.4
Confidence	 29.5
	
31.4
	
34.2
bca
Accuracy
	 4.9
	
12.5
	
32.0
Confidence	 29.7
	
35.6
	
42.8
cab
Accuracy
	 8.5
	
32.9
	
22.8
Confidence	 30.1
	
40.6	 35.0
cba
Accuracy
	 13.1
	
14.4
	
31.7
Confidence	 30,3
	
33.2
	
41.4
If we turn now to order bca the confidence/accuracy means
are displayed on graph 16. What we see at graph 16 is that for
the first two cues: the differentia and association, accuracy
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is well below confidence and it is only when the genus appears
at cue 3 that the two lines really converge. So the
association and the differentia in particular has sent subjects
Graph 15
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in the wrong direction but they don't realize this in terms of
confidence until the genus comes into play.
If we turn now to order cab the means are displayed on
graph 17. Confidence seems to follow accuracy but note that
the gap at cue 1, the association Is very wide. It's not until
the genus comes along at cue 2 that the lines really start to
follow each other. 	 In other words the association has not
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helped and again subjects don't become aware of this until the
genus comes In at cue 2.
In other words what we have is an explanation of why
Graph 16
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Liii
Conf
confidence doesn't respond to accuracy In the non genus first
orders for unknown meanings. We saw at graph 11 that for
genus first orders accuracy and confidence were close but that
for the other orders accuracy falls off but confidence doesn't
follow. The reason is that where the differentia or
association precede the genus subjects have been sent in the
wrong direction so accuracy suffers bUt they don't realize it
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so confidence stays up. The same is true of all the unknown
orders if we look at table 8 and not just those shown on
graphs. This factor also creates the pattern on graph 7 where
Graph 17
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both meaning conditions are combined.	 (A similar argument can
be used to show why confidence does not follow uncertainty on
graph 8.	 Subjects have to change guess to correct their
initial error, but since at cue 1 they aren't aware of the
error, confidence doesn't suffer. 	 I won't pursue this here).
The reason why	 on unknowns is a little lower than
other orders for confidence on graph 9 is due to the ba
-22 7-
combination. The differentia sends them in the wrong direction
and powerfully so, the genus tries to send them in the right
direction but it has to counteract the strength of the initial
differentia and this creates a measure of confusion.
Incidentally, If we look at the confidence means at
Result 16a we would expect the differentias in both unknown and
known meanings to produce the same confidence score when they
come in first position. Interestingly, the unknown
differentlas are lower than the knowns. The cause Is likely to
be that subjects saw the same targets a second time. Although
there was a lapse of two weeks, It might be that subjects
remembered those differentla cues in first place which seemed
to be good cues but which then turned out to be not so helpful
and this has lowered their confidence. Despite this artificial
lowering of confidence on the differentla In first place,
confidence is still out of proportion to accuracy where
differentia precedes genus and I would therefore expect this
problem to be more severe in real life.
What we can say, then, with respect to Intuitions as to
difficulty where unknown meanings or InconsIstent information
is involved Is that as graph 4 shows subjects do have such
Intuitions. These intuitions seem to be founded on an
understanding that the genus is the strongest cue. Where the
genus comes first accuracy and confidence in this accuracy is
quickly established and subsequent cues don't have the strength
to disrupt this relationship.	 Where differentia and
association come fIrst, subjects are tricked.
	 There is a
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problem of overconfidence in that confidence does not seem to
reflect the probability of being correct.	 (See Peterson and
Pitz	 (1986)	 for	 a	 more	 sophisticated	 definition	 of
overconfidence). But when the genus comes into play and
combines with these cues then subjects become aware of this and
the genus dominates these other cues. The initial problem does
decrease accuracy and and increase uncertainty scores for non
genus first orders but the way in which this is repaired
together with the way confidence does match accuracy and
uncertainty overall when order is not an Issue does support the
conclusion as shown on graph 4 that when dealing with guessing
unknowns by means of viewing such targets as combinations of
inconsistent information, subjects are broadly aware of
difficulty.
One point we might consider is that we could try to
repair the damage done by differentia and association initially
by teaching students to guess in genus first orders. We might
see this as teaching a plan for guessing as say proposed by
Faerch and Kasper (1983 & 1984). We would be making subjects
aware or conscious of the potential of an order and giving them
knowledge they seem to lack. It might even be worth trying to
raise such a plan to the status of script as described by
Widdowson (1983 p. 56) in terms of having a series of goal
directed actions "conventionalized" and "established as a
routine".
However, we need to be careful.	 This idea of not
realizing one has been sent in the wrong direction on unknown
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meanings affects the total accuracy scores on the orders, but
does it affect the finishing points for each order on the third
cue?	 In other words, do following different orders affect
outcomes?	 I'll look just at unknown meanings here.
	
The
finishing points are given below at table 9 for confidence and
accuracy.
Table 9
Means on cue 3 for the unknown orders
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
Confidence	 2.043 1.866 2.049 2.573 2.104 2.482
Accuracy	 .543	 .543	 .488	 .640	 .457	 .634
In fact, I think it is fair to say that there are no drastic
differences in finishing points for confidence and accuracy as
shown on table 9, but it is noticeable that orders bca and cba,
the two orders which are perhaps at the greatest disadvantage
initially since the genus comes last, actually finish higher
than the other orders in terms of confidence and accuracy. We'd
need another experiment to see if this difference is real, but
I can't pursue this here. But we now have the odd paradox of
the advantage in finishing point passing to genus last orders.
Before coming to the consequences for planning let's try and
think of an explanation for this.
How, then, might order effect final rather than total
outcome in guessing unknown meanings bearing in mind that the
genus last examples seem to be slightly more powerful in terms
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of their finishing points on cue 3?
One possible explanation is as follows. Let's stay with
verb target 7: This is to worship, this is done in a frenzy,
primitive tribes do this sometimes. If we guess in the order
acb we might go: pray off cue 1. Realise that it's wrong on
cue 2 and go for sacrifice. Both answers give an accuracy of 1
and reasonable confidence. Then off cue 3 we get in a bit of a
tangle.	 Sacrifice won't fit properly because not all
sacrifices are frenzied. We then perhaps abandon guessing
completely or stay with the sacrifice option as the best we can
do. The end result is to abandon or distort information and
give a single word answer bringing down confidence and possibly
bringing down accuracy to 0 if we abandon guessing or keep them
at 1 accuracy and low confidence if we retain sacrifice. If we
went cba, however, we might get war dance off the first two
cues which gives 0 accuracy but reasonable confidence. Then
the third cue gives worship, we look at options like pray but
they immediately get excluded by the preceding cues and so we
realize that we simply can't make the guess more specific but
must hang onto worship. We then see that the notion of
dancing can be attached, to give worship by dancing. The genus
In last place might act as a form of "buffer" which stops
processing so that previous hypotheses get attached to it.
Possibly processing effects like this inigh help overcome to an
extent suspicion in a new combibination. Also, this does not
mean that we can't form complex hypotheses in non genus last
orders, but it may be easier to form a complex hypothesis when
-231-
the genus comes last as opposed to when it comes first.
Unfortunately, as we've seen, subjects do not use the
phrasal option to build new meanings to any great extent.
Whilst the points about ease of forming a complex hypothesis
when the genus or strongest cue comes last is interesting and
worth researching further, I do not think it explains the
superiority we see in terms of finishing points for genus last
orders we have in this experiment.
Let's bring back uncertainty on the significant
interaction of meaning by information by order (Result l6c) and
see If it will help. The interesting Interactions are in the
unknown meaning section. The means are given at table 10 to
save referring back.
Table 10
Means for unknown orders across Information for uncertainty
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
2 amounts	 1.329 1.061 1.622 1.366 1.555 1.604
3 amounts	 1.067 1.384 1.238 1.384 1.311 1.384
One incidental point here. Earlier I mentioned that in
terms of overall score for each order the genus first orders
had an uncertainty which was more appropriate to confidence
than other orders. This was because where the genus did not
come in first place subjects were misled and had to change
guess at cue 2, We can see that the pattern of results at 2
amounts on table 10 fits this explanation since the genus first
orders have the lowest uncertainty.
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The interesting point here, however, is that the
interactions fall into neat pairs across information: abc/acb,
bac/bca, cab/cba. 	 What we see is that abc falls and acb
rises. Similarly, bac falls and bca rises, cutting across it.
The final Interaction is not so strong; cab falls but cba falls
less strongly. It's really the last two pairs we're interested
in since they contain the orders which place the genus last so
let's look at these first.
It could be that within the last two pairs, those orders
which rise or fall weakly le. bca and cba, have subjects giving
up more than on their counterparts. I suspect not. The two
orders, bca and cba as noted above finish higher on confidence
and accuracy. This superiority could not exist if subjects
were giving up guessing more. The contrast within these pairs
is due to the fact that getting a genus early is perhaps not
such a great advantage as one might think since the only moves
one can subsequently make are either to try to build a new
meaning by use of a phrase or hang on to or make small changes
to the previous single word guess. This latter course is the
more frequent and is probably the cause of the falls in
uncertainty on bac and cab where the genus comes early.
Neither option Is that satisfactory and confidence gets erroded
as does accuracy by the small changes which are made in the
genus guess. With orders which delay the genus: bca and cba,
the guesser will have a single word guess which he can hold or
exchange for another single word guess. Then the genus comes
and because it is the strongest cue we get another change to a
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single word guess, rather than holding the same guess. This
change is a much more substantial one than those noted in the
other orders in the pairs since subjects now have to change
away from cues which have misdirected them. So uncertainty is
high at this point. So also accuracy gets a slight boost where
the genus comes last since it over rules previous cues and gets
subjects into the correct family. Confidence also gets a
slight boost since subjects probably feel safe with a guess
that clearly lies within a specific family.
Also, if we go back to the pair abc/acb then_b is
stronger than c and encourages more change in the original
genus guess. So the first of these orders falls and the second
rises. But again the initial genus guess is being erroded
somewhat.
The trouble is that as far as planning an unknown meaning
order goes we are now in a somewhat tangled situation. One set
of arguments show that genus first is superior in terms of
total scores whilst another set suggests that genus last is
better in terms of finishing point. What I would suggest is
that the genus cue stands out as powerful and subject have good
intuitions about it. The other cues simply seem to Interfere
with the genus either by sending subjects in the wrong
direction when they appear before the genus or by eroding the
genus guess when they come later. My suggestion is that the
best planning strategy to adopt is to gather the available
cues, but not make a guess at this stage. This would limit the
danger of being tricked by differentia or association in first
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place.	 The genus cue should then be looked for and a guess
made from it alone.	 The rest of the cues being abandoned.
This to some extent in effect is what subjects seem to do
naturally. Abandoning information, almost always the
differentia and association cues, was seen as the most frequent
single word response out of the three types of single word
response. Even if we should decide to put forcing (a strategy
which we might wish to discourage now) and not spotting
Inconsistency together as variants of one type of response then
abandoning Is still a very frequent response type. All we add
to it Is the refinement that they collect cues before making a
guess and a little encouragement not to force cues together.
We do, therefore, seem to have a plan which could be taught on
unknown meanings but It does not involve order but rather is
based on limiting amount of information by going for a specific
type. This suits the principle of costs and benefits since it
gives a decent return for not too much effort. Also it seems
to accord with the findings of van Parreren and Schouten-van
Parreren (1981) who found that subjects tended to limit amount
of information rather than go for order based strategies.
Part of speech: We have two parts of speech: nouns and
verbs. I proposed at predictions 1, 2 and 3c that nouns would
be easier to guess than verbs since the association cue to
nouns is a verbal collocations, Such collocations, I have
suggested, might produce a set of closely related hypotheses
because of the presence of selection restrictions. They are
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intra selectional.
There is a significant result on the main effect, see
Result 3 where the means are given for all three dependent
variables. Nouns produce more confidence, more accuracy and
less uncertainty than verbs. It looks as though we might be on
the right track.
We also have a result for the interaction for part of
speech by information for confidence and uncertainty but not
accuracy. See result 7 for means. For uncertainty, we would
expect the noun means to be below the verb at each amount of
information if the association is having an'uniform effect.
This we get, but remember we lack a result for 1 amount of
information. For confidence, we would expect the noun means to
be above the verb at each amount. This we get at two and three
amounts but the position reverses at one amount.
We can see more clearly what's happened on the interaction
of meaning by part of speech by information, Result 9. The
only significant result is on confidence. The means are on
graph 18. Although nouns seem superior to verbs at two and
three amounts, both parts of speech start off equal at one
amount on the known meanings and with verbs superior on unknown
meanings. We would expect nouns to be superior at one amount
as well as two and three amounts if association is having an
effect.
From talking to subjects, it quickly became apparent that
the problem lay in the use of the word This in the cues to the
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the genus cue than the others. There is the infinitive in the
cue This is to, but nevertheless subjects did seem to get
confused. Since the probability of getting a genus at one
amount is one in three the effect is not drastic; nouns and
verbs are almost at the same starting point and the slight
superiority of unknown verbs may just be accidental. As more
cues are given, the probability of getting this confusing genus
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from the noun. Subject's are having to think harder about
the verb targets and put in more processing effort. The fact
that we have a main effect on accuracy and confidence suggests
that this extra effort is persuading subjects to give up. This
giving up happens on the unknowns rather than the knowns and at
three amounts of information. This is suggested by the way the
separation between noun and verb lines is so much more
pronounced on unknown meanings as opposed to known meanings.
Although the confidence lines separate for known meanings, I
suspect that for accuracy they would not.
The superiority of nouns over verbs that we see in the
main effect is not a product of the association cues. Rather
it's an experimental effect produced by the phrasing of the
verb cues. This is unfortunate since we noted in the section
on order that the association in the unknown condition was
somewhat misdirective. So where the association is a verb,
rather than helping us to guess noun targets it might hinder.
The reverse being the case for known meanings.
Conclusions
In guessing known meanings we recognize the familiar
relationships between cues and combine them to gradually narrow
down the range of hypotheses until, if we are completely
successful we arrive at only one possibility, this hypothesis
being a word form. Confidence and accuracy rise together so
subjects seem to have good intuitions about accuracy.
-238-
Uncertainty falls fairly steeply to complement this picture.
As subjects feel they are on the right track they seem less
willing to entertain alternative hypotheses
In guessing unknown meanings the first question is: Do
subjects lexicalise cues to form single word hypotheses or do
they construct new meanings or complex hypotheses? The
evidence suggests that they lexicalise cues. We must remember
the problem that subjects might see the experiment task as
vacuous if they do not use the cues. But as pointed out, this
need not drive them to lexicalise cues as there is still the
opportunity to use them to build new meanings, albeit at a more
"specific" level than intended.
Subjects, when guessing unknown meanings, are still,
then, in the main pursuing a single hypothesis or word form
rather than a complex hypothesis or meaning. The guessing
process on the unknown targets is similar to that on the
knowns. Subjects use a cue to get a word hypothesis. They
then try to use subsequent cues to reinforce or change to
another single hypothesis. However, either at cue 2 or mainly
cue 3 they hit a problem in that information can no longer be
properly lexicalised by combining cues. At this point, rather
than switch to building up a new meaning/complex hypothesis
they stay within the framework of guessing known meanings and
lexicalise the target by adopting one of two strategies. They
can abandon information, most often the differentia though
sometimes the association.	 Or they can force cues together.
When forcing takes place the differentia appears to be
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downgraded to an association and is no longer seen as a part of
the core meaning. In doing this, subjects seem able to retain
some kind of familiar or plausible relationship between the
cues as though they are dealing with a known meaning. Forcing
cues together though is dangerous since inconsistency might not
be perceived with the result that subjects can get drawn Into
overconfidence. On the whole though subjects do seem to have
good intuitions about their accuracy. Uncertainty also reveals
the struggle to deal with perceived inconsistent information in
that it falls less sharply for unknown meanings.
As to forms, the presence of a pseudoword seemed to
attract some processing effort in that subjects seemed to some
extent to be led into a slightly non typical response in the
presence of a strange form at cues I and 2. At cue three on
known targets, when the third cue comes in and it fits a known
form then the pseudoword is seen as a trick and ignored. With
unknown meaning, when Inconsistency appears, the pseucfoworcf is
simply an added difficulty which pushes subjects towards
abandoning information. This Is most likely on the third cue.
Again, If information is abandoned then the last guess made is
most probably going to be taken as a fair synonym for the
target so the pseudoword again gets ignored. In both known and
unknown meaning conditions, it seems to me that the pseudoword
is ultimately reduced to the status of doze space.
As to the difference between intra and extra selectional
collocations, which I hoped to show up In the noun verb
contrast, this failed due to an experimental effect so there Is
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no conclusion to be drawn here.
As to order, if we look at known targets/consistent
information first then we have an interesting result in that
bac emerges as superior. It is debatable whether in real life
such an order would be exploited. There is a difficulty
involved in that cues have to be found and then placed in this
order.	 Given that the advantage or benefit involved is not
that great, it is debatable whether subjects will employ this
order or whether it is worth teaching such an order. With
unknown targets there are also points of interest bearing in
mind that subjects are in the main lexicalising these targets.
The combination of ba is damaging to confidence but on the
whole this effect Is small and there is not much difference
between orders. With accuracy and uncertainty, genus first
orders are clearly superior overall. Subjects seem unaware of
this. However, genus last provides a stronger finishing point.
What really emerges is that the genus cue is the strongest.
The other cues coming before the genus mislead with subjects
being unaware of this or coming after they erode the genus
guess. The best strategy seems not to Involve order but amount
and type of information. It is better to find and use the
genus cue and leave the others alone. So the best strategy is
abandoning and not forcing Information.
Finally, the consequences of the experiment, if it does
duplicate reasonably what happens in real life are to some
extent relevant for the idea that we learn words through
guessing.	 Most of the guesses in the unknown condition are
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familiar single words. If we guess/learn words In this way the
language would be full of fairly precise synonyms, something
which doesn't seem to be the case. We'd have to go to the
dictionary or ask a teacher to complete the process. So
guessing can take us only part of the way down the road of
learning.
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Chapter 7
Using the Ruler Part 3
This chapter deals with the correlations of confidence
and accuracy, confidence and uncertainty and accuracy and
uncertainty. Apart from overall correlations between these
variables, there are a large number of possible correlations
based on factors like amounts of information, known and unknown
meanings etc. and possible Interactions. Whilst a large number
of these correlations were looked at, I will confine the
discussion here by identifying a set of topics of relevance to
this study.
The chapter will be structured as follows. First, I will
identify a set of topics for discussion and make some
predictions.	 Second, I will look at the measures of
association which will be used.	 Third, I will discuss the
topics identified and see if the predictions are met.
Topics
Overall correlation of confidence and accuracy: In the
last chapter we saw that subjects do appear to have fairly good
intuitions about accuracy. There, however, we were using an
ANOVA and looking at this as an average group phenomenon. Here
we want to know if individuals are consistently more confident
when they are more accurate.
Prediction 1:	 Confidence and accuracy will correlate
positively. When a subject is more accurate he will be more
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confident.
Complex hypotheses vs single word hypotheses: We noted
in the model that in the formation of complex hypotheses,
confidence will be damaged due to suspicion in the new
combination of ideas that form the new meaning. The model
predicts that this problem does not affect accuracy, however so
confidence in complex hypothesis formation should not be
proportionate to accuracy.
	 We can illustrate this by a
comparison with known meanings. So when subjects score a
maximum accuracy of 2 on unknown meanings, (they can only get
this score by forming a complex hypothesis here) their
confidence should be lower than those subjects on known
meanings who also score maximum accuracy. The idea is that
known meaning guessing represents a balanced situation in terms
of costs/benefits and confidence will be appropriate to
accuracy.
Prediction 2: We should find that subjects who form
complex hypotheses on unknown meanings and score an accuracy of
2 should have a substantially lower confidence than those who
score an accuracy of 2 on the formation of single word
hypotheses in the known meaning condition.
The deception of differentias and associations on cue 1
where unknown meanings are lexicalised: In the last chapter we
noted that the differentia tends to be a strong cue on known
meanings since not many words share the same differentia. This
type of cue tends to lead quickly to the correct target. On
unknown meanings we have an unfamiliar combination of genus and
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differentia.	 If a subject tries to lexicalise a target, the
differentia is now much more likely to send him In the wrong
direction without him realising.
	 The same Is true of the
association hut to a lesser extent. For example, if we take
unknown target 7: To reif: This is to worship, This Is done In
a frenzy, Primitive tribes do this sometimes, we can see that
the differentia is likely to send the subject into single word
options like kill, attack etc. which are not related to
worsh4. Also, a similar but perhaps not so drastic effect is
produced by the association. Any association has to be
compatible with the differentia as well as the genus. It would
be strange to suggest monks and nuns as associations of reif.
As we see above, the Idea of primitive tribes which is
compatible with the differentia Is more likely to suggest war
dance or hunt than forms of worship and again the subject is
misdirected. This led to overconfidence where differentia and
association came before genus.
	 We can again look at this
problem by correlating confidence with accuracy.
Prediction 3:
	 Differentla and association cues will
misdirect subjects when they come in first position and when
they try to lexicalise an unknown meaning.
	 This leads to
overconfidence.
Is changing a guess better policy than holding a guess in
terms of accuracy? This Is going to Involve a correlation of
uncertainty and accuracy and clearly, uncertainty is going to
be the Independent varIable. As far as holding guesses goes,
we have seen that this can be a response to difficulty but
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reflects a somewhat negative attitude. The subject is not sure
what guess to make so he holds his last one. In contrast, if
one thinks that one has gone wrong, changing does offer the
possibility of getting the correct answer.
Prediction 4: Changing guesses should be a better policy
with respect to accuracy than holding the same guess.
Does changing a guess generate the same amount of
confidence as holding a guess? This involves a correlation of
uncertainty and confidence and clearly uncertainty will be the
independent variable. Changing guesses should lead to the
generation of confidence just as holding a guess when
information is used. It Is interesting to speculate what might
have happened had I graded putting no guess as the same as
holding the same guess on unknowns. I will leave this topic
alone as it is not possible at this stage to regrade the
responses.	 On the whole, I would expect both holding and
changing to generate equal amounts of confidence.
Prediction 5: Changing a guess should produce the same
amount of confidence as holding a guess.
The Correlation Coefficients Used
Before coming to the discussion of the above topics, a
word about the correlation coefficients used. Also, to make
this discussion more concrete, I am going to Illustrate
techniques by using the overall correlation of confidence and
accuracy so we will also be looking at prediction 1 here.
The first type of coefficient used is Pearson r. Three
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assumption lie behind this test. First, the association
between the variables is linear. This is the main reason for
choosing this test. I wanted to begin by looking at the
possibility that the relationships between the variables was a
straight line and this statistic is a good indicator of this.
The second assumption is that the two variables are continuous.
As I've mentioned, we can't say for sure that the variables are
continuous since we can't say, for example, that the Interval
between 1 and 2 confidence is the same as the interval between
2 and 3. It is not uncommon, however, to find researchers make
the assumption of continuity where it might not strictly apply
and I'm going to do this here. The third assumption is that
the scores for the two variables are independent of each other.
We would make scores independent by adding together all the
responses for each subject (144 responses and 41 subjects in
this experiment). This assumption of independence Is important
if we want to do a significance test on Pearson r but is not so
important where we want to use this test only descriptively
Two methods of using Pearson r commend themselves. The
first is to take subjects as cases. A total score is given for
each subject for confidence accuracy or uncertainty using which
ever columns are of Interest. For example, we might give a
subject a total for verbs and another for nouns on two of the
variables. If we take as an example the overall correlation
for confidence and accuracy here, we get a coefficient of .084.
Very poor in fact. The scattergram Is given at graph 1 and we
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can see that the line runs flat through the centre of the
plots.
Graph 1 Scattergram for Overall Confidence and Accuracy
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It looks as though prediction 1 has failed rather badly.
However, I think it is fair to say that the reason for this
failure lies in the method used to obtain the correlation
coefficient. The real problem here is that we are rather
crudely lumping together 144 different kinds of score for each
person. The result is that we end up with 41 scores for the
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individual subjects all reflecting a fairly average confidence
over a fairly average accuracy which is essentially the picture
displayed on the scattergram at graph 1. There is a lot of
detail in terms of items such as amounts of Information and
known/unknown meanings and we need to look at items as well.
A second way, then, in which Pearson r could be used is
to take subjects and items as cases. Using again the overall
coefficient for confidence and accuracy as an example, the
following method can be employed. Imagine the confidence file
in the computer; forty one subjects down and one hundred and
forty four responses across. In minitab the computer was asked
to unstack the columns so that column 2 was placed beneath
column 1 etc. The same was done for the accuracy file. The
result is two columns 5,904 responses long with these columns
containing not just between subjects data but now also within
subjects data ie. the items. For example, the response for a
subject on one amount of information is present and lower down
the columns we get the same subject's responses on two and
three amounts all in the same positions for confidence and
accuracy. We can now correlate these two columns and the
coefficient is now .587 instead of .084. The greater detail
provided by the individual items improves the coefficient. If
we table the two columns of data we get the distribution given
at table 1.
We can't get a useful scattergrain for this coefficient
now since the accuracy scale in particular is too narrow. We
can get an average for each column by multiplying each score by
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it's confidence value, adding these scores for each column and
dividing by the column total. These scores/plots are given in
table 2.
Table I
The distribution of confidence and accuracy plots
ROWS= Confidence, COLUMNS= Accuracy
2310 1788 1806
	
5904 Totals
6
	
87
	
122
	
642
	
851
5
	
67
	
138
	
331
	
536
4
	
151
	
265
	
349
	
765
3
	
334
	
435
	
248
	
1017
2
	
439
	
417
	
155
	
1011
1
	
447
	
312
	
64
	
823
0
	
785
	
99
	
17
	
901
0
	
1
	
2
	
Totals
Table 2
Confidence and accuracy plots
Confidence	 1.639	 2.758	 4.441
Accuracy	 0	 1	 2
If we display the plots at table 2 on graph 2 we get a rising
line representing the positive correlation coefficient rather
than the flat line representing no correlation at graph 1.
From now on only plots derived from averaging the columns in
the tables will be given for the Pearson r (subjects and Items)
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coefficients.	 It will be too cumbersome to keep giving the
tables themselves.
What we do see, then, is that when we introduce items we
get a stronger correlation because of the greater detail
provided by items. Another advantage is that in terms of
Graph 2
Confidence a Accuracy
Accuracy
real life we would be interested in the confidence and accuracy
of particular people on particular items, not how they perform
on average over items. However, by using the subjects and
items as cases approach on Pearson r we have the disadvantages
of not being able to obtain clear scattergrams and also of not
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being able to use a test of significance since scores are now
no longer independent of each other.Despite these
disadvantages, this approach is to be preferred because of its
detail and realism and is the one I will adopt with respect to
Pearson r from now on.
In terms of prediction 1, it does look as though we do
get a positive correlation between confidence and accuracy.
The coefficient is not particularly strong at .587 but we can
say that when a subject is confident he also tends to be
accurate.	 One factor which might be interfering with the
correlation is different types of subject. Some people are
"naturally" more confident than others and the effect of this
variation might be to create to some extent lowish confidence
scores over high accuracy and highish confidence scores over
low accuracy thus spoiling to an extent the correlation.
We are, however, still exploring only the possibility of
a linear relationship. Just in case, however, the relationship
between the variables is not a straight line but a curve, I
thought it desirable to cover Pearson r with a second measure
of association more responsive to a curve. This measure being
Goodman and Kruskal's gamma. This test is used on the same
data of subjects and items as cases as Pearson r. Should this
statistic give stronger results than Pearson r it might be
taken as an Indication that the relationship is curved rather
than linear.	 Also, this statistic is slightly more generous
than Pearson r.
	 Therefore, a small increase of this result
above Pearson r can not be taken assupport for a curve rather
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than a line. Note that the overall measure of agreement for
gamma between confidence and accuracy is, .643, only marginally
above the Pearson r coefficient of .587 on the same data.
Probably not a sufficient increase to claim the presence of a
curve rather than a straight line.
Discussion
Complex hypotheses vs single word hypotheses:
The first question concerns those subjects on the unknown
meanings who were able to construct a reasonable meaning in the
form of a complex hypothesis for the targets. Such subjects
score 2 accuracy. But does the accuracy of these subjects
produce the same amount of confidence as it does for those who
score 2 on the known meanings. Prediction 2 suggests not. In
the known meaning condition the cues all support a single
hypothesis. In the unknown condition, we have an unfamiliar
combination and there will be a sense of suspicion in the
complex hypothesis. This will undermine confidence relative to
the known condition where maximum accuracy is achieved so that
we can say that subjects are somewhat underconfident where new
meanings are formed.
It is possible to use either accuracy or confidence as
the independent or explanatory variable. I will choose
accuracy. It is more reasonable to view high or low accuracy
as producing high or low confidence. Also, it is variations
in confidence on the same level of accuracy that we are
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interested in.
Are subjects who score high on accuracy in constructing
unknown meanings at a disadvantage as far as confidence is
concerned in contrast to similar subjects guessing known
meanings? The first place to look at this topic is the overall
contrast between known and unknown meanings. The coefficients
are given in table 3.
Table 3
Known and unknown meaning coefficients
Unknown meanings	 Known meanings
r	 .345	 .591
g	 .473	 .681
We can see that on both measures of association, unknown
meaning coefficients are weaker than the known so there is a
contrast.	 People are simply not such good judges of their
accuracy on unknowns. The distribution of plots for the
Pearson r coefficient for known and unknown meanings is given
in table 4. These means are displayed on graph 3.
What we see on graph 3 is that confidence falls off for
the unknowns in contrast to known meanings at an accuracy of 2,
so it looks as though those people who achieve a high level of
accuracy on unknown meanings are suffering some kind of
"confidence failure" in contrast to their known meaning
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Table 4
The distribution of plots for known and unknown meanings
Unknown Meanings
Confidence 1.568
	 2.708	 3.286
Accuracy	 0	 1	 2
Known Meanings
Confidence 1.828	 2.850	 4.567
Accuracy	 0	 1	 2
counterparts. The unknown meanings generate about 1.3 or 28%
Graph 3
Confidence and Accuracy x Meanin9
2
Accuracy
less confidence than the knowns.
	 It is a substantial
difference and does support prediction 2.
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As to whether the lines for the coefficients are curved,
it looks as though for known meanings we have an upward curve
and for the unknowns a downward curve. Possibly, for the known
meanings, subjects have strong intuitions about correctness at
accuracy 0 and 2 but are less sure at 1. With unknown
meanings the caution subjects feel In new meanings is bending
the line downwards at accuracy 2 in contrast to the known
meaning line at this point. The difference between gamma
and Pearson r for known meanings is 0.09 and for unknown
meanings is 0.128. This isn't a dramatic advantage for gamma
and I don't think we should read too much into it. At best we
can say that gamma shows a similar advantage on both types of
meaning and that the known meaning coefficient might just be
slightly concave and the unknown meaning, slightly convex.
The next place to look for support for this idea is
meaning by amount of information. I'm going to iou c t
third amount of Information since it Is here that we are going
to find the highest accuracy scores.
	 Table 5 gives the
coefficients we need.
Table 5
Coefficients for known and unknown meanings on the third amount
of information.
Unknown meanings	 Known meanings
r	 .449	 .632
g	 .580	 .760
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We can see that for Pearson r and gamma that the unknown
meaning correlation is weaker than the known. Subjects are
again not such good judges of their accuracy on the unknowns.
The plots for columns are given In table 6.
The means on table 6 are displayed on graph 4. We again
see confidence on the unknown meanings fall quite substantially
below confidence on the known meanings at an accuracy of 2 as
at graph 3. Unknown meanings are about 1.8 or
Table 6
Confidence and accuracy plots for the 3rd amount of information
Confidence unknown meanings 1.295
	 3.143	 3.534
Accuracy unknown meanings	 0	 1	 2
Confidence known meanings 	 2.109	 3.891	 5.367
Accuracy known meanings	 0	 1	 2
34% lower than knowns on an accuracy of 2. Again a substantial
difference.
Suspicion In the components of a complex hypothesIs Is
handicapping confidence on unknowns when subjects are actually
accurate. Whereas on the known meanings we'd get a confidence
progression of 2->4->6, on the unknowns we'd get 2->3->5.
There being no difference on cue 1 since the pseudoword which
would occur more naturally in the unknown condition rather than
the known only has a small effect. There will, then, be a
sense of underconfidence where new meanings are guessed.
Probably subjects are reluctant to use such complex hypotheses
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because of this. A good policy would be to follow guessing by
checking in a dictionary.
Graph 4
Conf/Acc x meaning x 3rd am Info
Accuracy
Finally, we could ask whether the line for the unknown
meanings on graph 4 is more of a curve than that for known
meanings. The differences between gamma and Pearson r for the
unknown meanings is .131. Again, the difference is slight.
Also note that the advantage for gamma on the known meanings is
.128, almost the same as for unknown meanings, yet the known
meanings are represented more clearly by a straight line. We
don't really have any supporting evidence that the line for
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unknown meanings on graph 4 is truly curved.
The deception of differentia and association on cue I
where unknown meanings are lexicalised: To move now to the
second question, Prediction 3 claims that subjects on unknown
meanings are being deceived by the differentia and association
in first position. This involves the correlation of confidence
and accuracy. I'll simply use Pearson r here.
The first thing we need to establish is how subjects
behave at low amounts of information normally. If we look at
known meanings by amount of information we get the coefficients
given at table 7.
Table 7
coefficients for known meanings by amount of information
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
r	 .366	 .495	 .632
The correlations between confidence and accuracy get stronger
as information increases. But how? The average amounts of
confidence for the accuracy scores is given at table 8. These
means are displayed on graph 5. Essentially, the picture we
get Is one of subjects exercising a degree of caution. Those
who get an accuracy of 1 are less confident on two amounts of
information than on three and again on one amount than two.
Yet even on 1 amount there Is an awareness of accuracy. Those
who score an accuracy of 1 are a little more confident than
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23.086
4.165
5.364
those who score 0 and again there is another increase at 2.
This then, I would suggest, is a fairly expected description of
Table 8
Confidence and accuracy plots for known meanings by information
Confidence 1 amount
Confidence 2 amounts
Confidence 3 amounts
Accuracy
0	 1
1.685	 2.133
2.049	 3.207
2.109	 3.891
the relationship between confidence and accuracy. Subjects
seem to have some awareness even at low amounts of information,
they know that they've got a little muddled or have taken a
wild guess. One interesting point is that over 0 accuracy
confidence still rises very slightly with information.
Possibly some subjects have gone wrong and don't realize It.
This would not be frequent though as confidence would go a lot
higher. Probably also subjects like to hold onto a vestige of
confidence even when they suspect they have gone wrong and this
has contributed.
If we move now to unknown meanings by amount of
information and look at the various orders. The coefficients
are in table 9.
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Table 9
Pearson r coefficients for order by unknown meaning by amounts
of information.
	
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
1 amount	 .249	 .221	 .117	 -.080	 .239	 .262
2 amounts	 .309	 .473	 .351	 .032	 .358	 .199
3 amounts	 .459	 .503	 .491	 .363	 .438	 .436
The first thing to note is that at three amounts of
information, all orders emerge pretty much the same. Given
that we are dealing with descriptive correlations and fairly
low power ones, If we rounded all scores correct to the first
decimal place we get .4 to .5 for all and there is no clear
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Confidence for orders
abc
acb
bac
bca
cab
cba
1
2.255 (137)
2.320 (125)
2.466 (15)
1.428 (14)
2.607 (28)
2.418 (43)
0
1.423 (26)
1.684 (38)
1.702 (148)
1.825 (149)
1.647 (136)
1.603 (121)
superiority for genus first orders since order bac is stronger
than abc. Whatever happens at low amounts of information
doesn't substantially interfere with the outcome of the various
orders. Table 10 gives the average amounts of confidence for
accuracy levels of 0 and 1 for all the unknown meaning orders
on one amount of information together with the number of
responses falling at each point.
What we get is essentially the same picture as on graph 5
at I amount of information. Subjects are slightly higher in
confidence on 1 amount at accuracy 1 as opposed to accuracy 0,
but it's not by a great deal. In other words, they have some
intuition about accuracy but are exercising caution. On the
surface, the unknown orders are not behaving much differently
from the more general effect for known meanings. But look at
the distribution of responses.	 On the genus first orders,
confidence was generally rewarded by an accuracy of 1,
Table 10
Confidence and accuracy plots and numbers of responses for
unknown orders at lam
KEY 0= number of responses
Accuracy
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and it is here we have the bulk of the responses, but on the
other orders the great bulk of the responses, get an accuracy
of 0. These responses which score an accuracy of 0 may be a
little lower in confidence than those that score 1 within the
appropriate order, but this degree of caution is not really
appropriate to the numbers of subjects/responses which are
getting accuracy 0. (Note also that where a pair of orders
start with the same cue, confidence should be equal over the
same accuracy. This is so where numbers of responses are high.
Where numbers of responses are low, confidence scores fluctuate
most noticeably on b at accuracy of 1. Note that with known
meanings by information as given in table 8 the number of
responses for each level of accuracy are much more evenly
spread.	 These are given at table 11 for one amount of
information.
Table 11
Confidence, accuracy and number of responses on 1 amount of
information for known targets.
Accuracy	 0	 1	 2
Confidence	 1.685	 2.133	 3.086
Responses	 401	 293	 290
We can see that there is a better than fifty fifty chance of
getting an accuracy of 1 or higher off one amount of
information and this warrants some confidence.	 In the
situation on unknown meanings for non genus first orders the
odds are probably nearer one in ten for some orders. We are in
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a situation where we are very nearly fooling all of the
subjects at 1 amount of information for the non genus first
orders and if they were to realize this their confidence would
drop to the more appropriate level of near zero. It's probably
mistaken belief by subjects that they have a reasonable chance
of being correct on the first cue of non genus first orders
which was causing the accuracy of these orders to drop below
their respective confidence scores in the last chapter. One
final point about tables 10 and 9. We can see on table 10 that
b first orders attract a larger number of responses on accuracy
O than £ first orders. Also on table 9, it is the b first
orders which have the poorest correlations at 1 amount with bca
actually going negative. It looks as though the differentia is
the main problem as noted in prediction 3. Not that many words
share the same differentia. This makes it a strong cue on a
known meaning but on an unknown or unfamiliar combination it
will mislead strongly. The association, for reasons given in
prediction 3 does not mislead so seriously.
However, we can' go on fooling most of the people all of
the time and as more information comes in subjects realize
their mistake and correct so that the non genus first orders
catch up the genus first orders in terms of the strength of the
coefficients. Just to show this I'll give the confidence and
accuracy scores for the weakest order bca at table 12 and
display them on graph 6.
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Table 12
Confidence and accuracy plots for unknown order bca by
inforrnat ion
Accuracy
0	 1	 2
Confidence
1 amount	 1.825
	
1.428
2 amounts	 2.118
	
2.181
	
2.500
3 amounts	 1.848
	
3.000
	
4.050
What we see is essentially a move to a rising line (positive
correlation) over information very similar to graph 5 where
confidence in an accuracy score of 1 or 2 increases as
information increases though we have the interesting point of
confidence rising at two amounts of information over an
accuracy of 0 and then a correction being made at three
amounts. Also, at three amounts of information the increases
in confidence are not so dramatic as with known meanings
because of the handicap guessing unknown meanings has at high
levels of accuracy discussed earlier. Note also that the
finishing point for bca on table 12 is 4.050 confidence on
accuracy 2 on the third amount of information. This is higher
than the average finishing point of 3.534 shown at table
6/graph 4. Despite the slightly weaker coefficient for this
order on table 9, the order is effective and there is again the
suggestion that genus last orders might be better when it comes
to building new meanings as noted in the last chapter.
Essentially, however, the key cue on unknown meanings is
the genus since these meanings are lexicalised. The best way
-265--
SS
2
6. 0
5. S
5. 0
4. 5
4.0
3. 5
	
0)	 3.0
0
C
	
0)	 's
2.0
C
1.0
.0
0. S
0. 0
0
I amount
2 amounts
3 amounts
to tackle the problem of the deception of differentia and
association in first place Is not to use genus first orders but.
to find the genus cue and abandon the others.
Graph 6
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Is changing a guess better policy than holding a guess In
terms of accuracy? The way in which uncertainty is measured in
this experiment does raise questions of how valid our picture
of uncertainty is.	 It does, however, give a good picture of
whether subjects are keeping or changing guesses. 	 If we now
bring In the idea of accuracy we can see whether persisting
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with an early guess is a "good" policy or not in terms of
accuracy. If one sticks with one's first guess Is one more
likely to be right than if one shows flexibility and be
prepared to change one's guess? I would expect the latter to
be the case as given in prediction 4. This possibility was
brought to my attention by Phil Scholfield who mentioned that
he had come across an article on this subject quite some time
previous to our conversation. Unfortunately, a search didn't
find anything so there Is an author I need to acknowledge, but
unfortunately I can't pay the debt.
Here, then, we are concerned with the correlation of
uncertainty with accuracy and it seems reasonable to take
uncertainty as the Independent or explanatory variable as this
is the factor influencing degrees of accuracy.
The overall correlations for accuracy and uncertainty are
give in table 13.
Table 13
Overall coefficients for accuracy and uncertainty
r= -.489
g= -.629
Neither of the coefficients is strong. The stronger result
for gamma suggests that the correlation might involve a curve.
The most important point is that the correlation Is negative.
The plots for Pearson r for accuracy over the three values of
uncertainty are given at table 14 and displayed at graph 7.
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Table 14
Accuracy and uncertainty plots for the overall coefficient
Accuracy	 1.490	 1.236	 0.567
Uncertainty	 0	 1	 2
We can see that there is high accuracy over low
uncertainty and low accuracy over high uncertainty. It seems
Graph 7
Uncert a rt y
as though holding the same guess is good policy as far as
accuracy is concerned at least in this experiment setup. Not
something I would have expected. Prediction 4 seems to fail.
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We also see on graph 7 that the line of the correlation might
involve something of a curve, brought on by a steeper decline
between 1 and 2 uncertainty as opposed to 0 and 1. The higher
gamma value might lend some support to this.
It seems likely that the known/unknown meaning distinction
is influencing this result, however. On the unknown meanings,
subjects gave up and scored 0 accuracy and 2 uncertainty. This
fact could be causing the more steeply falling section that
creates the curve on graph 7 and creating low accuracy over
high uncertainty. Also, with the known meanings, subjects got
to the correct answer quite quic'kly as a rule so they -uitiYt
really see any point in changing guesses and this could be
producing the high accuracy over low uncertainty with some
subjects getting a little confused and producing low accuracy
over high uncertainty. In other words the overall correlations
could owe their negative values, to some extent, to a combined
effect for known and unknown meanings.
Let's turn to the meaning distinction, then. 	 The
coefficients are in table 15.
Table 15
Coefficients for types of meaning
Unknown meanings	 Known meanings
r	 -.321	 -.391
g	 -.539	 -.572
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Negative values are present throughout. The plots for accuracy
and uncertainty for the coefficients are given at table 16.
The means at table 16 are displayed on graph 8.
Table 16
Accuracy and uncertainty plots for types of meaning
Unknown meanings
Accuracy	 .726	 .861	 .323
Uncertainty	 0	 1	 2
Known meanings
Accuracy	 1.802	 1.586	 1.134
Uncertainty	 0	 1	 2
If we look at graph 8 for unknown meanings it looks like
there's a curve there and the higher value of gamma in table 15
supports this. The low accuracy at low uncertainty tells us
that subjects are in difficulty here. The curve shows us what
they can do about it. If they hold a guess then clearly, they
can't get out of trouble. If they switch guesses they get an
increase in accuracy so that the line for unknown meanings
starts to rise. This Is probably caused by the differentia and
association cues in first place sending subjects initially in
the wrong direction. The subsequent fall producing low
accuracy over high uncertainty Is caused more by subjects
giving up than by switching guesses although there may be an
element of drastic changes In an attempt to get out of
difficulty.	 What the uncertainty 1 plot with its higher
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accuracy shows is that subjects seem quite able, If the
situation necessitates, to change guesses to Increase accuracy,
Graph 8
Acc a Unc: Meaning
unknown
known
0.00
0
Uncertainty
Holding, here, Is perhaps a symptom of difficulty and is
clearly not an effective way of dealing with It since It offers
no chance of improving accuracy.
If we turn now to known meanings the coefficients are
still negative (see table 15). But we see on the graph at 8
for the known meaning plots that the upper part of the accuracy
scale Is used. Although subjects are at their highest accuracy
when keeping the same guess, they have not gone very low when
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changing it. Probably subjects are getting through to the
correct answer quite quickly and see no need to change it.
Holding a guess in this way is going to create high accuracy
over low uncertainty. What pulls accuracy down, to some
degree, as uncertainty increases, is that subjects have got a
little confused on some of the targets (noun target 4 effigy
was not easy to guess) and have perhaps guessed wildly to try
and rescue the situation.
That we have negative correlations suggests that holding
guesses is a better policy than changing and so on the surface
at least prediction 4 fails. We do need to point out, however,
that changing guesses can be a way out of getting out of a
difficulty as illustrated by unknown meanings when subjects
have been sent the wrong way and is effective in generating
accuracy. On known meanings there might not really be a
pressing need to change since the items might be fairly easy to
guess. So changing might well be a better policy than holding
where there is difficulty. 	 We really need to experiment
further around this problem.
Finally, I'd just like to look briefly at order by
unknown meanings by amounts of information. In the last
chapter, I noted that the unknown orders across amounts of
information fell into neat pairs as far as uncertainty was
concerned. Order abc fell and order acb rose and crossed it.
Similarly, order bac fell and order bca rose again crossing it.
Order cab fell sharply but order cba not so sharply. I argued
that on orders which fell or fell sharply, subjects might be in
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more difficulty than where there were rises or slower falls and
might be holding on to the same guess or making small changes
as a way of dealing with the problem. Note also that for
accuracy, although there was some variation, all orders
finished at three amounts of information at pretty much the
same place, either at .5 or .6 accuracy (the a last being
slightly higher).	 If the finishing point for accuracy is
roughly the same for all orders, they must get there in
different ways.
	 I doubt if subjects are giving up on some
orders more than others as this would produce dramatic
differences in finishing points. There may, then, be this
tendency to hold guesses/make small changes on the order which
falls or falls sharply in each pair and a tendency to change
guesses more substantially on the others.
The tendency to hold/small change guesses should betray
itself in that a strongish negative correlation should be
produced. The point being that such accuracy as is produced is
the result of holding the same guess. This factor, In it
itself, would tend to give a zero correlation. However, the
tendency to give up guessing would produce a negative
correlation and the zero effect of holding guesses would not
interfere too much with this.
	 For the other order In each
pair, that which rises or falls more slowly, the correlation
should be weaker ie. not so strongly negative. That accuracy
which is produced Is the result of more positively changing
guesses. Since this would produce highish accuracy at highish
uncertainty the result should be a positive correlation.
	 I
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doubt if this would happen since we again have subjects giving
up guessing which would produce a negative correlation with low
accuracy at high uncertainty. However, this time we have a
positive rather than zero effect interfering and this should
weaken the correlation. If this is correct, then when we come
to look at the correlations we should see something like the
following for those coefficients at the third amount of
information. The coefficient for acb should be weaker than for
abc. The coefficient for bca should be weaker than for bac.
The correlation for cba should be weaker than for cab. This is
just what we do get if we look at table 17 where the
coefficients on Pearson r (I don't have gamma at this level)
for order on unknown meanings are given.
What is causing this is the point mentioned in the last
chapter. When the genus comes early in an order there is
perhaps more of a tendency to hold on to the guess generated or
make small changes and the reverse when the genus comes late.
In the a first orders the differentia causes more change than
the association so when it comes before this cue uncertainty
falls and visa versa.	 It is worth noting that order, then,
may play a role in changing and holding guesses on unknown
meanings. Rather than teach one order than another to
students, however, my inclination would be to remove any
difficulty attached to order by using the strategy of going for
the genus cue and abandoning the others.
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Table 17
Pearson r coefficients for order by unknown meaning on the
third amount of information of information.
	
abc	 acb	 bac	 bca	 cab	 cba
	
-.643	 -.531	 -.549	 -.014	 -.506	 -.196
Does changing a guess generate the same amount of
confidence as holding a guess? When a subject changes guesses,
then if he is using information efficiently to make this
change, confidence should rise just as when a subject uses
information to confirm a previous guess. The question I want
to look at very briefly here is whether or not using
information to change guesses contributes as much confidence as
when information is used to confirm guesses. Prediction 5
suggests that changing a guess should generate as much
confidence as holding a guess.
The overall coefficient is at table 18.
Table 18
Overall coefficients for confidence and uncertainty
r	 -.556
g	 -.615
It is negative so we are getting high confidence where
subjects hold the same guess and visa versa. The plots for
confidence and uncertainty for the coefficient are given in
table 19.
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Table 19
The overall plots
Confidence	 4.468	 3.539	 1.907
Uncertainty	 0	 1	 2
These plots are displayed on graph 9. It looks as though
prediction 5 fails and that changing a guess produces some kind
of loss of confidence. What could be pulling the confidence
score down at uncertainty 2 on graph 9 is subjects giving up
guessing on the unknown meanings.
We need to divide this result into known and unknown
meanings. Table 20 gives the coefficients.
Table 20
Coefficients for unknown and known meanings
Unknown meanings 	 Known meanings
r	 -.450	 -.476
g	 -.549	 -.554
The plots for confidence and uncertainty are given at table 21.
These scores are displayed on graph 10. What we see is a
downward trend on both types of meaning on graph 10. Holding a
guess seems to contribute more confidence than changing to a
new one. Giving up at uncertainty 2 on unknown meanings helps
to exaggerate the drop here. There is a corresponding fall in
the same position for known meanings and in all probability
this is caused by subjects who know they are In difficulty and
are having a wild stab so confidence is bound to suffer. The
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interesting point is the contrast on C) and 1 uncertainty.
There is a small advantage of .4 on unknowns and .9 for knowns
Table 21
The plots for known and unknown meanings
Unknown confidence	 3.343	 2.98	 1.438
Unknown uncertainty 0
	 1	 2
Known confidence	 4.928	 4.068	 2.995
Known uncertainty 	 0	 1	 2
for holding as opposed to changing. Prediction 5 has failed.
Possibly the source of this is that It costs a little extra in
processing effort with a resulting undermining of the "normal"
confidence level to change a guess as opposed to holding one.
It might be that this drain on confidence involved in changing
might encourage holding of guesses to some extent.
One final point.	 The perspective depending which
variable we see as independent and which as depend€nt in thz
correlations is important. Here, I've taken arzcectairzty as t2re
independent variable. We could turn this around though and
take confidence as the independent variable. The plots for the
correlation this way around are given at table 22. If we do
this, the picture we get is not one of uncertainty creating a
drain on confidence but of low confidence generating high
uncertainty. That is, when people are not sure about a guess
they want to process more by generating more hypotheses.
Unfortunately, this second picture is more In keeping with the
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view of uncertainty described by Peterson and Pltz (1988) as
the number of alternative hypotheses held, The idea of
changeability, I would see as better suited to using
uncertainty as the independent variable and where we do get
Table 22
Known and unknown meaning plots
	
Known confidence	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6
Known uncertainty 1.7 1.2 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.3
	
Unknown confidence	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6
Unknown uncertainty 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.8
this picture of change involving greater cost. Something in
fact which the principle of costs and benefits as described by
Payne (1982) might have suggested had I remembered this when
making predictions.
Conclusions
In prediction 1 we are interested in the overall
correlation of confidence with accuracy.
	 As expected, this
correlation Is positive but it is not strong.	 This, it Is
suggested, is because we have different types of subjects in
terms of confidence. In addition to "middle of the road"
subjects, we get some people who are always very sure of
themselves and others who lack confidence. In general though,
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when subjects are accurate they are confident.
With prediction 2, we are interested in what happens when
a subject builds a complex hypothesis or new meaning. Subjects
Graph 9
Confidence a Uncertainty
Uncertainty
are capable of doing this and achieving an accuracy of 2.
However, suspicion in the complex hypothesis undermines
confidence which suffers in contrast to the comparable known
meaning or single word hypothesis condition at accuracy 2.
Where a subject is able to guess a new meaning accurately, he
could well find himself less confident than he would expect in
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his hypothesis. In addition to processing information to make
a guess, one would
Graph 10
Conf a Unc: Meaning
unknown.
known.
Uncert 31 rity
expect subjects in such a condition to follow their guess by an
additional strategy of appeal to authority. They would check
it In a dictionary or ask a teacher or a knowledgeable friend.
There is also support for prediction 3 and the idea that
subjects are misled by the differentia and association cues in
initial position on unknown meaning orders when they lexicalise
such a target rather than build a knew meaning. The best
policy for dealing with this deception seems not to be to use
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genus first orders. This tends to lead to erosion of the
initial genus guess if subsequent cues are used. Rather, the
best policy is to find the genus and abandon the other cues.
In terms of accuracy, holding the same guess also seems
to be generally a better policy than changing guesses.
Prediction 4 seems to fail. We need to be cautious here,
though, in that we did see successful changes of guess on
unknown meanings. On known meanings, it might be that a high
level of accuracy is being reached fairly quickly is making
changes unnecessary and that where changes are taking place
they might be accompanied by an element of confusion. We need
more experimentation here.
With prediction 5, it appears that changing a guess does
lead to a slight drain on confidence as opposed to holding a
guess. In all probability, there is a little more processing
effort involved in changing.
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Chapter 8
Suggesting a New Meaning Part 1
This chapter contains the introduction to, method and the
results for Experiment 4. Chapter 9 contains the
interpretation and discussion of these results.
Experiment 4
Introduction
Purpose of the experiment: The purpose of this
experiment Is to look at the guessing of known and unknown
meanings across differing amounts of Information and across
orders of differing kinds of information In a more naturalistic
or real life setting. The dependent variables are confidence,
accuracy and uncertainty. A second purpose is that so far
wetve looked at confidence starting low and rising. It might
be interesting to reverse this and look at a situation where
confidence starts high and look at what impact known and
unknown meanings have on such a confidence.
What do I mean by "naturalistic"? One aspect of the
meaning of this word relates to the amounts and kinds of
information one would find In everyday text which would provide
cues to targets.
Schatz and Baldwin (1986) take up this problem. They
state their view of language in the following quote.	 "When
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novelists and journalists, for example, compose passages that
contain low frequency words, they do so with a minimum of
semantic redundancy." In a natural context, each word is seen
as maximally informative and adds information which can not be
predicted from other words in the environment. The conclusion
is that natural contexts do not usually give cues to word
meaning and so it is extremely difficult to guess.
These authors give some interesting illustrations of
their idea. I'll give some examples at 1.
la) Rasputin's necromancy allowed him to rule the kingdom.
b) Merlin's necromancy allowed him to rule the kingdom.
The first they regard as fairly nar-1 text. The second is a
little more helpful in terms of cues.
The first point I would make is that the genus of
necromancy can be partly or wholly guessed in both examples.
In la we could get some form of power and in the second, magic.
The real problem seems to be the differentla.
The second problem is that both examples at 1 are
decidedly odd. To understand this oddness I would turn to
Crice's idea of the Cooperative Principle, not in the original,
but as set out by authors like Leech (1974) and Levinson
(1983). Based on these ideas we would probably draw the
implicatures at 2 from the statements at 1 if we understood
necromancy.
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2a) Rasputin's evil stemmed from magic involving the dead.
b) Merlin was a very evil person.
Both implicatures fly in the face of what we know about
Rasputin and Merlin and are untrue.
Why should this be so? We need to be careful here since
Grice deals with the relationship between propositions and I'm
interested in the relationship between words, but I would say
that the problematic Implicatures at 2 are the result of the
association of Rasputin/Merlin with necromancy violating
Grice's maxim of Relevance. As a tentative view of what makes
association relevant, I would say that they should come from
the same set as described by Berry (1977). Basically, this
idea is that when two words have a lot associations in common
then we can amalgamate these words into a set. If we look at
2b, then Merlin and necromancy do have the idea of magic in
common but little else. The associations on the former are all
to do with good magic and the latter evil magic. With Rasputin
the gulf is wider since he is a religious figure. So
Rasputin/Merlin on the one hand and necromancy on the other are
not in the same set.
The consequence of not being Relevant is that a reader
who understood necromancy would probably reject the
implicatures at 2, so reducing the target at la) simply to
power and at ib) to magic. Conversely, if a subject had to
guess necromancy in a doze situation at 1 then power or magic
must be perfectly adequate guesses and are in no way flawed.
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A natural text should obey the Cooperative Principle,
then, and one way of doing this is by making associations
Relevant. We could make Ia and b) do this by restating them at
3.
3. The voodoo witch doctor's necromancy allowed him to rule the
kingdom.
Notice now though that not only do we have a chance to guess
the genus magic, we also have a chance to guess the
differentia. The association is Relevant to both genus and
differentia and there is a chance it could suggest the latter
component in the sense that voodoo is concerned with zombies
etc. So in a natural text, we might well get a reasonable
genus cue and the differentia might be suggested by association
cues. Of course, we will always have misdirective contexts or
contexts which give little information but I think the context
at 3 is a fairly likely possibility. Possibly, Schatz and
Baldwin have more inclined to literary contexts where poetic
licence does allow unusual collocation. On the whole though,
language is more redundant than they suggest.
In this experiment, then, I Intend to give one good cue
to the genus and then to give association cues with the
intention of suggesting a differentia. I'll give an example of
an unknown target from the experiment to illustrate this. The
target is sprag: To brake by using a lever against the wheel.
The cues in the form subjects saw them are at 4.
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4. a) He (
	
) in order to slow the vehicle down.
GUESS	 CONFIDENCE
b) The cowboy C	 ) in order to slow the wagon down.
GUESS	 CONFIDENCE
c) The cowboy C	 ) in order to slow the wagon down.
He strained and perspired.
GUESS
	
CONFIDENCE
The cue to the genus at 4a is definitional in the sense that
what is given is really the differentia of the target's genus
brake. We might call it implicit definitional. The cue
underlined at 4b which suggests the differentia of sprag by
being Relevant occupies subject and object slots in relation to
the verb target and I'll call this subject/object collocation.
A third collocation at 4c which performs the same function,
does not occupy these slots and is more loosely syntactically
connected to the target and I'll refer to it as non
subject/object collocation. Cues 4b and 4c are implicit
associational. This gives three cues in terms of amount. For
order, I intend to keep the genus cue always in first position
and vary only the associations at 4b and c giving just two
orders.	 This is done for convenience as it is difficult to
keep testing six orders.
	 The variation in associations has
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been selected as there seems to be an interesting contrast
here.
Note also that I've given two associations at 4 when
there is only one at my exemplar of naturalistic language at 3.
This does bring the total number of cues in the experiment to
three so putting it on a par with previous experiments. It
also gives us a reasonable number of cues to see guesses
develop across. Two would have been limited. Also, one does
find both types of association mentioned above in real life
text and it Is worth looking at them.
Also, with respect to naturalism, by making cues implicit
definitional/associational we are now making subjects work to
recover genus and differentia. This is more like what happens
in real life where it is probably rare to receive these
comonents explicitly.
I've given an unknown target. What of known targets? An
example of a known target is brake. The genus cue is the same
as 4a and the differentla cues are comparable to 4b and c and
are given at 5 respectively, again being varied to give two
orders.
	
5b. The driver (
	
) In order to slow the car down.
	
c. The driver C	 ) In order to slow the car down.
As the speed reduced, he changed down a gear.
Note that the target is the genus of sprag. Although these two
items are different targets, I'll refer to brake and sprag as
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know and unknown versions of the same target for convenience.
Also note that on brake we do not have cues to genus and
differentia but all cues point to the total meaning ic. to the
word brake
A question now is why reduce the known meaning condition
to guessing a word? Why have I not given cues to the genus and
differentia of brake just as I have done with sprag so making
the known and unknown conditions comparable?
The reason is that by reducing known meanings to guessing
a word it is possible to turn known meaning guesses into a
control situation which helps us illustrate the effect of
unknown meaning information. By using this technique both
known and unknown conditions on each target will begin with an
identical cue because cue 1 will now be identical In both
situations and confidence should begin at the same point for
known and unknown meanings. Had I given cues to the genus and
differentia on known meaning versions of the targets there
would have been a problem. The genus of the known target
brake is a lot more general than for the unknown target sprag
and it might be that the genus cues would not be of the same
strength or quality and we can't get a clear prediction of what
will happen on cue 1.
	
It's unlikely confidence for both
meaning versions would be linked here.
	 Using the method I
have suggested the guesses at cue 1 on both meaning versions
will be locked together in terms of confidence. Subsequent
differences will be due to different ways of processing
information.
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A second factor in linking confidence on cue I for both
meaning versions is that we need to select only one format for
form. Here I've gone for the doze gap rather than pseudoword.
Whilst the last experiment gives an effect for pseudowords it
is small and this format does not appear to trigger the
guessing of new meanings. The selection of the doze gap
leaves us free to consider the more interesting phenomenon of
known and unknown combinations of information.
An additional feature of this experiment mentioned in the
purpose is that confidence will start high. Given what I've
said about naturalistic contexts it could well be possible that
a subject might pick up on a strong genus cue first. Given
that subjects will not use the pseudoword as a signal that the
hypothesis they hold is incomplete, subjects will have a high
confidence initially and it is Interesting to see what
subsequent cues will do to such a confidence.
As to what will happen. Cue 1 in both meaning
conditions will give a single word guess with high confidence.
On the known version of the target cues 2 and 3 now come into
play. These point consistently to the same hypothesis as cue 1
and reinforce it. Confidence should remain static or rise to
some extent if cue 1 leaves some room for this to occur. This
effect gives us a control line in terms of known meanings or
consistency across amounts of information.
If we turn now to the unknown versions of the targets
then subjects, whilst giving a single word hypothesis on cue 1,
might try and build a complex hypothesis or new meaning on cues
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2 and 3 when the differentia is suggested. If this happens
then they will examine the combination of components making up
the new meaning and there will be a degree of suspicion in this
new relationship.	 Given that confidence starts high, this
suspicion is going now not going to hold back a rising
confidence as in previous experiments, but cause a fall. If
subjects do not try to construct a new meaning, they will have
to cope with a set of strange collocations on a familiar single
word hypothesis and this should again weaken confidence. In
terms of predictions, I'm going to make two sets to cover both
these possibilities.
Predictions: Complex Hypothesis on Unknowns
1. For confidence there should be an interaction between
known and unknown meanings across information. Known meanings
should produce a static or rising confidence. Unknown
meanings, starting at the same point, should fall then rise.
The fall should be caused by suspicion as the complex
hypothesis is formed at cue 2 and the rise by an increasing
familiarity with the new hypothesis on cue 3.
2. For accuracy, scores must be lower at cue 1 on unknown
meanings, since only the genus part of the hypothesis is
present, as opposed to known meanings where the whole, correct
single word hypothesis will be present. Knowns will maintain a
static accuracy across information with the same guess being
repeated and unknowns will rise towards them as accuracy
increases with the adding of the differentia so causing another
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interaction.
3. For uncertainty, measured again in terms of changeability,
we will have no value for cue 1. On knowns, subjects should be
retaining the same guess so uncertainty should be static and
low. On unknowns at cue 2, subjects should add a differentia
to the genus gained on cue I so uncertainty should be higher
here than for knowns. We effectively have a change but within
the same family. On cue 3 they should retain the same guess so
uncertainty should fall. Another interaction with knowns
static and unknowns falling.
The first two predictions are particularly interesting
as we will have a falling confidence and rising accuracy.
Predictions: Single Word Hypotheses on Unknowns
4. For confidence on the unknowns, there is no single word
other than sprg which can absorb all the cues, but the
subjects shouldn't be aware of this form. The result is that
subjects will be forced into a position, we might say
mistakenly, where they will have to regard the cues as items
of inconsistent information and they will in all probability
have to abandon some. Most likely, cues 2 and 3 will be
abandoned in favour of cue 1. However, this abandoning Is not
likely to be as drastic as in Experiment 3 where we saw
subjects give up completely, since in this case the differentia
is not being given directly. Here, although cues 2 and 3 can't
be lexicalised along with cue 1, they can be held on to and
seen as somewhat unusual association of the guess off cue 1,
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brake. Cowboys canbrake wagons andstrain and perspire when
doing so, This should allow subjects to continue lexicalising
the target rather than giving up and they will continue to have
a measure of confidence in their initial guess. But subjects
will think "There must be a better word than brake here".
Subjects should, then, be abandoning information which they see
as potentially useful from the process of lexicalisation and
this should undermine confidence. So we would expect the
unknown line across information to be lower than the known just
as in prediction 1. However, the fall/rise pattern on unknowns
caused by increasing familiarity at cue 3 should not be
present. Rather, there should be a consistent parting of ways.
Also, we can look at the responses to check what sort of
hypothesis is present.
5. There is also the possibility that subjects will fail to
notice any Inconsistency and be deceived in this experiment as
some were in the last. In this case there should be no
Interaction between known meanings and unknown meanings across
information for confidence.
6. For accuracy, clearly unknown meanings should be
consistently below known across Information. Single word
hypotheses can't get maximum accuracy In a situation where a
complex hypothesis is needed.
	 There probably won't be an
interaction. There should be an overall difference. An
interesting question here is whether confidence will fall in
proportion to this reduced accuracy.
7. For uncertainty, subjects will probably be holding on to
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the same guess in both meaning condition so no effect anywhere.
8. There will be no effect for order whether responses are
complex or single word hypotheses. This again is a convenience
prediction.
Method
Cases: Three hundred and forty subjects took part in the
experiment. All subjects were native speaker undergraduates at
University of Wales, Bangor, from the faculties of Linguistics
(approximately 40 subjects), Social Sciences (approximately 70
subjects), Biology (approximately 120 subjects), English
Literature (approximately 20 subjects) and Economics
(approximately 90 subjects).
Independent variables: Three targets were constructed,
all verbs. The Independent variable of meaning was dealt with
by half the subjects seeing these targets in an unknown meaning
condition and the other half in a known meaning condition.
Unknown meanings were regarded as an unfamiliar combination of
genus and differentia. Three unknown meanings were obtained by
going through dictionaries and looking for very infrequent
words which subjects would not be likely to know. The three
selected were: To sprag, which means to brake by using a lever
against the wheel, To flense, which means to cut the blubber
out of an animal like a whale and to scabble, which means to
shape a stone roughly. The three known meanings were the
genuses of the unknown targets: To brake, to cut, to shape. So
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within each target there are known and unknown counterparts.
There are really 6 targets but for convenience it is simpler to
see them as 3 with known and unknown variants on each. The
order of presentation of targets was decided by using a table
of random numbers and this order remained the same for all
subjects in all conditions.
The independent variable of form was dealt with by using
a doze space throughout the experiment. 	 So this isn't a
factor in this experiment. An added advantage of te doze
space is that the unknown meaning targets are genuine and if
some subjects did in fact happen to know them then they would
betray this knowledge by using the appropriate word form rather
than a phrase to describe the target's meaning. Subjects who
gave such responses could be excluded from the experiment so
preserving the integrity of the unknown meaning condition. In
fact, no subject gave such a response.
The independent variable of amount of information was
dealt with by giving three cues. For the unknown meanings, one
cue was given to the genus. This was always an Implicit
definitional and "powerful" cue and was intended to make clear
just what the genus was immediately It became available. Two
cues were given to the differentla. For the known meanings
(remember, these are the genuses of the unknown meanings), a
"powerful" cue was given not to the genus or differentia of the
target, but to the whole meaning or word Itself.
	 Then two
implicit associational cues were given again to the word and
not genus or differentia.	 Although this reduces the known
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meaning condition really to guessing familiar words rather than
familiar meanings, I'll continue to refer to it as a known
meaning condition.
Some criticisms here are that subjects will quickly
become aware that they are dealing with no more nor no less
than three cues. Also, in being presented with one cue after
another they will see all three as relevant or potentially
useful even if they have to abandon some cues.
The independent variable of order was dealt with by
giving an implicit definitional cue to the genus always in
first place. This means that the order variable is restricted
to the second and third cues only which are implicit
associational. Where a subject/object association comes at cue
2 and a non subject/object association at cue 3, this will be
termed Order 1. The reverse will be Order 2. So we have two
orders rather than the potential six. This avoids the
complexity of looking at 6 orders and we can focus on the
interesting association distinction.
The cues were presented to subjects in a booklet
approximately 3" by 8" with cue 2a) on page 1, 2b) on page 2
etc. in the form given at 4.
A full list of targets with their cues is given at
Appendix 3.
The three targets were tried out on friends and it
appeared that they were behaving differently in terms of
response given. It appeared that this variety of response
could be dealt with by ar .aysig each target individually.
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Procedure: A prior arrangement was made with lecturers
in the various departments named above for me to enter one of
their lectures either at the beginning or towards the end for
fifteen minutes. I asked those students attending whether they
would like to help out by doing a brief linguistics experiment.
Numbers of subjects attending a lecture varied from ten to
eighty. The voluntary nature of the experiment was emphasised.
Subjects were asked to work individually, read the Instructions
that came with the booklet before doing anything and not to
attempt the experiment unless they were English native
speakers. Occasionally someone pointed out that their first
language was Welsh. Such subjects were asked not to sit the
experiment.
Four versions of the experiment were used: known
meanings in Order 1, unknown meanings In Order 1, known
meanings In Order 2 and unknown meanings In Order 2 and a
subject did only one version. The pile of booklets was
organized so that version 1 was followed by version 2 which was
followed by version 3 and then version 4 with this sequence
repeating itself throughout the stack of booklets. Question
booklets were always distributed from such a pile, usually
directly into the hands of the subject though In some
situations It was possible to place them on the desks before
students entered. A reasonably even distribution of the four
versions was obtained through stacking the booklets In this
way.
The first thing the subjects saw was a page of
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instructions which had been attached to the booklet (see
Appendix 3 for the instructions). They read these instructions
which basically asked them to fill in the doze gap using a
word or phrase and to note their confidence on a scale from 0-
6. The phrase option is important and allows subjects to build
a new meaning on unknowns. A clear example of a phrase type
response was given. This is important since the size of the
doze gap might have persuaded subjects to go for word answers.
Also note that subjects did not write responses in this doze
gap but in a space provided beneath the cue where there was
ample room for a phrase. The instruction sheet also included
an example for subjects to complete. When the subject turned
over the instruction page, he saw the first cue to target I and
noted his guess to this target and his confidence in the space
provided beneath the words GUESS and CONFIDENCE (see the
example at 1 above). He then turned the page and did the same
thing for the second cue to target 1 and so on until all three
cues to all three targets had been attempted. The second and
third cues to each target were always underlined when they
appeared (see 4) to make sure subjects didn't miss them by
accident. Cue 3 also showed cues 1 and 2 and cue 2 also showed
cue 1. The three cues to target 1 were all marked QUESTION 1
and the three to target 2, QUESTION 2 etc. and it was
emphasised in the instructions that the target would change
every three cues. No subjects seemed to get confused on this
point. Subjects worked at their own pace. Although there was
the constraint of fifteen minutes out of a lecturer's period,
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subjects seemed to be able to complete the experiment in this
time.
Because experiment versions were distributed evenly, the
numbers of subjects in each version were reasonably uniform.
There was a problem in that approximately twenty booklets had
to be rejected because of bad language taken as a sign of non-
cooperation. This happened in the two unknown versions chiefly
and I'll leave It to the reader's imagination to decide just
how the cowboy was supposed to have braked the wagon. This
tended to create a disparity between known and unknown versions
of the experiments. After screening the booklets the numbers
in each version were balanced by using the smaller lecture
groups which had been held back until last for this purpose.
The result was eighty five subjects in each version. Responses
are given in Appendix 3.
Scoring: Confidence was rated on a scale from 0 to 6 as
in previous experiments. Accuracy and uncertainty were rated
from 0 to 2 as in Experiment 2.
With confidence there is little to be said since subjects
gave their intuitions directly.
With accuracy the following procedure was adopted. For
known targets, if a subject gave the correct word or acceptable
synonym then 2 was awarded. If a reasonably close answer was
given then 1 was awarded. If the answer was not close a 0 was
given. With the unknown targets a genus and a differentia had
to be given to get a 2. The differentia didn't have to be the
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exact answer I was looking for. If it was a reasonable guess
based on the information given then this was seen as
sufficient.	 A 1 was given if the genus category alone was
stated without the differentia. Since this represents the
situation on cue 1, the unknown meaning condition will always
start lower than the known. A 0 was given if subjects seemed
to have gone completely wrong.
With uncertainty the following procedure was adopted. If
the same word or phrase was repeated then 0 was given. If a
different word or phrase was given but I judged it to be
reasonably closely related to the first then 1 was given. If a
second answer did not seem to be closely related to the
previous one then a 2 was given. If a third guess was
unrelated to the second, but repeated the first guess or was
closely related to it then a 1 was given. There is an added
problem in the unknown condition which is the scoring of the
differentia if it appears. Logically, a genus plus differentia
guess following a genus guess is in the same family as the
previous guess and should score 1. However, the differentla is
a different quantity to the genus. What I decided to do in the
end was that if a subject made a "weak" attempt at the
differentia by, for example, adding an adverb: brake hard, I
gave 1.	 If a more positive attempt was made: brake using a
lever, I gave 2.
The notion of word family was again used to assess
"closeness" with respect to accuracy and uncertainty. There Is
clearly a subjective element here.
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As to the scales of 0 to 6 and 0 to 2 used, whilst, for
the sake of convenience, I'll regard them as interval, they are
perhaps more properly ordinal showing increasing and decreasing
amounts of the independent variables hut probably without the
intervals between these amounts being exactly the same each
time.
Experiment Design:	 The experiment design Is again
factorial with three dependent variables. We have several
independent variables with different levels on each as follows:
information x 3, meaning x 3, target x 3, order x 2. This time
we do nor have a repeated measures design, however. Different
subjects see the different meaning types and the different
order levels. For these variables the design is one of
independent groups. All the subjects, however, see all three
amounts of information and all three targets so for these
variables we have repeated measures.
Results and Discussion
Results: The results are given for each dependent
variable in the order: confidence, accuracy, uncertainty. Four
ANOVAs were run for each dependent variable using the SPSSX
package on the university mainframe computer: first,a general
ANOVA for all three targets and then three more AN0VAs, one for
each target. Result 4a shows my intuition about the targets
was correct and provides a justification for doing ANOVAs for
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each target separately. Where there are two levels on an
independent variable, the Mauchly Sphericity test does not
apply. Where there are three levels, as with target then one
Mauchly Sphericity test covers this main effect and all
relevant interactions.
Confidence
ANOVA I (All three targets)
RESULT Ia: Meaning x 2
F= 23.01	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknowns	 Knowns
3.592	 4.191
RESULT 2a: Order x 2
F= .07	 Sig of F= .790
RESULT 3a: Meaning by order
F= .88	 SIg of F= .350
Tests involving target
Mauchly= .002 ** The multivariate results apply.
RESULT 4a: Target x 3
F= 41.993
Means
Target 1
4.100
Sig of F= .000 **
Target 2	 Target 3
4.036	 3.539
RESULT 5a: Meaning by target
F= 24.728	 Sig of F= .000 **
-301-
Means
Target 1
	
Target 2
	
Target 3
Unknowns	 3.586
	
3.960
	
3.230
Knowns
	 4.614
	
4.112
	
3.847
RESULT 6a: Order by target
F= 1.234	 Sig of F= .292
RESULT 7a: Meaning by order by target
F= .630	 Sig of F= .533
Tests involving amount of information
Mauchly= .000 ** The multivariate results apply
RESULT 8a: Information x 3
F= 15.876	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
3.792	 3.829	 4.054
RESULT 9a: Meaning by information
F= 47.494	 SIg of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknowns	 3.792	 3.422	 3.562
Knowns	 3.792	 4.235	 4.545
RESULT lOa: Order by information
F= .032	 Sig of F= .969
RESULT ha: Meaning by order by Information
F= 10.348	 Sig of F= .000
Means
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1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknowns order 1	 3.580	 3.376	 3.595
Unknowns order 2
	 4.004	 3.467	 3.529
Knowns order 1
	 3.984	 4.239	 4.474
Knowns order 2	 3.600	 4.231	 4.616
Tests Involving target by information
Mauchly= .000 ** Multivariate results apply
RESULT 12a: Target by information
F= 19.112	 Sig of F= .000 **
Target 1
Target 2
Target 3
Means
I amount
4.236
3.900
3.242
2 amounts
3.859
4.015
3.612
3 amounts
4.206
4.194
3.762
RESULT 13a: Meaning by target by information
F= 11.830	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknown target 1
Unknown target 2
Unknown target 3
Known target 1
Known target 2
Known target 3
1 amount
4.183
4.012
3.183
4.288
3.788
3.300
2 amounts
3.130
3.824
3.312
4.588
4.206
3.912
3 amounts
3.447
4.046
3.194
4.965
4.341
4.330
RESULT 14a: Order by target by information
F= 2.049	 Sig of F= .087
RESULT 15a: Meaning by order by target by information
F= .780	 Sig of F= .538
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ANOVA 2 (Target 1)
RESULT 16a: Meaning x 2
F= 53.19	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknowns	 Known s
3.586
	
4.614
RESULT 17a: Order x 2
F= .410
	
Sig of F= .522
RESULT 18a: Meaning by order
F= .700	 Sig of F= .404
Tests involving information
Mauchly= .000 ** Multivariate results apply
RESULT 19a: Information x 3
F= 24.155	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
4.236	 3.859	 4.206
RESULT 20a: Meaning by information
F= 49.907	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknowns	 4.183	 3.130	 3.447
Knowns	 4.288	 4.588	 4.965
RESULT 21a: Order by information
F= .430	 Sig of F= .650
-304-
RESULT 22a: Meaning by order by information
F= 2.815	 Sig of F .061
ANOVA 3 (Target 2)
RESULT 23a: Meaning x 2
F= 1.13	 sig of F= .289
RESULT 24a: Order x 2
F= .50	 Sig of F= .479
RESULT 25a: Meaning by order
F= 1.64 Sig of F= .201
Tests involving information
Mauchly= .000 ** Multivariate results apply
RESULT 26a: Information x 3
F= 7.222	 Sig of F= .001 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
3.900	 4.015	 4.194
RESULT 27a: Meaning by information
	
F= 12.958	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknowns	 4.012	 3.824	 4.046
Knowns	 3.788	 4.206	 4.341
RESULT 28a: Order by information
F= .787	 Sig of F= .456
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RESULT 29a: Meaning by order by information
F 9.182	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknown order 1
Unknown order 2
Known order 1
Known order 2
1 amount
3.682
4.341
4.000
3.576
2 amounts
3.776
3.871
4.224
4.188
3 amounts
3.988
4.094
4.235
4.447
ANOVA 4 (Target 3)
RESULT 30a: Meaning x 2
F= 16.40	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknowns	 Knowna
3.230	 3.847
RESULT 31a: Order x 2
F= .33	 Sig of F= .563
RESULT 32a: Meaning by order
F= .10	 Sig of F= .748
Tests involving information
Mauchly= .000 ** Multivariate results apply
RESULT 33a: Information
F= 21.942
	
Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount
	
2 amounts	 3 amounts
3.242
	
3.612
	
3.762
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RESULT 34a: Meaning by information
F= 16.806	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknowns	 3.183	 3.312	 3.194
Knowns	 3.300	 3.912	 4.330
RESULT 35a: Order by information
F= 2.970	 Sig of F= .053
Result 36a: Meaning by order by information
F= 5.126	 Sig of F= .006 **
Means
Unknown order 1
Unknown order 2
Known order 1
Known order 2
1 amount
3.012
3.353
3.459
3.141
2 amounts
3.165
3.459
3.812
4.012
3 amounts
3.306
3.082
4.212
4.447
Accuracy
ANOVA 1 (All three targets)
RESULT ib: Meaning x 2
F= 1020.87	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknowns	 Knowns
.900	 1.766
RESULT 2b: Order x 2
F= .98	 Sig of F= .324
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RESULT 3b: Meaning by order
F= 6.91	 Sig of F= .009 **
Means
Order 1
	
Order 2
Unknowns	 .949	 .851
Knowns
	 1.744
	
1.788
Tests involving target
Mauchly= .024 *	 Multivariate results apply
RESULT 4b: Target x 3
F= 56.615
Means
Target 1
1.520
Sig of F= .000 **
Target 2	 Target 3
1.323	 1.157
RESULT 5b: Meaning by target
F= 16.269	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknowns	 Known s
Target 1
	
1.192
	
1.847
Target 2	 .841
	
1.804
Target 3	 .667
	
1.647
RESULT 6b: Order by target
F= 2.257	 Sig of F= .106
RESULT 7b: Meaning by order by target
F=2.416	 Sig of F= .091
Tests Involving Information
Mauchly= .000 ** Multivarlate results apply
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RESULT 8b: Information x 3
F= 60.738	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
1.205	 1.339	 1.456
RESULT 9b: Meaning by information
F= 3.305	 Sig of F= .038 *
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknowns	 .755	 .893	 1.053
Knowns	 1.655	 1.784	 1.859
RESULT lOb: Order by information
F= 4.057	 Sig of F= .018 *
Means
1 amount
	
2 amounts	 3 amounts
Order 1
	
1.188
	
1.379
	
1.473
Order 2
	
1.222
	
1.298
	
1.439
RESULT llb: Meaning by order by information
F= 10.791	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknown order 1
Unknown order 2
Known order 1
Known order 2
1 amount
.745
.765
1.631
1.678
2 amounts
1.016
.769
1.741
1.827
3 amounts
1.086
1.020
1.859
1.859
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Tests involving target by information
Mauchly= .000 ** Multivariate results apply
RESULT 12b: Target by information
F= 8.561	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Target 1	 1.350	 1.512	 1.697
Target 2	 1.277	 1.330	 1.362
Target 3	 .989	 1.174	 1.310
RESULT 13b: Meaning by target by information
F= 19.753	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknown target I
Unknown target 2
Unknown target 3
Known target 1
Known target 2
Known target 3
1 amount
.877
.824
.565
1.824
1.730
1.412
2 amounts
1.177
.824
.677
1.847
1.836
1.671
3 amounts
1.524
.877
.759
1.871
1.847
1.859
RESULT 14b: Order by target by information
F= 8.870	 Sig of F = .000 **
Means
Order 1,
Order 2,
Order 1,
Order 2,
Order 1,
Order 2,
target 1
target 1
target 2
target 2
target 3
target 3
1 amount
1.341
1.359
1.271
1.283
.953
1.024
2 amounts
1.642
1.382
1.400
1.259
1 .094
1.253
3 amounts
1.700
1.694
1.382
1.342
1.336
1.283
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RESULT 15b: Meaning by order by target by information
F= 5.368	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknown order 1, target 1
Unknown order 2, target 1
Unknown order 1, target 2
Unknown order 2, target 2
Unknown order 1, target 3
Unknown order 2, target 3
Known order 1, target 1
Known order 2, target 1
Known order 1, target 2
Known order 2, target 2
Known order 1, target 3
Known order 2, target 3
1 amount
.847
.906
.824
.824
.565
.565
1.835
1.812
1.718
1.741
1.341
1.482
2 amounts
1.471
.882
.894
.753
.682
.671
1.812
1.882
1.906
1.765
1.506
1.835
3 amounts
1 • 563
1.482
.882
.871
.812
.706
1.835
1.906
1.882
1.812
1.859
1.859
ANOVA 2 (Target 1)
RESULT 16b: Meaning x 2
F= 214.81
	
Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknowns	 Knowns
1.192
	
1.847
RESULT 17b: Order x 2
F= 3.40	 Sig of P = .066
RESULT 18b: Meaning by order
F= 7.40	 Sig of F= .007 **
Means
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Order 1
	
Order 2
Unknowns	 1.294
	
1.090
Knowns	 1.827
	
1.867
Tests involving information
Mauchly= .011 * Multivariate results apply
RESULT 19b: Information x 3
F= 38.813	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
1.350	 1.512	 1.697
RESULT 2Ob: Meaning by information
F= 28.981	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknowns	 .877	 1.177	 1.524
Knowns	 1.824	 1.847	 1.871
RESULT 21b: Order by information
F= 10.029	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Order 1	 1.341	 1.642	 1.700
Order 2	 1.359	 1.382	 1.694
RESULT 22b: Meaning by order by information
F= 15.553	 Sig of F= .000 **
1 amount	 2 amounts
Unknown order 1
	
.847	 1.471
Unknown order 2
	 .906	 .882
Known order 1
	 1.835	 1.812
Known order 2
	
1.812	 1.882
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3 amounts
1.565
1.482
1.835
1.906
ANOVA 3 (Target 2)
RESULT 23b: Meaning x 2
F= 545.08
Means
Unknowns
.841
Sig of F= .000 **
Known s
1.804
RESULT 24b: Order x 2
F= 1.90	 Sig of F= .169
RESULT 25b: Meaning by order
F= .02	 Sig of F= .887
Tests involving information
Mauchly= .000 ** Multivariate results apply
RESULT 26b: Information x 3
F= 3.242	 Sig of F= .040 *
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
1.277	 1.330	 1.362
RESULT 27b: Meaning by information
F= 1.619	 Sig of F= .200
RESULT 28b: Order by Information
F= 4.123	 Sig of F= .017 *
Means
1 amount
	
2 amounts	 3 amounts
Order 1
	
1.271
	
1.400
	
1.382
Order 2
	
1.283
	
1.259
	
1.342
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RESULT 29b: Meaning by order by information
F= .236	 Sig of F= .790
ANOVA 4 (Target 3)
RESULT 30b: Meaning x 2
F= 334.13	 SIg of F= .000 **
Means
Unknowns	 Knowns
.667	 1.647
RESULT 31b: Order x 2
F= 1.20 Sig of F= .274
RESULT 32b: Meaning by order
F= 3.34	 SIg of F= .068
Tests involving information
Mauchly= .000 ** Nultivariate results apply
RESULT 33b: Information x 3
F= 32.535	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
.989	 1.174	 1.310
RESULT 34b: Meaning by Information
F= 5.053 b Sig of F= .007 **
Means
1 amount
	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknowns	 .565	 .677	 .759
Knowns	 1.412
	
1.671
	
1.859
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RESULT 35b: Order by information
F 7.299	 Sig of F= .001 **
Means
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Order 1	 .953	 1.094	 1.336
Order 2	 1.024	 1.253	 1.283
RESULT 36b: Meaning by order by information
F 2.603	 Sig of F= .076
Uncertainty
ANOVA 1 (All three targets)
RESULT lc: Meaning x 2
F= 93.29	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknowns	 Knowns
.844	 .447
RESULT 2c: Order x 2
F= 3.92	 Sig of F= .049 *
Means
Order 1	 Order 2
.686	 .605
RESULT 3c: Meaning by order
F= 3.73	 Sig of F= .054
Tests involving target
Mauchly= .029 * Multivariate results apply
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RESULT 4c: Target x 3
F= 9.275
Means
Target 1
• 706
Sig of F= .000 **
Target 2	 Target 3
.564	 .668
RESULT 5c: Meaning by target
F= 66.841	 SIg of F= .000 **
Means
Target 1	 Target 2	 Target 3
Unknowns	 1.156	 .674	 .703
Knowns	 .256	 .453	 .632
RESULT 6c: Order by target
F= .332	 Sig of F= .717
RESULT 7c: Meaning by order by target
F= .860	 Sig of F =
 .424
Tests involving information
Univariate results apply
RESULT 8c: Information x 3
F= 11.20	 Sig of F= .001 **
Means
2 amounts	 3 amounts
.697	 .594
RESULT 9c: Meaning by information
F .98	 Sig of F= .324
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RESULT lOc: Order by information
F= 15.36	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
2 amounts	 3 amounts
Order I	 • 798	 .575
Order 2	 .596	 .614
RESULT lic: Meaning by order by information
F= 20.77	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknown order 1
Unknown order 2
Known order 1
Known order 2
2 amounts
1.012
.749
.584
.443
3 amounts
.679
.937
.471
.290
Tests involving information by target
Mauchly= .630 Univariate results apply
RESULT 12c: Information by target
F= 3.390	 Sig of F= .034 *
Means
2 amounts	 3 amounts
Target 1	 .707	 .706
Target 2	 .627	 .500
Target 3	 .759	 .577
RESULT 13c: Meaning by information by target
F= .320	 Sig of F= .729
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RESULT 14c: Order by information by target
F= 27.240	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Target 1, order 1
Target 1, order 2
Target 2, order 1
Target 2, order 2
Target 3, order 1
Target 3, order 2
2 amounts
.930
.483
.736
.518
.730
.788
3 amounts
.571
.841
.441
.559
.712
.441
RESULT 15c: Meaning by order by information by target
F= 16.620	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Target 1, unknown, order 1
Target 1, unknown, order 2
Target 1, known, order 1
Target 1, known, order 2
Target 2, unknown, order 1
Target 2, unknown, order 2
Target 2, known, order 1
Target 2, known, order 2
Target 3, unknown, order 1
Target 3, unknown, order 2
Target 3, known, order 1
Target 3, known, order 2
2 amounts
1.553
.753
.306
.212
.765
.647
.706
.388
.718
.847
.741
.729
3 amounts
.824
1.494
.318
.188
.541
.741
.341
.376
.671
.576
.753
.306
ANOVA 2 (Target 1)
RESULT 16c: Meaning x 2
F= 233.60
	
Sig of F= .000 **
Means
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Unknown	 Known
1.156	 .256
RESULT 17c: Order x 2
F 2.25	 Sig of F= .135
RESULT 18c: Meaning by order
F= .16	 Sig of F= .690
RESULT 19c: Information x 2
F= .00	 Sig of F= 1.000
RESULT 20c: Meaning by information
F= .01	 Sig of F= .914
RESULT 21c: Order by information
F= 43.26	 Sig of F = .000 **
Means
2 amounts	 3 amounts
Order 1	 .930	 .571
Order 2	 .483	 .841
RESULT 22c: Meaning by order by information
F= 47.62	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
Unknown order 1
Unknown order 2
Known order 1
Known order 2
2 amounts
1.553
.753
.306
.212
3 amounts
.824
1.494
.318
.188
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ANOVA 3 (Target 2)
RESULT 23c: Meaning x 2
F= 15.22
	
Sig of F .000 **
Means
Unknown	 Known
.674	 .453
RESULT 24c: Order x 2
F= .78	 Sig of F= .377
RESULT 25c: Meaning by order
F= 2.60	 Sig of F= .108
RESULT 26c: Information
F= 7.23	 Sig of F= .008 **
Means
2 amounts	 3 amounts
.627	 .500
RESULT 27c: Meaning by information
F= 1.72	 Sig of F= .190
RESULT 28c: Order by information
F= 12.71	 Sig of F= .000 **
Means
2 amounts	 3 amounts
Order 1	 .736	 .441
Order 2	 .518	 .559
RESULT 29c: Meaning by order by information
F= .04	 Sig of F= .851
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ANOVA 4 (Target 3)
RESULT 30c: Meaning x 2
F= 1.29	 Sig of F= .257
RESULT 31c: Order x 2
F= 2.90	 Sig of F= .089
RESULT 32c: Meaning by order
F= 3.95	 Sig of F= .048 *
Means
Order 1
	
Order 2
Unknowns	 .695	 .712
Knowns	 .747	 .518
RESULT 33c: Information x 2
F= 11.86	 Sig of F .001 **
Means
2 amounts	 3 amounts
.759	 .577
RESULT 34c: Meaning by information
F= .20	 Sig of F = .657
RESULT 35c: Order by Information
F= 9.67	 Sig of F= .002 **
Means
2 amounts	 3 amounts
Order 1	 .730	 .712
Order 2	 .788	 .441
RESULT 36c: Meaning by order by information
F= 1.00	 Sig of F= .318
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Chapter 9
Suggesting a New Meaning Part 2
This chapter contains the discussion of the results for
Experiment 4. There are a large number of results and to stop
the discussion wandering I will adopt four headings. First,
I'll make some general points about the results. Second, I'll
look at the idea of building a new meaning. This section will
cover predictions 1-3. 	 Third, I'll look at the idea of
familiar, single word guesses as an alternative to building new
meanings.	 This will cover predictions 4-7. 	 Fourth, I'll
look at the Idea of order, prediction 8.
Some General Points
The first point to note is that values of F on the
independent variable of amount of information reaches
significance for all three dependent variables (see Result 8).
Confidence and accuracy rise with increasing amounts of
information, uncertainty falls. The value for F on the
Independent variable of meaning also reaches significance for
all three dependent variables and unknown meanings generate
less confidence, less accuracy and more uncertainty than known
meanings (see Result 1). There seems to be a foundation for
predictions 1-3.
We come now to the Interaction of meaning by information.
This result, particularly with reference to the dependent
variable of confidence, is really the key to the whole
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experiment.
We see at Result 9a that there is a significant
interaction for meaning by information for confidence.
	
The
confidence means are displayed on graph 1.
	 What we see on
graph 1 is that confidences rises as information increases for
the known meanings. Although the first cue should make the
answer clear immediately, rendering the other cues redundant,
subjects have been a little conservative in their confidence
and the subsequent cues have been able to generate more
confidence by consistently reinforcing the original guess.
This was expected. The line for unknown meanings is
"peculiar". It falls at cue 2, then tries to rise again. This
is roughly the kind of interaction we are looking at prediction
1 so we may be getting complex hypothesis formation.
To move on, there is a significant interaction on
meaning by information at 9b for accuracy. The accuracy means
are displayed on graph 2. We can see that known meaning line
rises slightly. Something I did not predict but not too
unexpected as It would not perhaps be unexpected for there to
be a degree of error on low amounts of information which would
be corrected later. Most important, the unknown line rises
towards the known and it looks like prediction 2 is being met
not 6 which again suggests complex hypotheses.
With uncertainty, there is no interaction of meaning by
information at 9c. Prediction 3 faIls but note that unknown
uncertainty overall is higher than known, Result Ic, which Is
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unknowns
known.
broadly what we expected. 	 It's just that uncertainty on
unknowns doesn't start to fall on cue 3.
Graph 1
Conf: Meanjn 9
 x Info
2	 3
Amcunt of Info
A large part of predictions 1-3, involving the
construction of unknown meanings/complex hypotheses, seem to be
working. However, a major factor is the difference between the
targets given at Result 4 on all dependent variables. We can't
take the generalised picture given so far for granted.
The best place to look at this contrast between targets
is on the target by meaning interaction at Result 5 which gives
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us more detail.
	 All three dependent variables produce
significant interactions. I won't look in detail here, but
Graph 2
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will just make some general points.
On the known side of this interaction, target 1 generates
more confidence and accuracy than target 2 which in turn
generates more of these dependent variables than target 3. The
exact reverse is the case for uncertainty. So we can say on
the knowns that target 1 is easier than target 2 which Is
easier than target 3. The reason for this dine lies In the
uncertainty scores. On target l,the hypothesis brake is given
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very clearly and we get high confidence and accuracy. On
targets 2 and 3, there is more opportunity to change guess and
this allows room for error so reducing accuracy and also the
range of alternatives would undermine confidence to a degree.
The unknown side of this interaction is interesting. For
accuracy, target 1 is highest, followed by target 2 followed by
target 3. The same order is preserved as for knowns. For the
generation of confidence, however, the order of targets runs:
2, 1, 3. Target 1, unknown, is no longer generating the
highest confidence which we would expect from the accuracy
result which gives targets in the same order as the knowns so
something is draining this confidence. Also, the fact that,
target 1, unknown, is generating the highest accuracy suggests
that information is being used despite this drain on
confidence.	 Note also that with uncertainty, the order of
targets is: 2, 3,	 1, with target 1 generating the most
uncertainty.
All in all, it looks like target 1, unknown, is our
candidate for the construction of a new meaning or complex
hypothesis. The highish accuracy relative to other unknown
targets at 1.192 suggests that information has been used to
construct complex hypotheses (Accuracy could not exceed 1 or
50% If a single word is used) but the relatively lower
confidence Is being caused by suspicion in the new combination.
The highlsh uncertainty which attaches to this target at 1.156
would again fit this picture. The adding of one hypothesis to
another effectively produces a change within the family and
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should get I and I did mention that if a positive attempt was
made to add a differentia, I would give uncertainty of 2 (see
the scoring section in the last chapter).
Targets 2 and 3 on unknowns look to be generating single
word hypotheses. Accuracy does not reach a mean of I on either
target which supports this.	 Confidence also appears to be
slightly lower on unknown versions of these targets as opposed
to known but we'd expect this from prediction 4 since the cues
can't be used properly.
A Possible New Meaning (Target 1)
In it's known version, target 1 is brake. 	 In It's
-
unknown version, it is sprag or brake by using a lever. I'll
focus on the dependent variable of confidence to begin with.
There Is a significant difference for meaning (see Result
16a), The unknown mean is 3.586 and the known 4.614. We see
that the unknown meaning version of target 1 is generating less
confidence than the known.	 There is also a significant
difference for amount of information. I'll gloss over this,
but If the reader looks at the means at Result 19a a drop In
confidence can be seen on the second amount of Information.
The result we really need to look at Is 20a, the
interaction of meaning by information. Here, the significance
of F= .000. The means are displayed on graph 3. What we see
for the known version of this target is a rising confidence.
It Is not dramatic and Is caused, I would suggest by cues 2 and
3 consistently reinforcing the guess on cue 1. The first cue:
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He (
	
) in order to slow the vehicle down gives brake and the
guesser Is a little conservative and confidence Is slightly
Graph 3
Conf; Target 1, Meaning x Info
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over 4.
	 The next two cue add the ideas of driver, car and
changing gear. All these are factors involved in braking and
confirm the first hypothesis. Since subjects have been a
little conservative to begin with, this leaves room for
confidence to rise.
With the unknown version brake Is obtained from the first
cue just as in the known version. The cues that then come In
are: cowboy, wagon and He strained and perspired.
	
Well,
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cowboys can brake wagons and they can strain and perspire when
doing so. In other words, these cues could possibly have
allowed subjects to retain the initial guess brake possibly
with a falling confidence. 	 However, what we see on graph 3
is not a consistent drop. Rather, confidence falls quite
noticeably on cue 2 and then rises slightly on cue 3. If we
look at the responses then the typical hypothesis for this
target off cues 2 and 3 is pull on the reins. It looks as
though information is being transferred from cues 2 and 3 which
add Ideas of cowboy, wagon and He strained and perspired to
create this response. So Information is being used yet we are
in the "strange" position of seeing confidence fall causing the
interaction with the known version across Information. A
factor which might explain this fall is that the response pull
on the reins is a new meaning/complex hypothesis. At cue 1,
subjects think they are guessing a single word hypothesis. At
cue 2, they realise they have a complex hypothesis so suspicion.
causes a fall and at cue 3 they are becoming more familiar with
the new meaning. Prediction 1 may be at work.
The question now is whether we can justifiably view this
response pull on the reins as a new meaning/complex hypothesis.
Clearly it is not the one I wanted to suggest which was brake
using a lever, but it does seem to fit the information and if
we could consider it as a complex hypothesis It would help
explain the confidence pattern for the unknown meaning on graph
3. The major problem Is that pull on the reins seems to be a
paraphrase of the familiar single word rein in. That Is, It is
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really a description of a known not a new meaning. But why
then didn't subjects give the response rein in and why add
pull? We seem to have a genus pull which perhaps continues the
idea of braking and a differentia on the reins. Cautiously, I
would suggest we have the meaning to brake by means of using
the reins and that rather than being an expresion of the word
rein in, subjects are regarding it as a new unlexicalised
meaning and are suspicious of it. (Also, I'd regard the adding
of reins to brake as quite a positive attempt to form a new
meaning). If this response were a single word hypothesis there
is no way of explaining the drop in confidence at cue 2 unknown
version. Such a single word guess uses the information in cues
2 and 3 and so should force confidence to rise as with known
meanings.
However, I don't really want to leave this discussion of
the unknown version of target 1 here. There are quite a
variety of responses on this target in addition to pull on the
reins at cues 2 and 3 that we should take note of. Also,
order adds an interesting dimension and influences this variety
of response.
The first thing to note about order and confidence is
that if we look at Result 22a, meaning by order by information,
the significance of F= .061.
	 There is no interaction. The
means for the interaction are given at table 1.
	 Both known
orders rise in terms of confidence and both unknown orders fall
at cue 2 .
	 However, there is no difference within the two
known orders and within the two unknown orders. It is really
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the unknown version orders that I'm interested in.
Table I
Confidence means for unknown meaning by order by information
for target 1
Unknown Order 1
Unknown Order 2
Known Order 1
Known Order 2
1 amount
4.047
4.318
4.494
4.082
2 amounts
3.188
3.071
4.682
4.494
3 amounts
3.482
3.412
4.976
4.953
Just to make the picture clear, I'll display the unknown
version means on graph 4. We can see that the orders are very
similar.	 The real point of difference is that Order 2 is
slightly higher than Order 1 on cue I. This is accidental
since the same cues were present here in both orders. So there
is really no difference between the unknown orders in terms of
confidence, yet as I've mentioned order does seem to influence
the responses given. Let's now look at these responses.
Let's begin with Unknown Order 1. On cue I we get the
response brake and on cue 2 this changes. Forty four out of
eighty five responses are now pulled on the reins. Another ten
are either pulled or reined and these could be seen as
"abbreviations" of this complex hypothesis response with the
differentia missing in the first instance and the genus in the
second. If we put these responses together, then they make up
64% of the responses on cue 2. Another 21% of the responses on
cue 2 are represented by the single word brake. Another 15% of
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the responses are slightly "eccentric", for example, shouted
"Woah".
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If we move to Unknown Order 2 on cue 2, then twenty two
responses are represented by brake hard. A further fourteen
could be seen as abbreviations of this so this response comes
about 42% of the time. The single word brake is used about 48%
of the time and about 10% of the responses are slightly
eccentric.
Leaving aside the eccentric responses which are not too
numerous and probably don't influence things too much, what can
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we conclude from this?
	 On Order 1, cue 2, the majority
response is pull on the reins. This is a complex hypothesis
which, if we look at the actual responses, does tend to reduce
confidence on the second cue with respect to the first. Given
the prevalence of this hypothesis we would not see the drop in
confidence at cue 2 for Order 1 on graph 4 if this response
type did not contribute to that drop. On Order 2 we get a
similar drop in confidence at cue 2, but this response is not
present. Here we get brake hard which again can be seen as a
complex hypothesis consisting of genus and differentla. Again
in terms of plausibility, nothing dramatic has been attempted
here. The adding of hard to brake is hardly dramatic. Yet
again, looking at the responses, confidence tends to fall on
cue 2 for this response despite the fact that information is
being used.
We have, then, two different responses, depending on
order, which can both be seen as complex hypotheses and which
both seem to support the idea that the formation of complex
hypotheses results in a weakening of confidence compared with
the formation of single hypotheses in the known meaning
condition.	 The key point is that these hypotheses use the
information given at cue 2 quite effectively. We would
therefore expect confidence on the unknown version at this
point to match that for knowns. The fact that it does not can
be explained in terms of suspicion in a new combination.
However, the picture is not so completely straightforward
as suggested above since we have the single word response brake
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to consider at cue 2. On Order 2 this is the dominant response
coming 48% of the time. Confidence would not have fallen at
cue 2 had not this response type been contributing to the fall.
Looking at the confidence patterns of this response we find
that in approximately 50% of its instances confidence remains
the same or rises with respect to cue I and in the other 50% it
falls. However, the falls in confidence are a little more
dramatic than the rises and I've also counted static confidence
instances In with rising confidence Instances. This response
type, then, pushes down confidence on cue 2 in Order 2 just as
does the complex hypothesis. It's effect is almost identical
on Order 1 where we again see a 50% spilt between falls as
opposed to a static or rising confidence though here it is much
less frequent and the complex hypothesis dominates.
This effect where single word hypotheses force confidence
down on the unknown version in no way negates the idea that the
creation of complex hypotheses causes a fall in confidence.
Here, information is rejected as not useful and this factor not
the use of information causes the fall. Where brake occurs and
confidence falls on cue 2, I suspect subjects are thinking
something like "Well, cowboys can brake wagons but there must
be a better word than this". The problem seems to be that
subjects feel these cues to be potentially useful in that they
could produce a more precise single word response but that they
can't use them to do so. They escape this inconsistency by
abandoning cue 2 from the process of lexicalisation and hold it
as an unusual association of the form brake.	 Since useful
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information is rejected, confidence suffers. Essentially, we
are looking at prediction 4 here where the effect of abandoning
information was predicted.
Where brake occurs and confidence rises or remains static
subjects have probably been deceived in that they see brake as
a perfectly good common denominator between the first two
cues. So the effect noted at prediction 5 Is present.
However, the overall effect of the single word hypothesis
brake at cue 2 as pointed out in the above paragraph is to
create a fall in confidence which helps that created by the
complex hypotheses.
We should also look at cue 3 here as well as cue 2. At
cue 3 pull on the reins now becomes very dominant in both
orders. Confidence rises slightly and perhaps where this guess
is repeated the new cue is reinforcing it. Perhaps where a
change say from brake hard is involved then it may be that the
drain on confidence caused by suspicion only comes at the point
where a complex hypothesis is created and that changes can lead
to increasing confidence just as with known meanings.
The most Interesting point here is that we still get some
instances of the single word hypothesis brake at cue 3. There
are 9 in Order 1 and within this confidence remains the same or
rises for 8 and falls for just 1. In Order 2 there are 15.
For 10 confidence remains the same or rises and for 5 It falls.
The overall effect of this hypothesis now is not to reduce
confidence as we saw on cue 2 but to raise it. It seems odd
that on cue 2 subjects tend to see the cues as Inconsistent but
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suddenly on cue 3 they fail to do so. To some extent it is
only those who did not notice the inconsistency on cue 2 who
use this guess on cue 3.
Perhaps this failure to notice the inconsistency on cues
2 and 3 is not innocent or unsuspecting. Subjects might be
seeing the new information as in a sense "fraudulent".
Sometimes we come across new words that we consider simply to
be jargon. In my experience, when someone mentions contact
hours I immediately translate it to teaching hours. The more
people tell me that there is a difference the more stubborn I
tend to get about it and point out the distinct possibility of
arrest should contact hours have some special meaning. In the
same way subjects could be rejecting information on the basis
that It is over complex and gaining confidence in their more
straightforward guess as they do so. This might well be the
same effect we noted in Experiment 3 with pseudowords. They
were again rejected in both meaning conditions at cue 3 but
there was a small fall in confidence. This fall is tied in
with abandoning guessing though and it would be interesting to
see what might happen to pseudowords where the hypothesis could
be repeated.
If we turn now to accuracy on target 1, there is again a
significant difference between known and unknown meanings with
known meanings generating more accuracy than unknowns (see
Result 16b). Also, Result 19b shows accuracy to be increasing
significantly with information. The key interaction of meaning
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by information is also significant (see Result 20b). The means
are displayed on graph 5.
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We see accuracy stay high on the knowns because brake is
obtained on cue 1 and Is awarded an accuracy of 2. This guess
Is maintained across the other cues with a few subjects who
went wrong to start with coming to the correct answer on cue 3.
On the unknowns, brake is obtained on cue 1, but now It is only
worth 1. The response pull on the reins which seems
appropriate to all the the information and so is worth 2 even
If it was not the expected hypothesis comes In progressively at
cues 2 and 3. To understand the gradual rise of this unknown
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line, we need to look at the interaction of meaning by order by
information which is significant (see Result 22b). I'm only
interested in the unknown meaning side of the interaction here.
I'll give the means at table 2 to save referring back. We see
that accuracy on cue 2 is much higher on Order 1 than on Order
2.	 This is because pull on the reins became available as a
hypothesis on Order I at cue 2. On Order 2, the hypothesis
Table 2
Means for the interaction between unknown meaning orders across
information for target 1 on accuracy.
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Order 1	 .847	 1.471	 1.565
Order 2	 .906	 .882	 1.482
brake hard was available at this point but scored 1 since it
was not really appropriate to all three cues and does not cover
the information about cowboy and wagon. It was not until cue 3
that pull on the reins became available. Hence accuracy is
only half as good in total on cue 2 as opposed to cue 3 and so
we get the gradual climb in the unknown line as information
increases.
Essentially, prediction 2 is intact. Accuracy does rise
on the unknown	 the known. The order factor just slows
down the rise a little.
If we turn now to uncertainty on target 1 Result 16c
shows a significant difference for meaning with unknown
meanings generating significantly less uncertainty than knowns.
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There is no movement in the uncertainty line across information
(see Result 19c) and there is no interaction at the key point
of meaning by information (see Result 20c). This does not mean
that the two lines are in the same place, but that the unknown
line parallels the known at a higher level. The reason for
these parallel lines is to be found at Result 22c, the
significant Interaction for meaning by order by information.
The means are given at table 3.
Table 3
Means for the interaction of meaning by order by information
for uncertainty on target 1.
2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknown order 1	 1.553	 .824
Unknown order 2	 .753	 1.494
Unknown averages	 1.153	 1.159
Known order 1	 .306	 .318
Known order 2	 .212	 .188
Known averages	 .259	 .253
What we see is that on the known orders, Order 1 is
consistently about 0.1 higher than Order 2 so that the averaged
results for 2 and 3 amounts of Information are almost
identical. (This difference in orders is strange and I cantt
explain it. Since subjects seem to be keeping the same guess
they should be identical).
On the unknown orders the hypothesis pull on the reins is
available on cue 2 and since this Is seen as a strong attempt
to add a differentia to the previous guess brake (see the
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scoring section in the last chapter) It scores 2 giving high
uncertainty on two amounts. It gets repeated on three amounts
so uncertainty comes down. On Order 2, brake hard comes at cue
2. Since this is seen as a weak attempt to form a differentia,
it's just an adverb added to the first guess brake, it scores 1
and so uncertainty stays low at two amounts. On cue 3, pull on
the reins comes and scores 2 so uncertainty rises. The result
is an interaction of order on the unknown meanings with the
lines crossing, but the two sides of of the interaction cancel
each other out when an average Is taken and are equal. The
result is two static parallel lines with the unknown meaning
line well above the known.
So uncertainty on the unknown version is higher than on
the known as expected at prediction 3, but uncertainty does not
fall on the unknown version because of the effect of order 2.
Prediction 3 does come close to what actually happens. But we
do need to ask whether this picture of high uncertainty is
valid. We are looking at uncertainty in terms of changeability
and adding new information effectively changes a guess. A
strong attempt to add a differentia gets 2. But this might
well not reflect the number of alternative hypotheses a subject
might hold. Here I prefer the result of Experiment 2 which
shows uncertainty low and static then starting to rise as
associations are added. We are asking subjects directly for
their intuitions and there is some justification for this
initially low picture of uncertainty since there might be an
element of difficulty in retrieving information from the
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encyclopaedia relative to the lexicon. If we in fact convert
uncertainty scores to percentages (see table 4) here they come
out at just over 50%. Since in Experiment 2 the uncertainty
went from 0-10, this experiment suggests subjects think of 5
ideas when they get a cue which is too high with respect to
Experiment 2's results.
Interestingly, we do see an attempt to enlarge on
hypotheses in the unknown condition as more information Is
given as mentioned in Experiment 2. If we look through the
responses in the appendix to this chapter there are instances
at cue 3 of yanked on the horses reins where the idea of extra
effort has been added to pull on the reins. We also see
responses like pull hard on the reins where an extra word is
added to express this idea.
We can draw a graph to represent the unknown meaning side
of the interaction with amount of information for all three
dependent variables. The means as percentages are given at
table 4.
Table 4
The means for unknown meanings across amount of Information for
all dependent variables
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Confidence	 69.7%	 52.1%	 57.4%
Accuracy	 43.8%	 58.8%	 76.2%
Uncertainty	 57.6%	 57.9%
These means are displayed on graph 6.
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There is a problem with the position of uncertainty on this
graph in that it may be too high. However, when a new meaning
comes into existence from the perspective of high initial
confidence, which might happen in real life, in the more
naturalistic situation I have used here we see confidence fall
as accuracy rises. The fall in confidence might be taken as
evidence that the formation of complex hypotheses weakens
confidence though suspicion. The fall in confidence here does
not mean that confidence will always fall. If confidence
started low because of weak information perhaps, then
confidence would rise in the formation of a complex word
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hypothesis but not so fast as for a single word hypothesis as
in Experiment 3. The conclusion is that complex hypotheses
weaken confidence.
Accuracy, however, Is not affected and here we see it
rise. Where a subject builds a new meaning his confidence will
be undermined even when correct and guessing is probably
followed by some form of appeal to authority.
Correlations on the unknown version of target 1:
A large number of correlations were looked at. In the
main, there is nothing of great interest to add to what was
said In the correlations to Experiment 3 except where the
unknown version of target 1 is concerned. Here we can use
correlations to help sort out the variety of responses.
The measure of association used is Pearson r. Since we
will be operating at the level of target by order by amount of
information in order to give the greatest possible detail,
there is only one item for each of the 85 subjects involved at
this level. The decision we had to make in Experiment 3 as to
whether we use subjects or subjects by items as cases is
irrelevant. Here we can only use subjects as cases so scores
are Independent. Also, since the scales used to measure
confidence, accuracy and uncertainty are narrow, it proved
difficult to obtain clear scattergrams of the plots. So the
same tabling method used for Experiment 3 correlations is
repeated here.
The purpose of using correlations on the unknown version
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of target 1 is as follows. We predicted a drop in confidence
at cue 2 when a complex hypothesis is formed. Unfortunately,
whilst we get this drop, we have a mixture of complex and
single word hypotheses at this point. Using correlations, we
should be able to distinguish between these responses and
illustrate more clearly than In the last section that the
formation of complex hypotheses does indeed cause a fall in
confidence. Secondly, we saw that retention of the single word
hypothesis brake on cue 2 and the abandoning of information led
to a fall in confidence, but a similar retention on cue 3 led
to a rise. It was as though subjects were rejecting
information on the assumption that it was "fraudulent". We can
again illustrate this with correlations.
Let's begin with a correlation of confidence and accuracy
for Order 1. Remember here that the complex hypothesis formed
at cue 2 was pulled on the reins and the single word hypothesis
was brake. The former scored an accuracy of 2 and the latter
an accuracy of 1 so we can distinguish between these responses
in terms of accuracy and and display what degree of confidence
goes with each response type.
Coefficients are given at table 5 for both orders.
Table5
Confidence/accuracy coefficients for unknown target 1 across
amounts of information for Order I
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Order I
.190	 .111	
.284
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The coefficients are all low but the main point of interest
are the plots. These are given at table 6. The plots for
Order 1 are displayed on graph 7.
Table 6
Confidence/accuracy plots across information for the unknown
version of target 1, Order I
Accuracy
	 0	 1
	
2
Confidence I amount	 3.4	 3.6
Confidence 2 amounts 	 2.6	 3.4
	
3.3
Confidence 3 amounts	 2.1	 3.8
	
3.7
If we look at graph 7 at I amount of information at an
accuracy of 1 we see a confidence of 3.6. These subjects have
given the single word response brake. If we look at 2 amounts
of information at accuracy 2, these subjects have given the
complex hypothesis pull on the reins and confidence has dropped
to 3.3. This is hardly a major drop but it is interesting
since there should be no decrease at all in confidence here.
Information is being used and confidence should be rising.
What we see In this lowering of confidence is the effect of
suspicion in a new combination of meaning components.
Interestingly, the formation of the complex hypothesis at
accuracy 2 on two amounts of information decreases confidence
slightly further than the use of a single word hypothesis at
accuracy 1. Here brake Is repeated. So the formation of the
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complex hypothesis actually decreases confidence further than
the use of the single word hypothesis
Graph 7
Conf/Acc: Unkn Ti on Ord 1 x Info
Accuracy
even though the former uses information and the latter
abandons it.
On the third amount of information, confidence in the
complex hypothesis rises. The third cue is now confirming this
guess.
Turning to the retention of the single word hypothesis
brake. When this happens on cue 2, marked by an accuracy of 1,
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confidence falls slightly in relation to accuracy 1 cue 1.
Accuracy, however, is down by 50% since brake without a
differentia is only half correct. So confidence does not fall
in proportion to accuracy and does not reveal any great
awareness of difficulty. At at the third amount of information
again at an accuracy of 1 we see that confidence here is 3.8.
It has risen with respect to accuracy 1. on two amounts of
information which also marks brake. Subjects do boost their
confidence through the rejection of information, in all
probability because they see it as "fraudulent. We can't tell
if these are the same subjects on cue 2. This dosn't really
matter.	 The point is that information can be seen as
fraudulent at some point along the information sequence.
Unfortunately, we can't repeat the above illustration of
the unknown version of target 1 on Order 2 since the single
word response brake and the complex hypothesis brake hard both
score an accuracy of 1 and we can't distinguish between them on
cue 2.
Single Word Responses.
Target 2
Here we are dealing with the formation of single word
hypotheses on both meaning versions of the target.
First, let's look at the independent variable of meaning
for target 2. Result 23 shows that the unknown meaning version
differs significantly from the known meaning version for
accuracy and uncertainty, but not for confidence.
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For accuracy the difference between the two means is
significant and substantial. The known version mean is 1.804
and the known, .841, so prediction 6 is correct.
	 The target
in it's known form is cut and the first cue is: He (
	
) the
carcass with a sharp knife.
	 The second cue in Order 1 adds
butcher and
	 and the third adds: He wore an apron to stop
his clothes getting messy. The unknown version of the target
is flense. Cue 1 remains the same. Cue 2 adds sailor and
whale and cue 3, They were soon covered with a smelly, white
mess. The responses on both versions of the target are very
similar. Single word answers like: cut, carve, chop, open,
gut, slit, hack. On the known version these score 2, on the
unknown version only 1 since only a complex hypothesis can
score 2 here, hence an inevitable difference. Since there is
no significant difference in confidence between the two
versions of this target, the known mean is 4.112 and the
unknown 3.960, we might say that on the unknown version of
target 2, subjects are not aware of their lack of accuracy.
The interesting feature on target 2 is in the confidence
and uncertainty results. For uncertainty, there is a
significant difference with the known producing less
uncertainty than the unknown. The known mean is .453 and the
unknown .674. Prediction 7 fails and there is more
uncertainty, particularly on the unknown, than I bargained for.
On the other hand there is no significant difference between
the two versions for confidence. We would think that increased
uncertainty would decrease confidence. 	 Here, almost the
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opposite has occurred. The unknown version with the high
uncertainty (that is, high within the context of changing to
fairly closely related guesses since the mean Is below I) has
a confidence score which is close to and not significantly
different from the known version.
I suspect the high uncertainty on the unknown version is
linked to the closeness in confidence. The reason is to be
found in the nature of the responses given above. We get cut
which is neutral, and we get something like which is more
biassed in It's associations towards the idea of fish and then
we get hack which is biassed towards the idea of violence. In
the known version of the target, the tendency is to choose a
fairly neutral option and to retain it fairly frequently.
Hence a lowish uncertainty. In the unknown version there is an
increasing tendency to start with a neutral response but to
change more to responses like	 or hack when whale and the
idea of getting covered in a smelly white mess come in as
cues. I would suggest that such changes are useful in that
they allow subjects to extract some of the information from
these cues. In this way, the unknown version of target 2 gains
a confidence advantage over the strategy of simply abandoning
the whole cue and so generates a confidence total close to that
of the known version which is probably operating close to It's
confidence "ceiling" right from cue 1 and can't gain much from
cues 2 and 3.
Let's look at this notion of "extracting" some of
the information from cues on the unknown version. Given that
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subjects have obtained the hypothesis cut on cue 1 and know
also that they are dealing with some kind of dead creature,
then when the second cue whale comes in they might see it as
made up most prominently of the items sea creature and very
large size. If the subject changes his guess from cut to
he has been able to use the idea of sea creature and with the
use of information, confidence rises. If the subject changes
from cut to hack then he has used the idea large size (needing
a violent effort to cut up). With the third cue getting
covered In a smelly white mess then white mess could lead to
(we know there is a carcass and white suggests fish/sea
creature) and covered to hack (it suggests a large carcass
needing some effort). Or the subject having got from cue
2, might Ignore this third cue.
What we have is a partial use of information and we might
identify this as a strategy type. It involves taking some of
the information In a single cue or taking one cue in preference
to another where Information is relevant to one of the meaning
components.	 In this case the differentla information is
treated In this fashion.	 This strategy of partial use ia
similar to the strategy of forcing noted In experiment 3 in
that there Is distortion of information.	 It is different in
that with forcing we noted that there was a downgrading of
differentla to association. Since we are dealing with
associations suggesting a differentla here there can be no such
downgrading. We might say that forcing applies to core meaning
components and partial use to associations.
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There are some important points to note here. Partial
use need not only apply to situations where subjects have the
opportunity to change guess. A subject could retain a guess
and do the same thing. It is likely, however, that the
opportunity to change guesses allows subjects to see new
information as useful and attracts them to it. Where they hold
the same guess, new information might not seem so useful and
they would abandon.
	 Also, this high uncertainty will only
generate a confidence on unknowns. On a known target where
information is consistent then changing or holding should
generate confidence pretty much equally with the proviso noted
in the correlations on Experiment 3 that an extra degree of
processing effort might be involved in changing with a small
reduction in confidence.
But if some information Is used then what about the
remainder? Gut uses the idea of sea creature with respect to
whale but does not use large size for example. Now ! does
not necessarily preclude large size so what happens here is not
strictly logical. It simply doesn't use this item of
information In an active sense in the lexicalisation process to
achieve the change of guess. There is no single word form that
can absorb cut,sea creature and large size as part of its
meaning.	 Rather, large size is abandoned from the
lexicalisation process and held as a strange association to
The hack response uses large size and takes sea creature
as a strange association. We again see information abandoned
from the lexicalisation process as inconsistency becomes a
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problem in the same way as with the brake response on cue 2
target 1, but involving part of a cue this time rather than the
whole thing. We would expect this to have some kind of negative
effect on confidence since the abandoned information is
probably seen as potentially useful. Subjects are probably
thinking that there is a slightly better single word answers
than	 or hack.
So partial use of information will in part send
confidence up by allowing use of some information. But any
such rise is going to be held back or limited by abandoning
some information from the lexicalisation process. Where this
is applied we would expect an unknown target to generate less
confidence than a know.
The lack of a significant difference between the meaning
versions of this target on confidence does not reveal this
limiting effect on confidence for partial use, but we do need
to follow through to the meaning by information interaction.
If subjects are "troubled" by cues 2 and 3 on the unknown
version the known and unknown confidence lines should diverge
across information most likely with the unknown line falling.
The rational is that they should start very close together
since the first cue is common to both. Any differing approach
to information subsequently must produce an interaction.
I'll look at the possible interactions on meaning by
information for confidence and uncertainty together. The
relevant statistics are at Result 27a and c) and we can see
that there is indeed a significant interaction for confidence,
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but not for uncertainty.	 I'll give the means at table 7 to
save referring back.
Table 7
Means for the meaning by information interaction for target 2
for confidence and uncertainty
1 amount	 2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknowns confidence 4.012 	 3.824	 4.046
Knowns confidence	 3.788	 4.206	 4.341
Unknown uncertainty	 .706	 .641
Knowns uncertainty	 .547	 .359
For uncertainty, the unknown means are higher across
information than the knowns as we would expect. Both versions
show a tendency for uncertainty to decrease with information so
the lines remain parallel
The means for confidence are displayed on graph 8. This
interaction on graph 8 is not easy to Interpret since the two
confidence lines don't start In quite the same place (even
though both points are responses to the same cue in isolation)
and cross to cause the interaction. What we are looking at in
this crossing of lines might be no more than an accident on cue
1. On the other hand, if we could imagine squeezing the two
confidence lines together at cue 1, then the line for the
unknown version of the target would drop slightly as the line
for the known version rises, the strong point of the
interaction being over cue 2 with the lines parallel after
that. Note that though the lines are parallel after cue 2, the
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unknown line stays below the known.
What I suspect is happening is that on the known version
of the target across information, subjects see cues 2 and 3 as
consistent and able to reinforce a previous guess completely.
Sometimes guesses are changed, but again these cues
Graph 8
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is close to its maximum ceiling from cue I and there isn't much
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confidence up to a degree. However, some relevant information
can not be used and this holds confidence back and prevents it
from reaching the same levels as seen on the known version.
If we go back to the overall difference in confidence between
known and unknown versions of this target, it could be that we
find no significant difference for two reasons. First, the
confidence gap between the two versions of this target has
partly been closed by the accidentally high start on cue I
unknown as shown on graph 8. Also, however, because the
information which has been taken up by partial use on the
unknown version of the target has had an effect sufficient to
close the gap.
Also if we look at confidence and accuracy scores given
as percentages in table 8
Table 8
Confidence & Accuracy as % on target 2
Overall Accuracy
	
Known
	 Unknown
	
90.2
	
42.05
Confidence cues 2 and 3
cue 2	 70.1	 63.7
cue 3	 72.4	 67.4
we see a substantial difference on accuracy with unknown
meanings lower (meaning by information Is not significant for
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accuracy) but confidence differences between the two meanings
are small. Subjects have some intuitions about their lack of
accuracy on unknowns but these intuitions are limited because
partial use has given confidence a boost.
One final point about the strategy of partial use. Why
do subjects use it rather than build complex hypotheses? It
may be that the differentia has been formed then dropped
because of suspicion. I doubt this. There are two reasons I
would suggest. First, the way in which any information which
is not taken up by the strategy can be held simply as strange
collocations on the single word hypothesis formed allows
information to be fairly easily processed. Second, even though
there is a difficulty in processing here In that we have to
cope with this strangeness, the Information taken up is used to
do something-change guess. This opens up the possibility of
increased accuracy and so increased benefits.
It is not likely that a differentia is formed then and
subjects do not come near the possibility of constructing a
complex hypothesis but get sidetracked into choices between
single word guesses.
In a way the situation is not very different from where a
single word guess is retained in the unknown condition as on
target 1. Again the differentia is not formed partly because
information which is rejected can be held as unfamiliar
associations. However, the attractive option of changing is no
longer open and new information is not drawn in but must simply
be held as associations to the word guess so the strategy is
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more properly termed abandoning. However, a factor which off
sets the lack of options to change to and encourages the use of
this strategy is the possibility of seeing information as
fraudulent which helps. Again, intuitions about accuracy are
limited.
If in fact we move to target 3 where again single word
hypotheses are formed, the picture is almost identical to
target 2. The exception is that there is an overall confidence
difference between both meaning versions of the target (see
Result 30a), the unknown being the lower, but t 1nis tii botn
versions start at almost the same point on cue 1 (see Result 34
a). So possibly it was the accidental high start of the unknown
version of target 2 on cue 1 that closed the overall gap in
confidence between known and unknown version so there does
appear to be a drag on confidence where partial use occurs. I
won't proceed any further with target 3 here because of the
similarity with target 2.
To sum up then. In previous experiments, we have noted
that subjects form single word hypotheses in the unknown
meaning condition by abandoning or forcing information. We can
now add a third strategy which was not predicted, that of
partial use. This method of using information can provide a
limited boost to confidence. Also, the way in which confidence
is held back by the non use of some of the information in cues
does suggest that subjects do have some intuitions about their
lack of accuracy. However, whereas confidence is only
marginally lower on unknown versions of targets 2 and 3 as
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compared with known it is substantially lower for accuracy.
Although one might argue that we should refine our accuracy
grading scheme since a variety of single word guesses are given
and some are probably a little more accurate than others,
broadly, we can say that subjects have a limited awareness of
accuracy where partial use occurs. We also need to remember
the high uncertainty (changes of guess) which associates with
partial use. We might go further and say these intuitions
about accuracy are limited in that subjects are prevented by
high uncertainty from reaching the point where they might
consider a new meaning/complex hypothesis.	 The high
uncertainty makes sure that they are focussing on choices
between single words and never really get close to considering
that a complex hypothesis or new meaning might be present.
Order
Here we are concerned with the possibility that one of
the orders used is superior to the other. Remember that we are
dealing now with order only in a limited sense. The cue to the
genus always comes in first place and is the same for both
known and unknown versions of the target. Only the last two
cues vary their position so that we have Order 1:
subject/object collocation-> non subject/order collocation, and
Order 2:	 non subject/object collocation-> subject/object
collocation.	 Is one of these orders stronger?
	 i have
suggested at prediction 8 that there will be no effect for
order.	 This is due to the fact that order is complex and I
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decided to await results.
Having looked at the dependent variables of confidence
and accuracy, there seems to be little of interest here. I
intend to proceed straight to the dependent variable of
uncertainty where I think we can see some interesting effects
for order.
With uncertainty, we do get an overall effect for order
(see Result 2c). The mean for Order 1 is .686 and for Order 2
.605. Order 2 generates less uncertainty than Order 1 and this
difference is significant.
There is a significant interaction for meaning y orier
by information (Result lic). The means are given at table 9 to
save referring back.
Table 9
Means for meaning by order by information for uncertainty
2 amounts	 3 amounts
Unknown order 1
	 1.012	 .679
Unknown order 2
	 .749	 .937
Known order 1	 .584	 .471
Known order 2	 .443	 .290
Whilst the interaction between unknown orders is the first
thing to catch the eye since the lines appear to cross, the
averages for unknown Orders I and 2 are respectively: .846 and
.843. Although the interaction is interesting, it is not what
gives Order 2 less uncertainty. On the known version of the
orders there's really not much interaction. Both lines fall,
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but known Order 2 does so at a lower level than Known Order 1.
The fall is also a little steeper on Order 2 than Order 1 in
the known version. It seems that the overall reduction in
uncertainty for Order 2 lies in the known version side of this
variable. Note we almost get a significant difference for the
meaning by order interaction (Result 3c: significance of F=
.054) There is also a significant interaction at Result 14c,
order by information by target, but in order to bring back the
meaning variable I'll move to meaning by order by information
by target (Result l5c) where we have a significant interaction
with the significance of F= .000. Again, bringing target into
this discussion tends to decrease the importance of the order
variable in terms of constructing plans or order based
strategies in that we'd need a different plan for each target.
But the differences might be more on unknowns than knowns. The
means, however, are given at table 10. There's really too much
at table 10 to use graphs, but we can see by eye much of what
happens.
First the unknown orders. The orders for each
interaction on the unknown target versions cross each other.
On target 1, Order 1 falls and Order 2 rises. The same thing
happens on target 2. On target 3, however, Order 1 falls very
slightly, it's almost static. 	 Order 2 crosses it by falling
even more steeply.	 There is no real consistency across
targets.	 The pattern on target 3 is almost the reverse of
targets 2 and 1.	 What I suspect we're looking at 	 is an
accidental effect due to strength of cues. On targets 1 and 2
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the subject/object collocations are generally the strongest in
the sense that they seem to force most of the change that takes
place. On target 3, the non subject/object collocation seems
to generate the most uncertainty.
Putting the best light on things, we might say that the
balance	 of	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 the	 subject/object
collocation seems to produce the most uncertainty and forces
Table 10
The means for meaning by order by information by target for
uncertainty
Target 1 unknown order 1
Target 1 unknown order 2
Target 1 known order 1
Target 1 known order 2
Target 2 unknown order 1
Target 2 unknown order 2
Target 2 known order 1
Target 2 known order 2
Target 3 unknown order 1
Target 3 unknown order 2
Target 3 known order 1
Target 3 known order 2
2 amounts
1.553
.753
.306
.212
.765
.647
.706
.388
.718
.847
.741
.729
3 amounts
.824
1.494
.318
.188
.541
.741
.341
.376
.671
.576
.753
.306
the most change. Overall, however, there isn't really much
difference between the means for unknown Order 1 and unknown
Order 2 because as we see above, the lines keep crossing within
each target across information. This crossing of lines creates
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a balancing effect and both unknown orders end up producing
very close overall uncertainty means: Order 1= .846, Order2=
.843. We might say tentatively that the subject/object
collocation seems the stronger and generates more uncertainty
but that order does not really seem to exert much influence on
..-power.
With the known orders, Order 2 seems to have less
uncertainty consistently than Order 1. We need to know if the
cause is the same on each target. Remember, Order 1 puts the
subject/object collocation in second place, Order 2 puts the
non subject/object collocation in second place. We might try
to say that for each target, on cue 2 the subject/object
collocation generates more uncertainty than the non
subject/object collocation also on cue 2. This difference is
consistent on all three targets but is very slight on target 3
though and we're on dangerous ground. This shouldn't create
the overall superiority for Order 1 since we would expect the
subject/object collocation to generate a lot of uncertainty on
Order 2, cue 3.
Going on and looking at the third amount of information
for the knowns we can note something interesting. Look at
target 1, known Order 1 at cue 2. This is the subject/object
collocation. The mean is .306. Now look diagonally downwards
to the subject/object collocation on known Order 2 at cue 3.
The mean is .188. The subject/object collocation seems not to
maintain but to lose its power to generate uncertainty on cue
3.	 The same is true for all the other targets. 	 So, the
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subject/object collocation, whilst strong on cue 2, seems to
lose this power on cue 3 ie. it is strong early but weak late.
Reverse this process and look at the non subject/object
collocations and the same can not be said. 	 They seem to
maintain their power. 	 We have here the reason why Order 1
generates more uncertainty overall. 	 On known Order 2 the
subject/object collocation is losing it's influence to generate
uncertainty	 when	 it	 comes	 after	 non	 subject/object
collocations.
A possible explanation is as follows. If we take known
target 2 in Order 2 as an example. 	 The subject sees at He
( _) the carcass using a sharp knife. He wore an apron to
stop his clothes getting messy. Say he has the genus cue and
non subject/object collocation. Possibly the subject on the
basis of this Information which forms a familiar schematic
representation Is able to guess that the pronoun He is in fact
butcher. That Is, he has Instantiated the pronoun on the basis
of a familiar schema. See Whitney (1986) and (1987) for a
fuller discussion of this phenomenon. So the effect of cue 3,
the subject/object collocation Is transferred to cue 2, the non
subject/object collocation. But the subject might be cautious
of this Instantiation since Information is not given explicitly
and might not use It to generate uncertainty. When, however,
on cue 3, he is told that the pronoun does represent butcher he
will decide "Well I knew that all along" and ignore It again.
All told the result is a weakening of subject/object
collocatlons when	 they come	 after non subject/object
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collocations. Possibly also why we don't get the same thing
happening on unknowns is because subjects are building up new
schematic representations here and so can't instantiate so
well.
To sum up, then, is it worth incorporating some of the
above ideas into an order strategy which could be taught? I
doubt if subjects would be aware of this difference between
associations so we should probably think in terms of teaching
them this. Also note that in this study, subject/object
collocations are distant from the target only in terms of time,
but we might argue that any effect due to time might translate
into physical distance since these associations can o.ciit aa
from their close position to the target
On known meanings, what changes of guess that do take
place are important since changes might be needed to increase
accuracy. We did see on the correlations for Experiment 3 with
early cues on unknown targets how change was necessary and
beneficial since subjects had been sent in the wrong direction.
This could also happen on known targets in real life where
information may be inconsistent. Also if information is simply
vague close to the target we might need to change guess. It
might be worth pointing out, then, that the order
subject/object collocation-> non subject/object collocation Is
a better generator of uncertainty than the reverse. More
simply, perhaps, it might be better to warn subjects not to
ignore subject/object collocations when they occur some
distance from the target rather than telling them to find these
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cues, hold them and then use them in a set order. This
strategy of not ignoring subject/object collocations when they
are distant does seem to address the problem of this type of
cue losing it's power to generate uncertainty across distance.
It does, however, remove order from the strategy and we are
processing cues as we find them. But this does have the
benefit of simpilcity and low processing cost over an order
based strategy for probably the same gains.
One more point is that in this experiment there is no
marked difficulty on the knowns. If there were it is possible
that this order effect might vanish.
On unknown versions, order Is not really an issue. The
subject/object collocation doesn't seem to lose it's power to
generate uncertainty as it becomes more distant from the
target. We do need to remember that on the unknown versions,
however, the "value" of uncertainty is questionable. It could
lead to the formation of new meanings/complex hypotheses. On
the other hand, it could lead to a search for alternative
synonyms for the target which really do not improve accuracy,
but which can give confidence a boost through partial use of
information. This latter scenario Is clearly dangerous and
could involve overconfidence. Given that the construction of
new meanings/complex hypotheses seems to be rare (on one target
out of three) it might be best to teach a plan involving the
reduction of amount of Information used. Find the genus cue
and Ignore anything else.
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High and Low Confidence Subjects
One subject mentioned earlier is that we can get
different types of subject in terms of confidence. In addition
to a middle of the road group some are very confident, others
are conservative but all obtain roughly the same accuracy.
This is of interest to future experimenters since it might be
useful to issolate different subject types. So let's see if
there is any evidence for this subject distinction.
Since there were 85 subjects in each version of the
experiment this seemed sufficient so correlations of confidence
and accuracy were done for known and unknown meaning conditions
in each order so we have four correlations. All the scores for
each subject were added together so we are doing a subject
version and not subject by item. This is appropriate since it
is simply a subject effect we are after. The coefficient used
was Pearson r. Also, I'll use only correlations for order I
here only since those for order 2 were much the same.
The coefficient for known order 1 was .040 and for
unknown order 1 it was .157. They are very weak . The plots
for confidence and accuracy, using the same system as for
Experiment 3 correlations are given at table 11. These plots
are displayed on graph 9.
Looking at graph 9 we can make two points.
First, , we see that the known version of Order 1 occupies
the top half of the accuracy scale and the unknown version the
bottom half. This is because on the known version, the first
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cue gave subjects a clearly correct answer and so accuracy
immediately reaches a ceiling and stays there. Much the same
Table 11
The confidence/accuracy plots
Accuracy
0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.0
Confidence Unknown Order 1
2.7 3.6 3.6 3.1 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.8
Confidence Known Order 1
4.2	 4.0 4.6 3.8 4.3
happens on the unknown version. Targets 2 and 3 immediately
reach their ceiling, but this time, since subjects are giving
single word answers, this ceiling is 1 rather than 2. Only on
target 1 is there a tendency to get through to an accuracy of 2
and here only on later cues. The result is that accuracy is
again consistent, but at a lower level than for the known
version of Order 1.
Second, the confidence lines for both known and unknown
Order 1 are pretty much horizontal. In all probability what is
causing this is the problem of high and low confidence
subjects. Looking in particular at the known version of Order
1, then I would suggest that subjects who are conservative and
think that 4 is a high level of confidence have given the
scores of 3.8 confidence, 1.8 accuracy.
	 Subjects who are
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very confident and think 4 is a low level of confidence have
created the plot at 4.2 confidence, 0.9 accuracy. We can see
Graph 9
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the same factors at work on the unknown line with a large
number of 3.6 confidence scores across a wide range of
accuracy.
There is some evidence then for different confidence type
subjects.
Conclusions
I have suggested that in the formation of complex
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hypotheses there is a drain on confidence caused by suspicion
of a new combination. In this experiment, because confidence
begins at a high level, I predicted that confidence would fall
on cue 2 as a result of this effect and interact with known
meanings across information. On target 1 we see the formation
of two complex hypotheses which offer some support for this
idea by the way in which they tend to produce the predicted
interaction with known meanings across information.
With these complex hypotheses we are in the position of
seeing confidence decrease in the environment of a possible
increase in accuracy. Even if a subject guesses correctly he
might still be unsure about such a hypothesis. For guessing
as a learning strategy this is fairly serious. Subjects might
well remember such a hypothesis due to depth of processing but
if their confidence in it has been shaken to a degree they
would be reluctant to use it. In a sense, it has not properly
been learnt if it can't be used. One would expect there to be
a follow up to guessing a complex hypothesis in terms of an
appeal to authority. Subjects might well check their guess in
a dictionary or ask a teacher before making it part of their
productive vocabulary.
We also see the formation of single word hypotheses in
the unknown condition most noticeably on targets 2 and 3 but
also to some extent on target 1. This response type seems
again to dominate. This supports the results of Experiment 3
which suggested that single word hypotheses would be guessed in
an unknown meaning situation. A more naturalistic text as used
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in this experiment does not seem to mitigate the problem.
Subjects seem to apply the process for guessing known meanings
to the guessing of unknown meanings and try to lexicalise
information. Any lack of accuracy produced here is the result
of this misapplication and not as Schatz and Baldwin (1986)
suggest due to lack of information in more natural texts. This
use of the known meaning process on unknown meanings gets them
into a problem since they now have to deal with perceived
inconsistency between cues. This problem appears to be dealt
with by abandoning information from the process of
lexicalisation or by partial use of information which replaces
the strategy of forcing cues where the meaning component is
more explicit.
With respect to abandoning information. When, as in this
experiment, we suggest meaning In contrast to the last
experiment where the meaning cues were given explicitly, we do
not see subjects abandon guessing when they abandon
information. The target can continue to be lexicalised right
up to cue 3. The unusual associations do appear to trouble the
subjects so confidence falls at cue 2 on target 1. However,
there is an indication that on cue 3 these associations are
seen as "fraudulent" and ignored, this rejection of information
being able to give confidence a boost. We can only say that
subjects have limited intuitions about lack of accuracy.
With respect to partial use. The danger here is that this
strategy associates with high uncertainty/changeability. The
subject might get a boost to confidence through "bumping"
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around between possible single word hypotheses without
improving his accuracy. This might also deflect attention from
the building of complex hypotheses Again intuitions about lack
of accuracy are limited.
In fact, neither abandoning nor partial use leads to
subjects constructing a differentia and then rejecting the
genus differentia combination due to suspicion in this
experiment unlike the last. 	 We must therefore differentiate
between stategies on the basis of cue types. Where meaning
components are suggested by implicit associational cues we have
abandoning and partial use where confidence is high and
reflects only a limited awareness of accuracy. Where meaning
components are given more explicitly as in Experiment 3 and
probably also by implicit definitional cues, we have abandoning
and forcing but with a severe limitation on confidence
suggesting a much greater awareness of lack of accuracy.
As to a superior order, Order 1 produces more
uncertainty than Order 2 . The advantage seems to be on the
known versions of the target where subject/object collocation
seems to lose Its power to force change when it is delayed.
Such change could be important on known versions, contributing
to increasing accuracy If there were a problem with vaguenes or
inconsistency of information. However, It is not worth teaching
subjects to plan their guessing in Order 1. It would be better
and simpler to tell them to process information as it comes and
beware not to neglect subject/object collocations that occur
away from the target.
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As to unknown targets, order in the limited sense
discussed in this experiment is not really an issue since
subject/object collocations are strong in both orders and in
fact tend to dominate and create the high uncertainty, at least
on two targets. But this is double edged in that it could lead
to the guessing of a new meaning on the one hand or it could
encourage partial use and lead to subjects "bumping" around
between a selection of possible alternatives with no real
increase in accuracy but obtaining a boost for confidence. It
may on balance, since single word guesses seem to dominate, be
better to teach a strategy which Ignores order and simply
restricts amount and type. Process the genus cue and leave
everything else. This makes abandoning the best strategy.
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Chapter 10
Some Case Studies
Experiment 5 Part 1
Introduction
Purpose of the experiment: The preceding experiments have been
in a sense "artificial" due to the method of presenting cues.
Giving subjects one cue at a time in a gradual buildup of
information must suggest that each new cue as it appears is of
relevance to the target and must be used. The analogy has been
drawn with the way in which information is presented in
mathematical type questions. The reason for adopting this
approach is that it allows us to treat variables like type of
cue, order etc. systematically. Having looked at guessing
systematically it is now time to move to the more real life
situation of giving subjects a passage and asking them to guess
by picking whatever cues they choose to select. Cues will be
mainly implicit associational. The purpose is to provide a
followup and to check whether the more important results
obtained in the preceding experiments can be confirmed in a
more real life setting. I intend to focus only on unknown
meanings. The independent variables of part of speech and form
will be held constant by choosing verb targets marked by an
unknown form.	 Order will also be held constant. 	 This
followup is small in scale and is more in the nature of "case
studies" than an actual experiment.	 The structure of this
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chapter will be to present the protocol for each subject
followed by a brief analysis and finally to present a set of
conclusions.
Predictions:	 The results from previous experiments which I
intend to try and confirm in this more are as follows.
The tendency to lexicalise cues to form single word
hypotheses emerges as stronger than the tendency to form new
meanings/complex hypotheses in the unknown meaning condition.
Will this also be the case in a more normal reading as opposed
to the more controlled experiments conducted so far
Prediction 1: Subjects will tend to lexicalise cues to
form single word hypotheses rather than unknown meanings in a
more normal reading situation.
We have also noted the following strategies where
lexicalisation takes place: abandoning/forcing in a situation
where cues are fairly explicit with a large reduction in
confidence and abandoning/partial use where cues are implicit
associational and where there is a more limited reduction in
confidence. Since cues will not be explicit in this study and
I will be relying heavily on implicit associational cues, the
choice will be between abandoning where cues are implicit and
partial use. Again, it is the genus cue which is held and
associations suggesting the differentia which are abandoned or
partially used. I have suggested that the best strategy to
follow would be to abandon information (see Experiment 4).
Since partial use does not really lead to much of an
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improvement in accuracy over abandoning yet involves more
processing, I would expect abandoning to be favoured.
Prediction 2: Abandoning information will be the most
prevalent strategy.
A final point relates to the above introduction. I
mentioned that in previous experiments, subjects were forced to
see all cues as relevant because of the way in which they were
presented. It is possible that in a more real life situation
that subjects might not recognise some cues and simply be
unaware that they are relevant. This is most likely to be the
case with information related to the differentia which is most
often partially used or abandoned. However, from what I have
said in Chapter 3, I think it is probable that subjects will
recognise cues to the differentia, even where they are
associational, as relevant.
Prediction 4: Differentia information will be seen as
relevant by subjects.
Method
Cases: Six subjects took part in the experiment. They
were all post graduate students doing MAs in Teaching English
as a Foreign Language or Applied Linguistics at University of
Wales, Bangor. Two of the subjects were forced to drop out
since they knew the word I had chosen for a target.
Independent variables: Amount of information is the only
independent variable. One verb target marked by an unknown
form was used. Order of cues is fixed in terms of the order
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used in the passage is constant. There is a problem here in
that subjects might not use the cues in the order in which they
appear in the text. I'll only comment on this if it becomes
significant.
The target was to sashay (to walk in a dance like fashion)
and it was placed in a passage which I wrote myself so as to
have better control of the cues. This clearly leaves me open
to the criticism that I'm not using "authentic" materials. In
defence, I would say that it is not too unusual to find a
passage such as I've used here in real life. I'll give the
passage which I constructed at 1.
1. The following is an extract from the memoirs of Lord
Halifax, a well travelled gentleman of the last century. The
word to guess is Sashay.
The first time I saw someone sashay down the street was
in New Orleans. I was seated at the window of a rather
pleasant cafe when the person in question came into view after
turning a corner. He paused for a moment to exchange a
greeting with someone he evidently knew and then proceeded
onwards, raising his hat politely to a passing lady before
disappearing from sight.
I have always believed that one can learn a great deal
about a culture by observing the details of how people behave.
Now in London a gentleman strolls, in New York he strides, in
Paris he generally shuffles, but in New Orleans a gentleman
sashays down the street. On seeing this in 1849, when I first
visited the States, my inclination was to laugh. In truth, one
could only see this in a culture grown rich at too great a
pace. Yet, after consideration, I realised that this was but a
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reflection of a colourful society, of a happiness and
outgoingness we sometimes lack in London.
CLUE	 GUESS	 CONFIDENCE
If we look at the structure of a passage then all the
cues in paragraph 1, are implicit associational and are
relevant to the genus of the target which is walk. The
prepositional phrase down the street, suggests walk. Also, by
suggesting that the person in question exchanges a greeting and
then raises his hat I sought to block off the possible
hypothesis run. I wanted to keep subjects on as straight a
track as possible since I wanted to try and see what might
happen in guessing a new meaning not in changing known words
because of a wrong start. Paragraph 2 begins with a contrast
cue which is implicit definitional and gives the genus walk.
My intention here also was to block as many familiar, single
word hypotheses as possible such as: stroll which could be used
as alternatives to walk and so try to give subjects a clear
genus to which they could next try to add a differentia.
Following this contrast are a set of implicit associational
cues to the differentia such as my inclination was to laugh.
So we have a block of genus cues followed by a block of
differentia cues.
Again, subjects have to work to get the components of
meaning which as I argued in the introduction to Experiment 3
is the more natural situation.
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Procedure: Subjects were given a set of instructions
which basically asked them to guess the meaning of the target
and state each cue they used as they used it, together with the
hypothesis they formed and their confidence in that hypothesis.
These responses were to be written in the space provided at the
bottom of the passage. The instructions are given in Appendix
4.	 It was made clear that they could give responses as a
single word or a phrase. Subjects were asked to take the test
home and to complete and return it. All protocols were
returned within three days. I11 present each protocol below
followed by a brief discussion.
A criticism of the experiment Is that we have a great
deal less control over what happens than in previous
experiments and we can't say this this is anything more than
exploratory in nature. We should be able to examine the
predictions made, however. Also, there is the possibility that
this method of allowing subjects a great deal of freedom might
throw up something unexpected that we have missed in previous
more controlled experiments.
Subject 1
Protocol
CLUE
	 GUESS
	
CONFIDENCE
a) someone... down the	 walk (in some peculiar	 2
street (the first time)
	
manner)
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b) strolls, strides, shuffles struts	 4
gentleman
c) to laugh	 strut/swagger	 4
Discussion
We have a pattern of rising confidence, but the subject
is not trying to guess a new meaning. Rather, he is holding to
single word options. Most important to note, is that the cues
to the differentia have not been ignored. They are seen as
relevant, but just as in Experiment 3, they are used to guess
and change familiar, single word hypotheses. The strategy used
is partial use. The idea of strangeness has been extracted
from cue c) laugh but the idea of humour included in this cue
is not really covered by properly by the responses. Also we
see this strategy linked with a highish uncertainty and the
subject is not sure which of the two responses on c) to take.
Also, the first guess is interesting in that it is not just a
single word guess, but the words in a peculiar manner have been
added. The hypothesis walk in conjunction with an unknown form
has been sufficient to start the process of guessing a new
meaning, but the subject has retreated from this into guessing
familiar single words. This is something we have not really
seen before. The contrast has always been either between a
single word hypothesis or a combination of hypotheses to form a
new meaning.
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Subject 2
P rot 0 CO 1
CLUE
a) down the street
b) strolls, strides,
c) to laugh, rich at too
great a speed
GUESS
	
CONFIDENCE
walk	 1
kind of walk or run	 3
skip?	 3
Discussion
Again cues to the differentla are not simply ignored in a
more realistic setting.	 They are used, but again on single
word guesses, producing change in these guesses. The strategy
again is partial use and the uestion mark after skip
reveals that not only does this single word hypothesis not
absorb the cues properly, the subject is aware that they don't.
There is an awareness of limited accuracy. Note that skip is a
poor response and would get an accuracy of 0 yet the subject
does manage 50% confidence so we can only say there is a
limited intuition about accuracy, With subject 1 confidence is
slightly higher but the responses are better quality.
It seems to me that cues which can be used to build new
meanings are seen as relevant and are not simply ignored. They
are, however, distorted by partial use In the search for an
ever more precise, single word guess.
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Note also, that at guess b) the subject starts to try and
build a new meaning, this time the contrast cue has pushed him
into it in conjunction with the strange form. We get a kind of
walk rather than the single word walk. However, like subject
1, he retreats to single word guesses.
Subject 3
Pro to c 01
CLUE
	
GUESS
	
CONFIDENCE
a) down the Street	 a kind of walk	 1
b) strolls	 a kind of walk	 3
c) strides	 a kind of walk
	
4
d) shuffles	 a kind of walk	 5
e) but	 a swagger, confident walk	 5
f) laugh	 rather comic, pompous 	 5
exaggerated walk
g) colourful	 the above & colourful, 	 5½
smiling, confident
Discussion
Here we see a subject combining hypotheses to try and
form a new meaning. The initial hypotheses are interesting
in that the unknown form together with the hypothesis walk have
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been strong enough to start the subject looking for a new
meaning hence the words a kind of. Unlike subjects I and 2,
this subject has persisted. Confidence rises quite well. It
looks as though the awareness that a new meaning is present has
depressed confidence on the early guesses. This subject only
has a confidence of 1 at the end of the first paragraph. Had
he been guessing a single word, I would have expected it to be
higher.	 It suggests that awareness that the hypothesis is
incomplete surpresses confidence. 	 What surprises me is that
the subject does not retreat to a word guess here. Note that
we also seem to be getting increasing uncertainty as well.
Once a subject starts to guess a new meaning, each new cue
seems to suggest a new hypothesis and the presence of & in
response g) suggests that old hypotheses are not being thrown
away.
Subject 4
Protocol
CLUE
	
GUESS
	
CONFIDENCE
a) London.. .strides	 A kind of walk
	
6
b) New york...strides	 A kind of walk
	
6
c) Paris...shuffles	 A kind of walk
	
6
d) culture.. .behave	 A specific walk peculiar to 	 6
black people in New Orleans
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e) colourful society...	 To walk with abandonment 	 3
...happiness-	 perhaps swaying from side
outgoingness	 to side
Discussion
Here we see confidence start at maximum yet the subject
indicates the presence of a complex hypothesis by a kind of.
This level of confidence should not be possible according to
the model since the hypothesis is incomplete. But note that he
has given no response for the cues in paragraph 1. I would
suggest this subject has not initially been provoked into
trying to guess a new meaning as have subjects 1 and 3.
Rather, I would suggest, he has guessed the familiar word walk
and is not thinking in terms of kind of walk. We can't see
this since his first response relates to the start of paragraph
2. At the beginning of paragraph 2 he becomes aware of the
possibility of a new meaning, tries to guess it at d), but
throughout will not give up his high confidence, and then, as
he, paradoxically, builds up the complex hypothesis very
successfully his confidence in the combination of components
drops.	 The reason?	 There is suspicion in the unfamiliar
combination of components making up the complex hypothesis.
Note also that accuracy is increasing as confidence
decreases and we would really have to give him 100% accuracy
for his last guess.
We again see an expanding uncertainty off the last two
responses although there Is no overt evidence this time that
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the hypotheses at d) are retained at e). My feeling is that
the subject is keeping them in mind even if he has not noted
them down.
This is a good illustration of the effect of initial high
confidence predicted on Experiment 4 and shows that this can
happen in real life.
Conclusions
As to prediction 1. Two out of four subjects lexicalise
the targets and go for single word hypotheses. This is quite a
significant percentage though I would have predicted It would
be higher.
As to prediction 2. Partial use is the strategy used by
both subjects who go for single word hypotheses rather than
abandoning. Prediction 2 fails. Probably the temptation to
process some information proves too tempting in that subjects
believe they might be increasing benefits.
As to prediction 3, information relevant to the
differentia is clearly not Ignored and is drawn in either by
partial use or the construction of new meanings. There is
support for the idea that subjects would have seen differentia
information as relevant in the previous experiments even had it
not been made attractive by the method of presentation.
However, there Is one strange facet to this experiment.
The presence of a strange form over initial cues appears to
have prompted subjects to try and build a genus marked usually
by the phrase a kind of on early cues even if they later
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retreat from this and go for single word hypotheses. We have
not seen this before and the choice has always been to build a
single word hypothesis or a complex hypothesis. I ruled out
this type of response on the grounds that subjects would not
want to perceive the hypothesis as incomplete.
	
This needs
further investigation. As a result, I have extended this
experiment and a further follow up study is given in the next
section.
Experiment 5 Part 2
The purpose of this small follow up investigation was to
see if subjects would use a single word hypothesis to replace
the target or think in terms of some kind of or do something in
some kind of fashion. Part 2 of this experiment was identical
to Part 1 except in the following details. Three subjects were
used. They were again from the same background as those in
Part 1.	 Two short passages were used.	 I'll give them at 2
below
2.	 Passage 1
It had been a good year for the tribe. Their crops had
been bountiful. It was fitting, therefore, that the people of
the tribe should crell their gods. The women prepared food and
brought out the large jugs of alcohol which had been stored,
the men built a large bonfire in the middle of the village. As
darkness fell, the fire was lit and the feasting and drinking
began. Soon a procession was started, the people of the tribe
chanting and clapping as they wound their way around the
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flames. As the moon rose high in the night sky, the speed of
the procession increased with some of the men breaking off to
leap high in the air to the accompaniment of great shrieks and
whoops. Others of the tribe left the procession to stand
swaying unsteadily, the dancing flames reflecting in their
eyes.
Passage 2
Mario had a problem. He had too much money. The old
rackets of gambling and protection had been good sources of
income, but since the family had moved into drugs, things had
boomed. So Mario decided to mult some money in business. He'd
always fancied a hotel, the holiday business in Florida was
taking off. Something classy with a casino maybe. After all,
the other families had gone into Vagas in much the same way.
The trouble was, he'd have to be careful. Large sums of money
appearing from nowhere were bound to attract attention. He
needed a partner, a legitimate partner. But then no legitimate
businessman would come near him. Well, he'd just have to send
some of his boys down to Florida to have a friendly chat with
some of the hotel owners. If that didn't work, then one or two
of those nice law abiding folk might just accicienta1ly lall
under a bus. That would be sure to make the others listen to
his partnership offer.
The two targets are to crell (to worship in a frenzy) and
to mult (to invest illegally obtained money). Both are made up
meanings taken from Experiment 3. The passages are similar to
that in the Part 1 of this experiment. As the reader can see,
it Is reasonably easy to guess a word like worship in passage
1, and that there are plenty of cues to the differentia like
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alcohol, leaping into the air etc. The main difference is that
I did not use the contrast cue here.
	
There didn't seem any
point since it had not really worked in blocking off possible
single word options.
	 Also some cues which suggest the
differentia come before the target. For example, drugs and
protection rackets which fix the illegal nature of the
investment come before mult. This should help push subjects
towards thinking in terms of invest in some fashion so we are
not relying entirely on the effect of the pseudoword.
Subject 1
Protocol Passage 1
CLUE
	
GUESS
	
CONFIDENCE
a) feasting	 thank
	
3
b) merrymaking	 adore	 4
c) shrieks and whoops	 worship
	 6
Protocol Passage 2
C LUE
	
GUESS
	
CONFIDENCE
a) too much money	 invest
	 3
b) drugs	 launder	 4
c) no legitimate businessman 	 launder	 5
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give thanks to	 6
3spend
4invest
Subject 2
Protocol Passage 1
CLUE
a) bountiful
b) fitting
c) crell
Protocol Passage 2
a) t3uch money
b) hotel/holiday business
c) careful
GUESS
	
CONFIDENCE
give thanks to	 6
give thanks to	 6
invest illegally gained 6
money
c) large sums/attract	 hide illegally gained	 6
attention	 money
d) accidentally fall under
	 invest illegally earned 6
a bus	 money
Subject 3
Protocol Passage 1
a) Gods	 Thank	 4
"Thought about changing it to worship because of procession
but decided to stick with thank."
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Protocol Passage 2
a) business	 invest	 5
"Wanted to change invest to a more devious word suggesting
under-hand activity but couldn't think of appropriate word."
Discussion
Subject 2 on passage 2 builds a new meaning so this kind
of response is possible here. The other five cases involve
using single word hypotheses. Of these five cases, 2 involve
partial use of information: Subject 1 on passages 1 and 2
Here differentia information is used to switch to alternative
single word guesses. The final single word hypotheses don't
fit the cues properly since, for example with subject 1,
launder is not really a form of investment and shrieks and
whoops suggest a very atypical form of worship. Confidence is
quite high and subjects are deceived to an extent since their
responses don't really fit the cues well enough to justify
their confidence scores. Possibly we need a large experiment
like Experiment 4 to really catch the effect of partial use on
confidence. Subject 2, passage 1, abandons information with a
high confidence. Subject 3 also abandons with a slightly more
limited confidence though it is still over 50% so awareness of
accuracy is limited. We can also see from his comments that he
is aware of cues to the differentia so this information is
relevant.
The main point is that we do not, even where subject 2,
passage 2, builds a new meaning have a response of the type a
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kind of investment on initial cues. There is nowhere an
attempt to build a genus on the basis of an unknown form.
Rather, on the one instance a new meaning occurs it is the fact
that information can't be lexicalised which prompts this. In
fact, if we look at the final response of subject 2, passage 2
he repeats the word crell at maximum confidence. What he's
probably saying is "You can't catch me with this" and is
dismissing the pseudoform as "fraudulent". This is what we
would expect from Experiment 3 and I am reasonably sure that
this dismissal of an unknown form is fairly typical.
Why then do we get the formation of genuses marked by a
kind of rather than single words on the first part of this
experiment.	 The subjects are not very different.	 Also the
passages are fairly similar. 	 This suggests that the target
sashay in Part 1 is in some way "peculiar" or marked.
In what way might the target sashay be marked. Note that
subjects tend to treat the target as a noun not a verb when in
fact it has been presented to them as a verb. Only one gives
the response walk in some peculiar fashion. All the others
treat it as a noun giving a kind of walk. This happens despite
the fact that the verb form Is the more frequent and familiar
part of the derivation. Perhaps, with a little stretch of the
imagination one can lay the cause of what is happening at the
door of a government ministry and a comedy show. Monty
Python's Ministry of Silly Walks sketch has become something of
an institution. Also American films showing the kind of Negro
jiving walk that can more correctly be termed sashay are
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popular. Monty Python in particular presents the noun side of
the derivation and not the verb. There is a ready made
connection in most people's minds between the hypotheses of
walk and some silly or strange movement even if they can't
specify the nature of the strangeness. This connection is
probably so strong that in some cases it needs only the mention
of an unknown form in the environment of walk to trigger the
possibility of some kind of walk. The point I wish to make
here is that there are ready made connections in the mind. We
have the case of known or, perhaps more correctly, partly
formed meanings for which either no word exists or for which
the subject might not know the form because of it's
infrequency.
We have here a possible extension of the explanation as
to why subjects are sometimes able to form complex hypotheses
given in the model. There I suggested that where a new meaning
was formed subjects could somehow overcome suspicion in the
combination. It is more than this. Where new meanings are
formed there is an associative link between the genus and
differentia combination which though not lexicalised is
reasonably strong. I would suggest that in perhaps all cases
where subjects have been able to guess a "new meaning" in
previous experiments they have done so by exploiting these
already existing familiar links between combinations. 	 Note
that I sometimes used such combinations inadvertently myself
when constructing targets.	 We have all seen pictures on
television of strange instruments played by Indian musicians
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and handicapped people manipulating things with their feet
rather than with their hands which I used in Experiment 3.
Also the link between braking and using reins is fairly
espablished which is why a complex hypothesis could be formed
on target 1 of Experiment 4. Where such a link is available,
it can be exploited whether meaning is given fairly explicitly,
perhaps by implicit definitional cues or where it is given by
implicit associational cues. The combination of components
forming the complex hypothesis is still somehat strange,
however, since it is not lexicalised and there is still a
measure of suspicion in the complex hypothesis which undermines
confidence to a degree.
Where a familiar link between meaning components is not
available to a subject the following happens. If genus and
differentia are fairly explicit the subject has trouble "making
sense" of the combination of hypotheses and reverts to treating
them as inconsistent in order to lexicalise a familiar
hypothesis. If cues are implicit associational then the
subject simply does not try to form a complex hypothesis.
Being able to change to alternative single word guesses and
retaining items of information which are not lexicalised as
strange associations on the word hypothesis make strategies
like partial use attractive.
We can illustrate these ideas with some experiments
conducted by Rumeihart et al. (1986 pp 7-58). If we give a
subject the term bedroom and ask for associations we get a
fairly typical schematic representatin of a bedroom.
	 If we
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give bedroom and sofa together, the schematic representation
now incorporates associations like easy chair, and fireplace
even if there is no single word for a fancy bedroom. If we go
one stage further than these experimenters and put together
bedroom and cooker we would probably cause problems. Subjects
would not understand the combination and could only operate by
dropping one of the items, perhaps just giving a familiar
bedroom schema or by forcing them together to get bedsit and
giving associations like tiny or gloomy even though what we
want to suggest to the subject is a fairly pleasant room used
for sleeping and cooking.
In other words it comes back to the idea of costs
and benefits. We will go for a new meaning/complex hypothesis
where we have help in terms of existing patterns of knowledge
which not so much reduce processing costs as make processing
along these lines possible. The effect can can be summed up by
the word plausibility. Where a new meaning is plausible we may
well go for it. Where it is not we either reject it if it is
given by implicit definitional cues or never see It if It is
given by implicit associational cues. Another point is that
unlexicalised links between genus and differentia components
are probably rare. Also, when there is such a link it may not
be easy to spot since the association, whilst present, is not
strong enough to give rise to a new word. Hence, subjects tend
to guess words rather than new meanings.
We still have a problem. We are now saying that when
subjects guess unknown meaning, they are helped and probably
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need, vaguely familiar combinations of hypotheses in addition
to cues or they will go for familiar single word options. But
why in the sashay example do they give the response a kind of
walk really on the basis of the unknown form and initial cues.
My prediction in the model and most of the evidence suggests
that at this point they should really form a single word
hypothesis and not be too concerned with a possible new
meaning.	 Here, I would repeat the suggestion made above that
the sashay target is exceptional. There is such a strong
connection between walk and some strange kind of walk, due to
the media, that it needs only an unknown form or a cue
suggesting something out of the normal to generate the response
a kind of walk.
Conclusion
Returning to the predictions. With respect to prediction
1, we can say that subjects do tend to lexicalise unknown
meanings and form single word hypotheses. This is because they
need the help of existing, unlexicalised patterns of genus and
differentia knowledge to process cues in order to construct
complex hypotheses. However, such existing combinations are in
all probability not that frequent so they end up forming single
word hypotheses as alternatives. Out of 10 cases in both parts
of this experiment, single word hypotheses were formed on 7.
10 cases is a very small number but all the previous
experimental evidence backs this up.
With respect to prediction 2, though partial use was the
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only strategy used for lexicalisation in Part 1 we do see
examples of abandoning on Part 2. Both strategies are used.
Since abandoning is better since we don't go on processing for
no appreciable gain in accuracy we might think in terms of
teaching abandoning. Remember again, however, that this is a
small study. We do have evidence of abandoning and on a large
experiment this might be favoured.
With respect to prediction 3, subjects do indeed seem
sensitive to differentia related information and see it as
relevant even when they abandon it. So we can feel fairly
confident that the method of presenting cues in the first four
experiments has not forced subjects to perceive information
they would not normally do so as relevant.
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Chapter 11
Winding Things Up
This chapter deals with the conclusions of this study.
First, I want to summarise and contrast briefly the processes
involved in the four guessing situations outlined in Chapter 1:
doze over a known meaning, doze over an unknown meaning,
pseudoword over a known meaning, pseudoword over an unknown
meaning. Second, I want to look at the interesting area of cue
classification. In studies concerned with cue classification,
a pseudoword or doze gap is often used to cover a known
meaning rather than an unknown meaning. Given the differences
in process between guessing known and unknown meanings which we
will note in the first section, what are the consequences of
this substitution for cue classification studies? Third, I
want to evaluate the effectiveness of guessing as a strategy
which might help further the process of communication.
Finally, I'll look at some directions for future research
The four guessing situations
Cloze over a known meaning
This is an artificial testing or experimental situation.
Some, probably the majority of targets blanked out by an
experimenter will have meanings known to the subject.
What we see here is essentially a very efficient
information processing system. 	 Subjects recognize familiar
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combinations of cues and are able to put them together
effectively to guess single words so generating, as we see, an
increase in confidence, matched by an increase in accuracy
(suggesting subjects are aware of their accuracy) and a
reduction in uncertainty. 	 There is no necessity for
uncertainty to fall as confidence rises. 	 One could,
theoretically, hold a lot of hypotheses and still be very
confident in one. It's just not very efficient to do this.
Hence there is a tendency to increasingly focus on one
hypothesis as cues combine and to reject, or ignore, the more
peripheral hypotheses which a cue In isolation might suggest.
Another mark of the efficiency of the system is the way in
which subjects appear to have good intuitions about their
accuracy. Probably, what governs these intuitions is the
perception of cues fitting together in a familiar and known
pattern.
As to the Independent variable of order, on Experiment 3
there are interactions between orders and differentia->genus-
>associatIon emerges as superior. Again, on Experiment 4,
subject/object collocations followed by non subject/object
collocations generate more uncertainty than the reverse and
this might be valuable if early information is vague. However,
differences between orders are not great and all orders are
quite effective. Given that order is a complicated variable
and involves a high degree of processing effort, the principle
of costs and benefits suggests that it might not be worth
exploiting such differences as exist. If we gave subjects the
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freedom to choose between orders, a freedom they would have in
real life guessing but one which they are not allowed in my
experiments (remember, there would very likely be an unknown
form present in real life but this doesn't appear to have any
great effect as seen in Experiment 3), they would simply ignore
the order variable and process information as it comes. It is
also questionable whether we should try to teach a strategy
based on order say when tackling a doze test. Note, however,
that I have generalised from my experiments to real life by
using this costs/benefits principle. It would be worthwhile
doing more realistic studies of order to see if these points
hold true and that this variable is in fact ignored.
Cloze over an unknown meaning
This is generally an experimental type situation. In
some ways it is the most unusual of the four. It is perfectly
possible to get an unknown meaning on a doze test but one
would expect relatively few instances of this. This situation
does give us a clear picture of how unknown combinations of
cues are dealt with without the pseudoword being present.
Subjects, in this situation, tend to form single word
hypotheses rather than complex hypotheses/new meanings if there
is no plausible connection between the components of the
complex hypothesis.	 They are looking for a familiar
combinations of cues just as with known meanings.
	 However,
there is a price to pay for guessing single words in that
subjects are forced into the position of regarding unfamiliar
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cue combinations as combinations of inconsistent information.
They handle this problem of "inconsistency" by abandoning!
forcing where cues are fairly explicit and clearly give the
meaning components and abandoning/partial use where cues are
implicit associational. Accuracy is limited and static across
information. Subjects are much more aware of their limited
accuracy on the first pair of strategies than the second.
Uncertainty tends to be higher on the unknowns as compared to
the knowns.
Sometimes, however, a new meaning or complex hypothesis
is formed if there is a plausible link between meaning
components which can be exploited. Hence, accuracy can reach a
high degree yet confidence is handicapped since there is still
an element of suspicion in such a complex hypothesis since it
has not been lexicalised. In the situation where initial genus
cues are strong and a subject thinks at this point he is
guessing a single word then we see accuracy rise as confidence
falls. As to uncertainty, the best picture is probably given
by Experiment 2. Here uncertainty is low and static on the
first two amounts of information but rising on the third as
associations accumulate.
As to order. In the unknown condition, single word
hypotheses are most frequently formed. Although Experiment 3
shows interactions between the orders these interactions
indicate that the genus is the strongest cue and that where It
comes initially the genus guess gets eroded by the subsequent
cues. Where the genus comes late it overrides earlier cues.
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The best policy as far as strategies are concerned is 	 to
identify the genus and ignore other cue types. Given that
other strategies like forcing and partial use do compete with
abandoning, it might well be desirable to teach abandoning as
the best strategy.	 It would also be interesting to experiment
in situations where subjects are given freedom to select
orders to see whether subjects might try to use the different
cues in some order since they do see the various types of
information as relevant. They might perhaps try in the hope
of getting around the difficulty caused by the apparent
inconsistency of information but the cost/benefit principle
predicts that although they might try they would abandon any
such attempt as not worth the effort. (Remember that in
teaching or more realistic experiments we would have a
pseudoword present. Experiment 3 shows the form variable to
have very little effect though).
Pseudowords over an known meanings
This can again be of interest as an experimental
situation, but, perhaps, more so as a more realistic situation
involving foreign learners. The fact that foreign learners
have Li equivalents (perhaps not completely so in all details)
to many targets they encounter in the foreign language places
them in this position.
Whilst the presence of a pseudoword in Experiment 3
causes a significant decrease in confidence and accuracy and a
significant rise In uncertainty in comparison with the doze
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gap, these differences are small. What differences there were
came on initial cues for the knojjianing condition. Possibly,
a strange form combined with an initial guess might push
subjects into a slightly atypical guess so that instead of say
doll they give voodoo doll. This tends to get corrected by the
third amount of information so the end result is of little
consequence provided there are cues available to dispel this.
The pseudoword is eventually treated as a a doze gap.
In terms of both communication and learning strategies,
guessing should be very effective for the foreign language
learner. One point should be remembered here though. My
subjects were native speakers and so I'm arguing from analogy.
There may be depths to this situation that we do not see from
the experiments in this study. Meara (1982) points out that
foreign learners tend to give different types of response to
natives on word association tests, the tendency being to
produce clang responses most often associated with quite young
native children. They also seem to know the words they have
responded to in this fashion. Whilst factors like mistaking
the stimulus word may be at work, there is always the
possibility that foreign learners do not know or understand
words in the "same way" as natives and that simply guessing a
translation equivalent and so getting the meaning is not the
end of the matter.	 We really need to rerun some of these
experiments on foreign learners directly.
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Pseudowords over unknown meanings
This is the kind of situation in which native speakers
are more likely to find themselves. There is no reason why the
native speaker should use guessing in this situation as a
communication strategy, but it is most interesting to
researchers as the initial stage in a learning strategy.
Again, we have the same small but significant differences
between pseudoword and doze gap as noted in pseudowords over a
known meaning with pseudowords slightly less powerful than
doze. However, the main point of difference is now on cue 3.
The effect of the pseudoword in Experiment 3 tended to
encourage subjects to give up guessing. Since subjects in this
situation would probably use their last guess before giving up
and this would be a single word, then the pseudoword condition
is again really reduced to a doze gap and the form ignored.
Apart from the above difference we are really in the same
condition as doze over an unknown meaning and pseudowords do
not tend to act as a trigger signalling the presence of a
complex hypothesis. This is more likely done by the failure to
lexicalise information though again this factor needs support
in terms of existing but unlexicalised combinations of meaning
components.
So subjects, for the most part form single word
hypotheses.
I'll come to the consequences of the use of single word
hypotheses as a communication strategy shortly. For learning
strategies the consequences seem grave. If subjects learnt the
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single word guesses they make on unknown meanings and this was
a major source of learning, then the language would be full of
fairly exact synonyms. Something which is clearly not the
case. It is likely that strategies like use of the dictionary
supplement guessing as a learning strategy.
	 As a learning
strategy, guessing, then, is deficient. Perhaps our biggest
mistake here is that we expect guessing to do all the work.
Subjects could guess and remember both form and part of the
meaning from guessing. Certainly, the. di tc&ltj y
seeing information as inconsistent would encourage depth of
processing. Other strategies in the general context of appeal
to authority probably supplement guessing, however.
One factor which we should, perhaps, pay attention to in
future experiments is time. There might be an interesting
parallel here with the learning of words by native speaker
children. Snyder et al (1981), for example, point out that
after initial phases of under and over extension children seem
to start to collect associations. The word kitty is used when
pointing to a dish. It is not that the child is calling a dish
kitty. He is associating the two. With guessing it may be that
where subjects make single word guesses they actually remember
the cues they reject and that they work on these cues over
fairly longish periods of time and eventually produce a complex
hypothesis. This is speculative though and needs research.
Also, in the smaller number of instances where complex
hypotheses are formed In the experiments we still have a
problem. A subject might learn his guess but be reluctant to
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use it due to the handicap confidence suffers. In a sense we
can say that a subject has not properly learnt the target if
he's afraid to use it. Probably the best strategy to follow if
learning of a single word or complex hypothesis is intended in
this condition Is an appeal to authority such as consulting a
dictionary
Two things are needed here now. The first would be to
repeat these experiments with primary school native speaker
children to see if the results can be replicated since it is
mainly to such subjects that the topic of learning through
guessing relates. My subjects are adult native speaker. If
they do and something dramatically different is not happening,
we need to look at to what extent reading lessons where
children encounter unknown words are followed by attempts to
use the dictionary, questions to teacher or parent and perhaps
simply the use of targets in speech production to try and form
more precise hypotheses about them.
Consequences for cue classification studies
In many studies involved with cue classification
such as Ames (1966) the experimenter usually replaces words in
a text with a blank space or pseudoword. We are really in the
situation of pseudowords covering known meanings. The
situation experimenters like Ames intend to be in is that of
unknown meanings. Given that there are some striking contrasts
in process between the two meaning conditions, should we regard
existing cue classifications derived from known meaning targets
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as suspect when we are interested in unknown meanings ?
On thing we've noted is that in Experiment 5, cues which
could be used to form a new meaning tend to be used on single
word hypotheses. In Experiment 5 we are in the kind of
experimental situation often used by classifiers of cues where
subjects are given a passage and asked to make guesses and
indicate how they arrived at their guesses. (This is usually
done verbally whilst I've asked subjects to write). Now in a
sense, whilst subjects are in an unknown meaning condition
here, they do in fact behave as though they were in a known
meaning condition and try to get a word. This in turn suggests
that regardless of type of meaning the same cues are perceived
as relevant. A point of interest is that Experiment 4, known
meanings, suggests that subject/object cues tend to lose their
power to cause change in third position. This whole idea is
speculative and needs to be experimented on. But it is
reasonable to assume cautiously that this might be a symptom of
a wider process of simply not looking for more cues when we are
fairly confident in a hypothesis. It may be that unknown
meanings will continue to attract cues for longer than known
meanings. I don't see this as much of a problem though. It
certainly does nothing to discredit work on cues. 	 It simply
means that unknown meaning targets will give us more data than
knowns but not of different sorts.	 So if a classification
study is fairly extensive then most types should be caught.
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The consequences of guessing for communication
We've noted two types of motivation for guessing. It
could stem from a desire to learn words as noted by Jenkins et
al (1984) or it could stem from a desire maintain reading
fluency ie. keep the process of communication going. I've
noted some consequences of guessing for learning. What might
be the consequences for communication?
To consider this problem we need to work in the context
of a theory of communication. Arguably, the only comprehensive
theory of communication available to us is that of Relevance
Theory, Sperber and Wilson (1986). The title of this theory is
not to be confused with relevance in the sense of factors which
draw our attention to particular cues. Nor is it to be
confused with Grice's Maxim of Relevance mentioned in
Experiment 4. I'll give only the briefest of descriptions of
Relevance Theory here.
The Principle of Relevance states that a listener/reader
will try to obtain the greatest possible contextual effects for
the least processing effort. What's a contextual effect?
There are three types, but I'll confine myself to one; that of
implications taking the following examples from Sperber and
Wilson (1986 pp.194-199). If we look at the dialogue at 1
	
1. Peter:	 Would you drive a Mercedes?
	
Mary :
	
I wouldn't drive ANY expensive car.
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then Peter, knowing that a Mercedes is an expensive car, can
draw the implication at 2.
2. Mary wouldn't drive a Mercedes.
But why didn't Mary simply reply "No" at 1. By giving this
indirect reply she is increasing the amount of processing
effort Peter has to put in and as a result Peter is going to
want a return for his effort. In short, Peter is going to
assume that there is more to Mary's utterance at 1 than the
interpretation at 2 and he will try to derive more contextual
effects. He might decide that people who refuse to drive
expensive cars disapprove of displays of wealth so he might
derive the implication at 3:
3. Mary disapproves of displays of wealth.
What the authors suggest is that there is a guarantee of
Relevance that comes with every communication which to put it
very simply Is a statement that work must be rewarded since the
writer/speaker would not otherwise have required that work of
the receiver. Because Mary's reply at 1 involves increased
effort then further contextual effects over and above that at 2
must be obtained for this guarantee to be optimal.
We can add to the above the idea proposed in Sperber and
Wilson (1985/86) that the propositions expressed in sentences
need not be literally true.
	
Rather, it's the implications
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which need to be true.	 To give an example.	 Mary is asked
where she lives and gives the reply at 4.
4. I live in Paris.
But in fact she lives in a block outside the city limits. Her
answer is not true. However, Peter derives the implications at
5.
5. a) She spends most of her time in Paris.
b) She knows Paris.
If Mary had been literally true at 4 and said: I live near
Paris then near demands some processing effort which in turn
will produce implications like that at 6
6. She has to travel to Paris.
which are false.	 The expression at 4, whilst not literally
true is effective in conveying what Mary intends.
Instead of "truth" we can talk of "accuracy". Production
can be inexact but reception needs to be accurate. The point
is that the writer/speaker needs to produce accurate
implications. Accurate implications, that is, in the sense of
producing the ones he intended to produce. Processing effort
seems to be a significant factor in controlling this.
If we move now to guessing.	 In the unknown meaning
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condition we have, in the main, single word hypotheses produced
by two sets of strategies depending on types of cue. I'll look
at abandoning/partial use where cues are implicit associations
first and come back to abandoning/forcing in the more explicit
situation where cues are perhaps implicit definitional.
Abandoning and partial use in the implicit associational
situation lead to incomplete processing. To see the
consequences of this incomplete processing let's take the
example at 7.
7. The negro sashayed down the street listening to his ghetto
blaster.
The subject might process down the street and so would give
the hypothesis walk which in turn would generate the
implication at 8
8. He moved on foot down the street at a regular pace.
However, he abandons cues like negro and listening to the
ghetto blaster which are relevant and which he perceives as
relevant. The subject will know that there is something wrong
with the implicature he has derived since he can't process
information completely. In fact the implicature at 8 is
inacurate in the sense that it is inadequate. We'd also want
to derive implicatures along the lines of "Having a good time".
However, as we have seen in Experiment 3, confidence stays
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reasonably high In this situatiuon. This suggests that a
degree of error can be tolerated in reception where meaning is
given implicitly and that the subject could continue reading on
the basis of a guess like walk derived by abandoning.
Also, in Experiment 4, I spoke of limited Intuitions of
accuracy. I suspect this is not so much to do with a subject
being ignorant that there is a problem. If he can't process
information he will know that something is wrong. Rather, in
this situation, where meaning is implicit associational, error
can be tolerated to a degree. Possibly, this is because the
association cues need not be discarded completely since,
although they are excluded from lexicalisation, they can be
held as strange associations on the single word guess.
Let's move to the strategy of partial use. Here the
subject will process genus cues and so get the hypothesis walk
but he will go further and take some of the differentia
information but at the same time leave behind other aspects of
the differentia cues. So he might take the cue listening to
his ghetto blaster and abstract the idea listening to music.
Well, listening to music is pleasant so the hypothesis could be
stroll and the implication which is derived is given at 9.
9. He moved in a relaxed, leisurely fashion.
However, the subject is aware that he has left behind the idea
that the music is very loud. Again there is a problem. The
idea which the subject has not processed music is very loud is
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not conducive to strolling and the implicature derived at 9 is
not so much inadequate as inexact. The move part is right but
relaxed is not quite what we'd want to say. Again, however, we
see a fairly high confidence with partial use and this kind of
difficulty can be tolerated perhaps again because the
information which is excluded from lexicalisation is not
completely discarded but can be held as strange associations of
stroll.
As a communication strategy, then, guessing seems to
operate reasonably well. The Guarantee of Relevance may be
strained somewhat but it won't be broken and reading can
continue on the basis of guesses in the above situations
There is of course the possibility that a good synonym
for the target exists. If the subject could guess jive here
then he would get the implication at 10
10. He walked in a swaying, dance like fashion.
and would know that the Guarantee of Relevance is preserved
since all the information is being processed smoothly.
	
But
good synonyms are rare in English and this option will be very
infrequent.	 So again, abandoning is a better strategy than
persisting in the hope of getting such a synonym.
Incidentally, foreign language learners would very much be in
this situation of having a good substitute for the target so
they have an advantage over native speakers though the native
speaker could make use of guessing quite adequately as a
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communication strategy.
So abandoning and partial use are reasonably useful
strategies to follow when reading. I would suggest that the
former is the better since it is better, or at least safer, to
be inadequate rather than inexact. However, if we move to the
situation where cues are now more explicit indicators of genus
and differentia,	 lexicalisation damages confidence very
severely. In this situation subjects will be so aware that
they cannot process information properly (perhaps they must now
explicitly acknowledge error in their guess since they can't
hold on to abandoned differentia cues excluded from
lexicalisation and must knowingly downgrade the differentia if
it is forced) that they will see the implicatures derived as
completely inadequate. The Guarantee of Relevance will be
broken and reading fluency damaged in the following way. A
strategy of interest which I have not looked at in this study
is avoidance. Normally we think of this happening on the basis
of not enough information. 	 It could also be linked to
explicitness of information. Given that a subject's
confidence in the way that he is processing information is
drastically weakened he might well be able to make a single
word guess at the target but will be so dissatisfied with the
implicatures derived that he will Ignore or avoid them
completely. This would be tantermount to actually ignoring the
word itself.	 However, since fairly explicit presentation of
cues is not frequent this is not a major problem.
	 On the
whole, guessing is a good communication strategy.
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So finally, in terms of advice to teachers. The foreign
language teacher should continue as before. Show subjects how
to find relevant cues and encourage guessing. The native
speaker teacher should be cautious of guessing. it is not, as
we have seen, the powerful learning tool we might expect. It
needs to be suplemented by appeal to authority. As far as the
native speaker student goes, guessing is probably better taught
as a communication strategy.
Future Research
It seems to me that a lot can be gained in future from
applying Relevance Theory to guessing.
A very important area where Relevance Theory could
provide some Interesting ideas is In terms of what makes cues
relevant to subjects in the sense of why should a subject be
attracted to one cue and not another. We might research this
through the analysis of guessing errors. Laufer and Sim (1985)
give lots of examples of foreign learners errors when guessing.
I'll give one at 11.
11. In a society where mobility is enjoined on every citizen.
Here, the target was guessed as enjoyed which seems to be a
confusion with a similar looking/sounding word. There's 	 more
here than a	 slip to sound.	 The subject has gone for this
because he can get the contextual effect given at 12.
-413-
12. We'd all be lost without our cars.
What we are saying here is that what makes cues relevant in the
sense of subjects being attracted to them is the ability of a
cue to produce a hypothesis which gives a good contextual
effect. What should block the guess enjoyed and the
implication at 12 is the preposition on at 11. So relevance in
the sense of subjects being attracted to an item as a cue is a
combination of a desire for context effects limited by the
language code. Error in this instance Is a product of cues
being attractive because of their ability to produce contextual
effects coupled with an insufficient understanding of the code
which should deflect the subject from the cues and the
hypothesis he has chosen.
Again cohesion could be seen as an aspect of language
code which constrains the need to find cues simply on the basis
of generating context effects and helps point us to the correct
cues and get the implications the author intended. To give an
example. I remember when I first heard the Don McClean song
13. Bye, bye Miss America Pie
Drove my Chevy to the levy
But the levee was dry
I guessed levee as bar because of the polysemy on and
didn't realise my mistake until several months later when after
using this item in a conversation with an American friend I
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found myself being closely interrogated as to which levee I
supposed there might be alcohol in. I suspect it was the way
in which bar could generate some interesting contextual effects
which led me to be deceived by the polysemy in I don't
take this as evidence that we constantly go around making this
kind of error. Rather, since any cohesive code is manifestly
absent from this song, I take this as evidence of just how
important the code side of language is in blocking such error
by indicating relevance. Had Don McClean given a clear reason
for his trip to the levee then I would have not made this
mistake.	 Mind you, the song would probably have lost
something.
A major area, then, in which future research could move
is to investigate what attracts subjects to cues. It could
prove to be a balance between a desire for context effects and
code constraints.
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Appendix 1
This appendix contains information relevant to
Experiments 1 and 2.
Targets and cues used in Experiments 1 and 2
Known Targets
Example
To record
a) This is to make a copy
b) This is done to ensure permanence
c) This is done to music sometimes
1. To wonder
a) This is to want to know
b) This is done with curiosity
c) Poets sometimes do this
2. To sweep
a) This is to clean
b) This is done with a broom
c) Rooms sometimes have this done to them
3. To gulp
a) This is to swallow
b) This is done quickly
c) Fish sometimes do this
4. To taste
a) This is to discriminate
b) This is done by taking something into the mouth
c) Food sometimes has this done to it
5. To take over
a) This is to assume control
b) When this is done people are replaced
c) Companies sometimes have this done to them
6, To balance
a) This is to be stable
b) This is to be very close to falling
c) Acrobats sometimes do this
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Unknown Targets
Example
To losk
a) This is to help to grow
b) This is done by singing
c) This is done to tulips sometimes
1. To mutle
a) This is to use one's feet
b) This is done because one can't use one's hands
c) Handicapped people sometimes do this
2. To juplicate
a) This is to impersonate
b) This is caused by madness
c) Napoleon sometimes has this done to him
3. To kiarim
a) This is to worship
b) This is done in a frenzy
c) Primitive tribes sometimes do this
4. To hersk
a) This is to carry
b) This is done on the head
c) African women sometimes do this
5. To zilst
a) This is to travel
b) When you do this you remain with your home
c) Gipsies sometimes do this
6. To pral
a) This is to invest
b) This is done against the law
c) The Mafia sometimes do this.
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Cue Presentation Orders for Experiments 1 & 2
The following grid shows which order of cues each subject
saw on each item.
Key a = genus
b = differentia
c = association
S = Subject
T = Target
Ti
	
T2
	
T3
	
T4
	
T5
	
T6
Si	 cba	 cab
	
bac	 bca	 abc	 acb
S2
	
acb
	
cba	 cab
	
bac	 bca	 abc
S3
	
abc	 acb
	
cba	 cab
	
bac
	
bca
S4
	
bca	 abc	 aeb
	
cba	 cab
	
bac
S5
	
bac	 bca	 abc	 acb
	
cba	 cab
S6
	
cab
	
bac
	
bca	 abc	 acb
	
cba
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ANSWER SHEET EXPERIMENT 1
CONFIDENCEGUESS
EXAMPLE a)____________
b)____________
c)_____________
WORD 1 a)___________
b)____________
c)______________
WORD 2 a)____________
b)____________
c)______________
WORD 3 a)____________
b)____________
c)
WORD 4 a)___________
b)____________
c)_____________
WORD 5 a)___________
b)	 -
c)_____________
WORD 6 a)____________
b)____________
c)_____________
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ANSWER SHEET EXPERIMENT 2
EXMIPLEa)____________
b)____________
c)_____________
WORD 1 a)___________
b)____________
c)_____________
WORD 2	 a)
b)
c)
WORD 3 a)___________
b)____________
c)_____________
WORD 4 a)___________
b)____________
c)
WORD 5 a)___________
b)____________
c)_____________
WORD 6 a)___________
b)____________
c)_____________
Subject responses Experiment 1; Known Meanings.
Subject 1	 Subject 2
Guess	 Confidence	 Guess	 Confidence
Word 1 a) rhyme	 2	 interest	 2
b) ponder	 3	 research	 3
c) ponder	 3	 research	 4
Word 2 a) decorate	 2	 decoration	 2
b) dust	 2	 swept clean 4
c) sweep	 6	 sweep	 5
Word 3 a) run
	 0	 breathe	 0
b) gulp	 3	 gulp	 1
c) gulp	 6	 gulp	 2
Word 4 a) chew	 3	 feed	 3
b) chew	 4	 taste	 3
c) taste	 6	 tasting	 4
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Word 5 a) take over	 3
b) take over	 4
c) take over	 6
Word 6 a) calm
b) balance	 4
c) balance	 5
Subject 3
Guess	 Confidence
Word 1 a) enquire	 0
b) investigate	 1
c) search	 0
Word 2 a) scrub	 1
b) scrub	 1
c) sweep	 4
Word 3 a) swim	 1
b) jump	 2
c) gulp	 3
Word 4 a) boiled	 1
b) ____	 0
c) eating	 0
Word 5 a) substitution 	 1
b) take over	 2
c) take over	 5
Word 6 a) stumble	 1
b) tumble	 1
c) balance	 3
Subject 5
Guess	 Confidence
Word 1 a) enquire	 6
b) ask	 6
c) wonder	 6
Word 2 a) sweep	 6
b) clean	 6
c) dust	 5
Word 3 a) imbibe	 4
b) ingest	 3
c) gobble up	 5
repopulate	 1
	
take over
	 3
	
take over	 5
	
balanced	 3
	
balanced	 4
	
balanced	 6
Subject 4
Guess	 Confidence
ask	 0
ponder	 2
philosophise	 4
wash	 1
sweep	 3
sweep	 4
gulp	 1
gulp	 2
gulp	 4
processed	 1
chewed	 3
spit out	 3
take over	 1
take over	 3
take over
	 5
trip over	 2
land on feet	 2
balance	 6
Subject 6
Guess	 Confidence
orate	 3
question	 4
pry	 4
sweep	 5
brush	 5
sweep	 6
blink	 5
jump	 5
gulp	 6
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5
5
5
6
5
6
5
6
6
Word 4 a) distinguish
b) select
c) taste
Word 5 a) take over
b) take over
c) take over
Word 6 a) tumble
b) balance
c) balance
side	 3
taste	 5
taste	 5
command	 5
amalgamate	 3
directorship 3
fall	 3
totter	 5
balance	 6
0
1
1
1
2
4
2
3
4
2
4
4
Subject responses Experiment 1, Unknown Meanings.
Subject 1	 Subject 2
Guess	 Confidence	 Guess	 Confidence
Word 1 a) drop	 0	 mumble
b) tumble	 2	 hobble	 2
c) grasp	 0	 shuffle	 4
Word 2 a) honour	 I	 have fun	 0
b) mock	 1	 make fun	 0
c) delusion	 5	 imitate	 2
Word 3 a) scream	 0	 special dance
b) fetish	 1	 sacrifice
c) fetishise	 2	 trance
Word 4 a) groom	 0	 hit
b) plat	 1	 carry large pots
c) balance	 3	 carry large pots
of water
Word 5 a) slowly	 1	 like a snail
b) caravanning	 3	 caravan
c) nomadic	 5	 tour in a mobile
home
Word 6 a) to grow	 0	 time & energy
b) usury	 2	 in prostitution
c) usury	 3	 gambling etc.
Subject 3	 Subject 4
	
Guess	 Confidence	 Guess	 Confidence
	
Word 1 a) dance	 1	 use feet	 0
b) improvise	 0	 use feet	 0
c) stumble	 1	 paint with feet	 4
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be impressionist	 3
schizophrenic	 2
cloned in wax
	 4
pray	 2
sacrifice	 2
religious dance
	 4
transport using head 2
transport using head 5
transport using head 6
tell fortune	 3
be nomadic	 4
be nomadic	 5
sell stolen goods
	 0
fiddle tax
	 3
blackmail	 5
Subject 6
Guess	 Confidence
to cover up
	 3
to totter	 3
to manipulate with
	 4
the feet
split personality	 4
to mimic	 4
applied shock
	 3
treatment
Word 2 a) duplicate	 1
b) imitate	 1
c) ___	 0
Word 3 a) fight	 0
b) dance	 1
c) trance	 0
Word 4 a) grind corn
	 1
b) drag	 0
c) balance	 1
Word 5 a) hibernate	 0
b) caravan	 0
c) camp	 1
Word 6 a) drink	 0
b) murder	 1
c) extort	 2
Subject 5
Guess	 Confidence
Word 1 a) tear with one's 0
teeth
b) squashing pulp
	 3
(grapes)
c) hold brush or	 4
pen in mouth
Word 2 a) to have certain 1
illusions about
perceptions
b) give false	 1
reports
c) to take on	 6
someone else's
identity
Word 3 a) to treat as a
	 0
prophet
b) scream in	 0
adoration
c) whoop in	 1
Word 4 a) on the shoulders 0
in a container
b) babies in shawl 2
round shoulders
c) carrying loads	 6
chatter quickly
	 4
chatter quickly
	 4
to chant	 3
to hump around in	 3
a back pack
as tribeswomen	 5
carry things
as tribeswomen/	 6
Africans
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S5
d
C
c
b
d
b
c
b
b
C
f
b
d
C
a
d
b
b
S6
C
d
e
b
c
d
e
C
c
C
b
C
b
C
C
C
b
a
Word 5 a) cheat	 0
b) give up roaming 2
c) roam with	 6
caravan
Word 6 a) spread false 	 0
rumours
b) pay protection	 1
money
c) bribe officials 3
to hop from one
place to another
to camp around
to camp around
in caravans
extract
protection money
extract
protection money
illegal share
dealings
3
5
6
4
4
4
Subject responses Experiment 2, Known Meanings.
Key: S= subject
S2
a
C
C
C
c
b
b
a
b
d
b
b
C
c
b
d
C
d
Si
Word 1 a) c
b) c
c) b
Word 2 a) d
b) c
c) b
Word 3 a) b
b) b
c) b
Word 4 a) c
b) b
c) b
Word 5 a) b
b) b
c) b
Word 6 a) d
b) d
c) d
Uncertainty
	
S3	 S4
	
c	 c
	d 	 b
	
b	 b
	
e	 d
	
c	 b
	
b	 b
	
d	 c
	
a	 c
	
b	 b
	
g	 e
	
c	 d
	
c	 b
	
b	 c
	
b	 b
	
b	 b
	
d	 b
	
b	 b
	
a	 b
Subject responses Experiment 2, Unknown Meanings
Uncertainty
	
Si	 S2	 S3	 S4	 S5	 S6
	Wordla)b	 c	 b	 a	 b	 b
	
b)c	 d	 b	 b	 b	 b
	
c)c	 d	 c	 b	 a	 d
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	Word 2 a) c	 d	 d	 b	 a	 a
b) c	 a	 C	 b	 a	 b
c) c	 d	 C	 C	 b	 b
	
Word 3 a) b	 C	 e	 b	 C	 a
b) b	 b	 b	 b	 b	 b
c) b	 C	 d	 b	 b	 b
	
Word 4 a) b	 a	 C	 a	 b	 a
b) b	 d	 d	 b	 a	 b
c) c	 d	 C	 C	 b	 b
	
Word 5 a) c	 C	 a	 b	 C	 a
b) b	 C	 d	 b	 b	 b
c) b	 f	 C	 C	 a	 b
	
Word 6 a) c	 C	 d	 C	 e	 b
b) C	 C
	 d	 C	 a	 b
c) c	 d	 C	 a	 ci	 b
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Appendix 2
This appendix contains information relevant to Experiment 3.
Targets
Targets with known meanings may be identified in that the
correct word form is given next to the pseudoword in brackets.
The remaining targets are those with unknown meanings. Targets
are presented in the sequence in which subjects saw them.
Verbs
Example 1
To rimp (To record)
a) This is to make a copy.
b) This is done to ensure permanence.
c) This is done to music sometimes.
Example 2
To frell
a) This is to carry.
b) This is done on the head.
c) African women do this sometimes.
1. To kurf (To march)
a) This is to walk.
b) This is done in a measured or regular fashion.
c) Soldiers usually do this.
2. To dren
a) This is to manipulate.
b) This is done using the feet.
c) Handicapped people do this sometimes.
3. To rult (To contaminate)
a) This is to cause to become impure or corrupt.
b) This is done through contact.
c) Radiation does this sometimes.
4. To cusp (To meditate)
a) This is to think.
b) This is done with concentration.
c) Mystics do this sometimes.
5. To trull (To sweep)
a) This is to clean.
b) This Is done with a broom.
c) This is done to floors sometimes.
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6. To plend
a) This is to impersonate.
b) This is caused by madness.
c) This is done to Napoleon sometimes.
7. To reif
a) This is to worship.
b) This is done in a frenzy.
c) Primitive tribes do this sometimes.
8. To pesh (To steal)
a) This is to take.
b) This is done without permission.
c) This is done to jewelry sometimes.
9. To mult
a) This is to put money into a business.
b) This is done against the law.
c) The Mafia do this sometimes.
10. To rilk (To boil or poach)
a) This is to cook.
b) This is done using water.
c) This is done to eggs sometimes.
11. To hesk
a) This is to throw away.
b) This is done to something one has an emotional attachment
to.
c) This is done to photographs sometimes.
12. To losk
a) This is to help to grow.
b) This is done by singing.
c) This is done to tulips sometimes.
Nouns
Example 1
A resk
a) This is a kind of cutting instrument.
b) This has pointed teeth.
c) This is sharpened sometimes.
Example 2
A lurb
a) This is a kind of meeting place.
b) Drugs are taken here.
c) People usually hang around this.
-427-
1. A veck (An encyclopaedia)
a) This is a kind of book.
b) This gives information on many subjects.
c) This is usually consulted.
2. A flen
a) This is a kind of holiday.
b) This follows a divorce.
c) This is usually looked forward to.
3. A belk (An income)
a) This consists of money.
b) This is received periodically.
c) This is usually earned.
4. A trug (An effigy)
a) This is a kind of stuffed figure.
b) This is made to represent a person.
c) This is hanged sometimes.
5. A wirp (a hedge)
a) This is a kind of barrier.
b) This is made up of bushes.
c) This is trimmed sometimes.
6. A pleck
a) This is a kind of glass jar.
b) Plants are grown in this.
c) This is usually looked at.
7. A reth
a) This is a kind of musical instrument.
b) This has one string.
c) This is usually strummed.
8. A lut (An antidote)
a) This is a kind of medicine.
b) This counteracts the effects of poison.
c) This is injected sometimes.
9. Crell
a) This is a kind of crime.
b) This results from not helping someone in danger.
c) This outrages people sometimes.
10. Bronts (Slippers)
a) These are a kind of shoe.
b) These are meant for use Indoors.
c) These are fetched sometimes.
11. A shut
a) This is a kind of garden.
b) This is uncultivated.
c) This is usually studied.
-428-
T1O
K
bca
cab
acb
bac
cba
abc
Ti 1
U
cba
abc
bca
cab
acb
bac
Ti 2
U
bac
cba
abc
bca
cab
acb
12. Crith
a) This is a kind of fear.
b) This is caused by being robbed.
c) People suffer from this sometimes.
Orders in which cues were presented
KEY a= genus
b= differentia
c = association
T= Target
U= Target with an unknown meaning.
K= Target with a known meaning.
R= Run. The sequence of orders seen by a subject on the
various targets. Subject 1 saw the targets in Run 1, Subject 2
saw the in Run 2 and so on down to Subject 6 in Run 6. Subject
7 then returned to Run 1.
Ti T2 T3 T4
K U K K
Ri abc bca cba bac
R2 bca cab abc cba
R3 cab acb bca abc
R4 acb bac cab bca
R5 bac cba acb cab
R6 cba abc bac acb
T5 T6 T7 T8 T9
K U TI K U
acb cab acb cab abc
bac acb bac acb bca
cba bac cba bac cab
abc cba abc cba acb
bca abc bca abc bac
cab bca cab bca cba
Instructions
The following instructions were seen by subjects when in the
doze condition.
Guess the unknown word.	 You will see a blank space
followed by a piece of information. Use this piece of
information to guess what goes in the space. Write your guess
In the space provided on the answer sheet and also write down
how confident you feel in your guess. You will now see the
blank space again followed by two pieces of information.
Again, try to guess what goes in this space using the
information given. Again, write your guess and your confidence
in it on the answer sheet. Finally, you will see the blank
space a third time followed by three pieces of information.
Again, try to guess what goes in the space using the
information given and write your guess an your confidence on
the answer sheet. Altogether there will be twelve words and
you will be asked to guess and give your confidence three times
for each word as described above.
When you write your guess on the answer sheet, you can
use a single word eg. "retreat", "mascot" or you can use a
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phrase eg. "To move back when faced by an enemy", "An object
which is thought to bring luck". If you can't think of an
answer at all then put a dash -
When you write your confidence, use a scale from 0 to 6
0= no confidence
6= maximum confidence
You will now see two examples. Work your way through
these recording your answers on the answer sheet. When you
have done this, you may ask any questions you might have. Now
go on an complete the experiment.
-
The following instructions were seen by subjects when In
the pseudoword condition.
Guess the unknown word. You will see a word followed by
a piece of information. Look first at the word then use the
piece of information to try and guess it. Write your guess in
the space provided on the answer sheet and also write down how
confident you feel in your guess. You will now see the same
word followed by two pieces of information. Again, look at the
word and try to make a guess using the information given.
Again, write your guess and your confidence in it on the answer
sheet. Finally, you will see the same word a third time
followed by three pieces of information. Again, look at the
word, make a guess from the Information given and write your
guess and your confidence in it on the answer sheet.
Altogether you will see twelve words and you will be asked to
guess and give your confidence three times for each word as
described above.
When you write your guess on the answer sheet, you can
use a single word eg. "retreat", "mascot" or you can use a
phrase eg. "To move back when faced by an enemy", "An object
which is thought to bring luck". If you can't think of an
answer at all then put a dash - .
When you write your confidence, use a scale from 0 to 6.
0= no confidence
6= maximum confidence
You will see two examples. Work your way through these
recording your answers on the answer sheet. When you have done
this, you may ask any questions you might have. Now go on and
complete the experiment.
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GUE S S
	
______	
1)
	
_____	
ii)
	
_____	
iii)
7.
	
_____	
1)
	
_____	 ii)
	
_____	
iii)
8.
	
_____	 1)
	
_____	
ii)
	
_____	 iii)
9.
	
____	 1)
	_____	
ii)
	
_____	
iii)
10.
	
____	
i)_____________
	
____	
ii)
	
_____	
iii)
11.
	
_____	
1)
	
______	
ii)
	
_____	
iii)
12.
	
_____	 i)
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ANSWER SHEET
CONFIDENCE
6.
CONFIDENCEGUESS
Eg .1
1)
ii)
iii)
Eg.2
i)_____________
ii)
iii)
1.
i)_____________
ii)
iii)
2.
1)
ii)
iii)
3.
i)______________
ii)
iii)
4.
1)
ii)
iii) -
5.
1)
ii)
i'i)______________
I
11
21
0
02
12
0
22
20
1
11
11
0
01
12
Responses
The complete set of responses is too lengthy to include
here.	 I have, therefore, given a sample consisting of the
first set of responses for eight subjects. 	 For a computer
printout of all dependent variable scores, see Appendix 5.
C= confidence
A= accuracy
U= uncertainty
10
212
311
2a) party	 1 0
b) treat	 1 0 1	 8a) lozenge	 1
c) fling	 1 0 2	 b) penicillin	 1
c) antidote	 2
3a) belt	 0 0
b) wages	 1 2 2	 9a) guilt	 1
c) wages	 3 2 0	 b) selfishness	 I
c) neglect	 1
4a) painting	 1 0
b) effigy	 2 2 2	 lOa) sticks	 1
c) effigy	 4 2 0	 b) slippers	 2
c) slippers	 4
5a) hedge	 1 2
b) hedge	 2 2 0	 ha) herb	 1
c) hedge	 4 2 0	 b) wild	 1
c) botanical	 2
6a) storage	 1 0
b) crystal ball	 1 0 2	 12a) hayfever	 I
c) terrarium	 3 1 2	 b)loss of privacy 2
c) paranoia	 1
Subject 2 (Nouns/Pseudoword Condition)
Guess	 C A U	 Guess
la) encyclopaedia	 1 2	 7a) bow
b) book	 2 1 1	 b) violin bow
c) encyclopaedia
	
	
3 2 1	 c) stringed
instrument
___	 ___	 C AU
Subject 9 (Verb/Pseudoword Condition)
	
Guess	 C A U	 Guess
	
ha) march	 4 2	 9a) assassinate
b) march	 5 2 0	 b) corrupt a
c) march	 6 2 0	 business by
takeover
C AU
30
421
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C AU
20
002
002
00
002
002
30
202
002
20
422
620
2a) flex	 3 0
b)_	 0 0 2
c) stamp	 0 0 2
3a) touch	 3 0
b) heat by friction 2 0 2
c) to contaminate	 5 2 2
4a) ponder	 4 1
b) wrack one's
brains	 3 1 1
c) meditate	 6 2 1
5a) sweep	 3 2
b) sweep	 5 2 0
c) sweep	 6 2 0
6a) to be ridiculous 3 0
b) to be
schizophrenic	 4 1 2
c) to be
schizophrenic	 4 1 0
7a) chant	 2 1
b) chant & dance	 4 1 1
c) chant & dance
a specific ritual
with prayer etc 6 2 1
8a) disobey	 2 0
b) steal/pilfer	 4 2 2
c) steal/rob	 6 2 1
c) takeover by
	
intimidation	 4 21
	
lOa) grill	 3 0
b) poach	 3 21
c) poach	 6 20
ha) to promise	 2 0
b) to treasure	 3 02
c) to rid oneself
of something
though the
process is
painful &
poignant	 5 2 2
12a) nourish	 3 1
b) to encourage
growth esp of
plants by
human voice
insong	 4 2 1
c) to encourage
growth esp of
plants by
human voice
insong	 5 2 0
Subject 14 (Noun/Pseudoword Condition)
Guess	 C A U	 Guess
la) encyclopaedia	 2 2	 7a) bow
b) encyclopaedia	 3 2 0	 b)
c) encyclopaedia	 5 2 0	 c) -
2a) party	 2 0
	 8a) -
b) weekend break	 3 1 2	 b) -
c) short break	 1 1 0	 c) -
3a) -	 0 0	 9a) guilt
b) bursary	 2 1 2	 b) death
c)wage	 4 2 1
	
c)_
4a) suit	 0 0	 lOa) sticks
b) voodoo doll	 3 1 2	 b) slippers
c) voodoo doll	 5 1 0
	 c) slippers
-433-
5a) thicket	 2 0
b)	 0 0 2
c)ge	 6 2 1
6a) bottle	 1 1
b) ship in bottle	 1 0 1
c) miniature garden 4 2 2
ha) window box
b)
c) -
12a) flue
b) shock
c) shock
21
002
002
10
302
400
Subject 20 (Nouns/Cloze Condition)
Guess	 C A U	 Guess
ha) encyclopaedia	 4 2	 7a) bow
b) encyclopaedia	 5 2 0	 b) -
c) encyclopaedia	 6 2 0	 c) -
2a) Christmas	 3 0	 8a) laughter
b) Christmas	 4 0 0	 b) insulin
c) -	 0 0 2	 c) antidote
3a) salary	 2 2	 9a) regret
b) salary	 4 2 0	 b) irrespons-
c) salary	 6 2 0	 ibility
c) neglect
4a) human	 3 0
b) effigy	 3 2 2	 lOa) children
c) effigy	 6 2 0	 b) boot
c) slippers
5a) copse	 4 0
b) horse jump	 4 1 2	 ha) vegetable
c) hedge	 6 2 1	 patch
6a) kilner jar	 3 1
	 b) herbaceous
b) test tube	 3 0 2	 border
c) incubator	 3 0 2	 c) -
12a) amnesia
b) loss
c) anxiety
C AU
40
002
002
20
212
221
20
202
412
20
212
621
31
311
002
30
301
312
Subject 24 (Nouns/Cloze Condition)
Guess	 C A U	 Guess
ha) encyclopaedia	 3 2	 7a) guitar
b) encyclopaedia	 4 2 0	 b) guitar
c) encyclopaedia	 5 2 0	 c) -
2a) Bank Holiday	 3 1	 8a) medicine
b) a needful rest	 1. 1 1	 b) a vaccine
c) beginning a new	 c) a vaccine
life	 1 0 2
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C AU
61
410
002
41
311
410
3a) a monthly
magazine
b) a financial
magazine
c) wages
4a) guy
b) an effigy
c) an effigy
5a) hair
b) lawn
c) hedge
6a) soil
b) soil
c) jam jar
40
400
622
51
421
620
40
502
622
60
500
412
9a) an insult	 3 0
b) cowardice	 4 0 2
c) cowardice	 2 0 0
lOa) wellingtons	 4 1
b) slippers	 5 2 1
c) slippers	 6 2 0
ha) plastic	 3 0
b) a forest	 2 0 2
c) wild life	 5 0 2
12a)claustrophobia 3 1
b)claustrophobia 4 1 0
c) fear of the
outside world 2 1 1
Subject 27 (Verbs/Cloze Condition)
Guess	 C A U	 Guess
ha) fight	 3 0	 7a) hunt
b) march	 5 2 2	 b) dance
c) march	 3 2 0	 c) pray
2a) use	 2 1
	
8a) -
b) -	 0 0 2	 b) steal
c) soil	 2 0 2	 c) steal
3a) exchange	 1 0	 9a) extort
b)_	 0 0 2	 b)fund
c) subvert	 2 0 2	 c) fund with
dirty money
4a) contemplate	 3 1
b) consider	 3 1 1	 lOa) heat food
c) contemplate	 3 1 1	 b) fry
c) poach
5a) polish	 2 1
b) sweep	 5 2 1	 lla) love
c) sweep	 6 2 0	 b) frame
c)
6a) rave	 3 0
b) imitate	 2 1 2	 12a) fertilize
c) mock	 2 0 2	 b) increase
c)
C AU
20
212
111
00
322
320
30
312
221
21
311
421
30
302
002
31
102
002
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Subject 31 (Verbs/doze Condition)
Guess	 C A U	 Guess	 C A U
la) move	 6 0	 7a) praise	 5 1
b) pace	 4 1 2	 b) sing	 3 1 1
c) march	 5 2 1	 c) chant	 1 1 1
2a) walk	 6 0	 8a) value	 3 0
b) shuffle	 3 0 1	 b) -	 0 0 2
c) get the better	 c) steal or
of	 0 1 2	 remove	 1 2 2
3a) burn	 5 0	 9a) invest	 6 1
b) touch	 3 0 2	 b) illegally
c) to influence	 be involved	 2 0 2
badly	 0 1 2	 c) be involved
in a black
4a) thought	 3 1	 tnarke.t	 0 1
b) contemplate	 3 1 1
c) philosophize	 3 1 1	 lOa) warm	 5 1
b) boil	 5 2 1
5a) wash	 5 1	 c) boil	 6 2 0
b) wash	 5 1 0
c) brush or sweep	 6 2 1	 ha) frame	 4 0
b) treasure &
6a) honour	 1 0	 frame	 3 0 2
b) imitate	 3 1 2	 c) it seems
c) -	 0 0 2	 contradictory
discard
something one
is attached
to	 0 0 2
l2a) make a noise 3 0
b) nurture	 0 1 2
c) prune	 0 0 2
Subject 45 (Verbs/Pseudoword Condition)
	
Guess	 C A U	 Guess	 C A U
la) kill	 1 0	 7a) to perform
b) march	 4 2 2	 fertility
c) march	 6 2 0	 rites	 1 1
b) to perform
2a) fiddle	 0 0	 tribal dances 3 1 2
b) turn wheelchairts	 c) to perform
wheels	 1 0 2	 tribal dances/
	
pedal	 0 0 2	 rites to the
gods	 4 2
3a) catch something
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eg. a cold
b) burn
c) stain
4a) consider
b) consider
c) meditate
5a) sweep
b) sweep
c) sweep
20
402
002
31
410
621
52
620
620
Ba) play truant
b) to steal
c) to steal
9a) kill
b) invest
c) invest in
shady deals
l0a) to fry
b) to fry
c) to boil
ha) to kiss
b) to display
c)
20
522
620
30
212
221
31
310
521
20
202
002
6a) to be hysterical 1 0
b) to be
schizophrenic	 2 1 2
c)_	 0 0 2
	
l2a) to nurture	 21
b) to nurture	 110
c) to nurture	 010
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Appendix 3
This appendix contains information relevant to Experiment
4.
Targets
Target 1 Known Version: 	 To Brake
Target 1 Unknown Version: To Sprag (To brake by using a lever
on the wheel)
Target 2 Known Version: 	 To Cut or a reasonable synonym
Target 2 Unknown Version: To Flense (To cut the blubber from a
creature like a whale)
Target 3 Known Version: 	 To Shape or a reasonable synonym.
Target 3 Unknown Version: To Scabble (To shape roughly).
Cue S
Cues for the targets. Cues for Order 1 are given first
followed by those for Order 2. Since Order 2 involved only a
reversal of cues b and c with cue a remaining unchanged in
first position, only these last two cues will be given for
Order 2.
Known Versions
Target 1, Order 1.
la) He (
	
) in order to slow the vehicle down.
lb) The driver (
	
) in order to slow the car down.
ic) The driver (
	
) in order to slow the car down.
As the speed reduced, he changed down a gear.
Target 1, Order 2.
ib) He C	 ) in order to slow the vehicle down.
As the speed reduced he changed down a gear.
ic) The driver (
	
) in order to slow the car down.
As the speed reduced, he changed down a gear.
Target 2, Order 1.
2a) He (
	
) the carcass using a sharp knife.
2b) The butcher (
	
) the pig's carcass using a sharp knife.
2c) The butcher (
	
) the pig's carcass using a sharp knife.
He wore an apron to stop his clothes getting messy.
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Target 2, Order 2.
2b) He (
	
) the carcass using a sharp knife.
He wore an apron to stop his clothes getting messy
2c) The butcher (
	
) the pig's carcass using a sharp knife.
He wore an apron to stop his clothes getting messy.
Target 3, Order 1.
3a) He (
	
) the stone to get it to the correct size.
3b) The workman C	 ) the stone to get it to the correct size.
3c) The workman C	 ) the stone to get it to the correct size.
He hammered away happily.
Target 3, Order 2.
3b) He (
	
) the stone to get it to the correct size.
He hammered away happily.
3c) The workman (
	
) the stone to get it to the correct size.
He hammered away happily.
Unknown Versions
Target 1, Order 1.
la) He C	 ) in order to slow the vehicle down.
lb) The cowboy C	 ) in order to slow the wagon down.
lc) The cowboy (
	
) in order to slow the wagon down.
He strained and perspired.
Target 1, Order 2.
ib) He (
	
) in order to slow the vehicle down.
He strained and perspired.
ic) The cowboy (
	
) in order to slow the wagon down.
He strained and perspired.
Target 2, Order 1.
2a) They C	 ) the carcass using sharp knives.
2b) The seamen (
	
) the whale's carcass using sharp knives.
2c) The seamen (
	
) the whale's carcass using sharp knives.
They were soon covered with a smelly, white mess.
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Target 2, Order 2
2b) They (
	
) the carcass using sharp knives.
They were soon covered in a smelly, white mess.
2c) The seamen (
	
) the whale's carcass using sharp knives.
They were soon covered with a smelly, white mess.
Target 3, Order 1.
3a) He (
	
) the stone to get it to the correct size.
3b) The farmer (
	
) the stone to get it to the correct size.
3c) The farmer C	 ) the stone to get it to the correct size.
He cut his hand and swore.
Target 3, Order 2.
3b) He (
	
) the stone to get it to the correct size.
He cut his hand and swore.
3c) The farmer (
	
) the stone to get it to the correct size.
He cut his hand and swore.
Experiment Instructions
What do you do? You will see a sentence with a space
marked by brackets in it, for example, "John picked up his pen
and began to (
	
)". Try to complete the sentence by putting a
word or a phrase in the space. In order to complete this
example, you could use the word "write" or the phrase "write in
a slow, careful fashion". If you can't think of an answer, put
a dash.
Also, each time you write an answer, put down how
confident you feel in your answer. When you write your
confidence, then
0= no confidence
6= maximum confidence
So you can use any number between 0 and 6.
	 Perhaps your
confidence for the above example may be 2.
You will then see a second sentence giving some extra
information on what goes in the same space. This extra in
formation will be underlined so you can see it clearly. For
example, "John picked up his pen and began to ( ) a letter."
Try to complete this space again- you can keep your first
answer or change it to something different If you wish. Again,
remember to put down your confidence in this second answer.
You will then see a third sentence, again with some extra
information eg. "My son John picked up a pen and began to ( )
a letter". Try to complete this sentence a third time and
remember to give your confidence in your answer. You will then
see a second question which you will answer three times and
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finally a third question which you will answer three times just
as above.
Try this example. Put your answers underneath the
headings GUESS and CONFIDENCE. Try also to make your answers
explicit. If you think a single word is sufficient then PLEASE
use a single word.
	 If you feel that you need to give more
information then PLEASE use a phrase.
a) She (
	
) the song.
GUESS	 CONFIDENCE
wrote	 2	 (I've put an answer here for you)
b) The soprano (
	
) the aria.
GUESS	 CONFIDENCE
(Now you try an answer)
c) The soprano (
	
) the aria and smashed all the windows in
the hail.
GUESS	 CONFIDENCE
(Now you try an answer)
Now do the experiment by turning one page of this booklet at a
time. Don't look back and don't go forwards until you have
answered a question.
Responses
Three hundred and forty subjects took part in Experiment
4 and it will be too lengthy to record the responses for all of
them here. To give the reader an idea of the responses
obtained then those for the first fourteen subjects on each of
the four versions of the experiment will be recorded here. For
a computer printout of all dependent variable scores, see
Appendix 5.
C= confidence, A= accuracy, U uncertainty
Known Version, Order 1
C AU	 C AU
Subject 1	 Subject 8
la) braked	 3 2	 la) put his foot
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ib) braked
ic) braked
2a) slashed &
mutilated
2b) cut
2c) cut
3a) ground &
measured
3b) ground
3c) chipped at
Subject 2
la) braked
ib) braked
Ic) braked
2a) cut up
2b) cut up
2c) cut up
3a) hammered at
3b) hammered at
3c) hammered at
Subject 3
la) put on his
brakes
ib) put on his
brakes
ic) put on his
brakes
2a) picked
2b) cut
2c) cut
3a) filed
3b) filed
3c) chiselled
ject 4
la) brakes
ib) brakes
ic) brakes
2a) cuts
2b) cuts
2c) cut
3a) smashed
3b) smashed
3c) smashed
Subject 5
la) braked
ib) changed down
32
420
520
22
320
320
22
220
321
5 2 0	 on the brake
6 2 0	 ib) pressed the
brake
1 0	 ic) pressed the
4 2 2	 brake
5 2 0	 2a) cut
2b) cut
2 0	 2c) cut
300	 3a)cut
6 2 2	 3b) cut
3c) chiselled
away at
5 2	 iiect 9
5 2 0	 la) braked
6 2 0	 ib) braked
4 2	 ic) braked
5 2 0	 2a) cut
5 2 0	 2b) cut
3 2	 2c) cut
3 2 0	 3a) broke
5 2 0	 3b) cut
3c) hammered
iect 10
la) braked
5 2	 ib) braked
ic) braked
5 2 0	 2a) cut
2b) cut
3 2 0	 2c) opened
6 0	 3a) polished
5 2 2	 3b) smashed
5 2 0	 3c) broke
30
5 0 0	 Suject11
4 2 2 là) braked
ib) braked
ic) braked
2a) cut
6 2	 2b) cut
6 2 0	 2c) cut
6 2 0	 3a) sanded down
6 2	 3b) sanded down
6 2 0	 3c) chiselled
220
2 2	 Suject 12
2 2 0 là) braked
2 2 0	 ib) braked
ic) braked
2a) carved
2b) cut up
6 2	 2c) cut up
3a) chiselled
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62
620
620
62
620
620
12
321
621
52
420
420
52
420
321
30
522
621
52
620
620
52
620
620
50
600
622
52
520
620
32
421
520
42
Subject 13
la) braked
lb) braked
ic) braked down
2a) slashed at
2b) cut open
2c) worked
3a) broke
3b) broke
3c) broke
Subject 14
fa) braked
ib) braked
ic) braked
2a) skinned
2b) cut
2c) cut
3a) smashed
3b) smashed
3c) chiselled
62
620
602
62
421
402
32
520
220
42
520
620
40
422
420
42
420
521
Subject 1
la) braked
ib) shouted Whoa!
ic) pulled on the
reins
2a) sliced
2b) butchered
2c) slashed
3a) broke
3b) cracked
3c) chiselled at
C AU
41
622
622
51
511
311
21
411
411
3b) chiselled	 520
3c) chiselled	 620
agear	 6 0 2
lc) braked	 6 2 1
2a) carved	 6 2
2b) butchered	 6 2 1
2c) used
continental
butchering
techniques on 6 2 1
3a) measured	 6 0
3b) worked/paired 6 2 2
3c) paired	 6 2 0
Subject 6
la) braked	 2 2
ib) braked	 4 2 0
ic) braked	 5 2 0
2a) butchered	 2 2
2b) cut up	 3 2 1
2c) cut up	 5 2 0
3a) broke	 2 2
3b) broke	 3 2 0
3c) smashed	 5 2 1
Subject 7
la) braked	 5 2
ib) braked	 4 2 0
ic) braked	 5 2 0
2a) cut	 3 2
2b) attacked	 3 0 2
2c) attacked	 3 0 0
3a) smashed	 3 2
3b) ground	 4 0 2
3c) hit	 4 2 1
Unknown Version, Order 1
C AU
Subject 8
la) braked	 5 1
ib) pulled on the
reins	 4 2 2
ic) dragged his feet
on the floor	 1 0 2
2a) dissect	 5 0
2b) dissect	 5 0 0
2c) dissect	 5 0 0
3a) hit	 3 1
3b) hit	 4 1 0
3c) hit	 4 1 0
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Subject 2
ii) braked	 6 1
ib) pulled the
horses' reins 4 2
ic) pulled hard on
the reins to
control the
horses	 4 2 1
2a) dissected	 4 0
2b) butchered	 4 1 2
2c) butchered	 3 1 0
3a) chiselled	 4 1
3b) chiselled	 3 1 0
3c) chiselled	 3 1 0
Subject 3
i) braked	 3 1
ib) pulled on the
reins	 1 2 2
ic) pulled hard on
the reins	 1 2 1
2a) mutilated	 1 0
2b) mutilated	 1 0 0
2c) mutilated	 1 0 0
3a) threw	 0 0
3b) filed down	 0 0 2
3c) filed down the
stone	 1 0 0
Subject 4
T) braked	 4 1
ib) took out his
whip to the
horses	 1 0 2
ic) pulled hard on
the reins	 2 2 2
2a) cut up	 2 1
2b) sliced	 2 1 1
2c) cut open	 2 1 1
3a) filed	 1 0
3b) filed down
	
1 0 1
3c) filed down
	
2 0 0
Subject 5
la) braked
	 4 1
lb) braked
	 2 1 0
ic) pulled the
reins
	 2 2 2
2a) Cut up
	 5 1
2b) cut up
	 4 1 0
2c) slashed	 3 1 1
3a) filed	 3 0
3b) filed	 3 0 0
Subject 9
la) braked	 6 1
ib) pulled on the
reins	 4 2 2
ic) pulled on the
reins	 6 2 0
2a)cutup	 6 1
2b) slit	 3 1
2c) slit	 5 1 0
3a) scraped	 5 0
3b) ground	 5 0 2
3c) ground	 3 0 0
Subject 10
la) brake	 4 1
ib) brake	 2 1 0
Ic) jumped out and
slowed the
vehicle down
with his spurs 0 0 2
2a) carved	 2 1
2b) speared	 3 0 2
2c) cut up	 4 1 1
3a) struck	 1 1
3b) smashed	 2 1 1
3c)cutup	 3 1 1
Subject 11
la) braked	 4 1
ib) pulled in the
reins	 4 2 2
ic) fought with
the reins	 4 2 1
2a) opened	 3 1
2b) slashed	 3 1 1
2c) attacked	 3 0 2
3a) ground	 2 0
3b) smashed	 1 1 2
3c) split	 0 1 1
Subject 12
ti) brake	 4 1
ib) braked	 4 1 0
lc) pulled the
reins	 5 2 2
2a) removed	 2 0
2b) removed	 4 0 0
2c) Cut	 5 1 2
3a) chipped	 2 1
3b) smashed	 2 1 1
3c) hammered	 2 1 1
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Subjct 13
1i) braked
ib) pulled on the
reins
ic) pulled on the
brake lever
2a) carved
2b) cut up
2c) cut up
3a) broke
3b) hit
3c) hit
j. ct 14
la) pressed the
brake
ib) pulled the
reins
ic) pulled the
reins
2a) Cut
2b) sliced
2c) sliced
3a) filed
3b) filed
3c) filed
61
622
522
41
511
31	 C)
31
311
51	 0
31
322
120
41
411
410
20
300
300
3c) filed	 3 0 0
Subject 6
1à) waved	 3 0
ib) pulled on the
reins	 4 2 2
ic) pulled on the
reins	 5 2 0
2a) sliced	 3 1
2b) sliced	 3 1 0
2c) sliced	 3 1 0
3a) chipped pieces
off	 0 1
3b) chipped pieces
off	 6 1 0
3c) chipped at	 5 1 1
Subject 7T) braked	 3 1
lb) braked	 3 1 0
ic) pulled on the
reins	 5 2 2
2a) gutted	 3 1
2b) gutted	 4 1 0
2c) gutted	 5 1 0
3a) broke	 2 1
3b) broke	 3 1 0
3c) cut	 5 1 1
Known Versio	 Order 2
C AU
ject 1	 Subjct 8
la) braked	 6 2	 tã) braked
ib) braked	 6 2 0	 ib) braked
lc) braked	 4 2 0	 ic) braked
2a) dissected	 3 0	 2a) cut
2b) dissected	 3 0 0	 2b) opened
2c) dissected	 2 0 0	 2c) carved
3a) chipped away	 3a) smashed
at the stone	 4 2	 3b) tapped
3b)smashed away at 3 2 1	 3c) tapped
3c) hammered away
at	 2 2 1	 Subject 9
CAU
62
620
620
42
521
521
42
321
520
Subject 2
la) braked
ib) applied the
brakes
ic) applied the
brakes
2a) cut up
2b) cut up
62
502
521
62
520
202
20
101
101
1a) braked
ib) decelerated
5 2	 ic) braked
2a) carved
6 2 0	 2b) carved
2c) dissected
6 2 0	 3a) smoothed
6 2	 3b) honed
6 2 0	 3c) smoothed
-445-
Suject 10
la) braked
ib) braked
ic) braked
2a) cut
2b) cut
2c) cut
3a) ground
3b) chipped
3c) chipped at
Subject 11
Ia) waved
ib) signalled
ic) saluted
2a) cut
2b) hacked
2c) cut
3a) paired
3b) hammered
3c) carved
Subject 12
la) braked
ib) braked
ic) braked
2a) cut
2b) butchered
2c) cut
3a) weighed
3b) broke
3c) broke
Subject 13
la) braked
ib) braked
lc) braked
2a) cut
2b) cut
2c) cut
3a) filed
3b) filed
3c) filed
Subject 14
la) waved
ib) braked
lc) braked
2a) cut
2b) carved
2c) carved
3a) chipped
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62
620
620
62
620
620
60
622
620
20
202
202
22
221
121
12
221
221
42
620
620
32
321
421
30
422
420
52
320
420
32
420
520
50
400
500
30
522
620
32
521
620
32
2c) cut up	 6 2 0
3a) ground down	 4 0
3b) chipped at	 5 2 2
3c) chipped at	 4 2 0
Subject 3
f) braked	 6 2
ib) braked	 6 2 0
ic) braked	 6 2 0
2a) sliced	 6 2
2b) carved	 5 2 1
2c) carved	 6 2 0
3a) chipped	 6 2
3b) chiselled	 5 2 1
3c) chiselled	 6 2 0
jject 4
la) used the brake 6 2
ib) used the brake 6 2 0
ic) used the brake 6 2 0
2a) cut	 6 2
2b) cut	 6 2 0
2c) cut	 6 2 0
3a) broke	 6 2
3b) broke	 6 2 0
3c) broke	 6 2 0
Suject 5
la) braked	 6 2
lb) braked	 6 2 0
lc) braked	 6 2 0
2a) cut	 6 2
2b) cut	 6 2 0
2c) cut	 6 2 0
3a) chiselled	 6 2
3b) chiselled	 6 2 0
3c) chiselled	 6 2 0
Suject 6
la) braked	 3 2
ib) braked	 5 2 0
ic) braked	 6 2 0
2a) cut	 2 2
2b) cut	 4 2 0
2c) cut	 5 2 0
3a) chipped	 2 2
3b) chipped	 5 2 0
3c) chipped	 5 2 0
Subject 7
Ia) waved his arms 3 0
3b) chipped
	
520
3c) chipped
	
620
ib) braked
ic) braked
2a) opened
2b) sliced open
2c) opened
3a) hammered
3b) hit
3c) hit
522
520
22
421
521
22
521
620
Unknown Version Order 2
C AU	 C AU
Subject IiY braked
ib) braked
ic) pulled the
reins
2a) stripped
2b) skinned
2c) stripped
3a) ground
3b) ground
3c) ground
Subject 2
Ta) braked
ib) braked
ic) reined
2a) carved
2b) carved
2c) boned
3a) carved
3b) carved
3c) carved
Subject 3
'fi) braked
ib) braked
ic) pulled
2a) cut
2b) hacked
2c) sliced up
3a) chipped at
3b) chipped at
3c) used a pick
axe to
Subject 4
la) braked
ib) struggled
lc) heaved
2a) dissected
2b) chopped
Subject 8
4 1	 Ta) braked	 6 1
3 1 0	 ib) pulled	 3 2 2
lc) pulled	 3 2 0
4 2 2	 2a) dismembered	 4 1
4 1	 2b)	 0 0 2
4 0 2	 2c)TEup	 51 1
411	 3a)cut	 61
3 0	 3b) cut	 6 1 0
400	 3c)cut	 610
300
Sul?ject 9
tà) braked	 6 1
6 1	 lb) braked	 6 1 0
O 1 0	 lc) pulled the reins 6 2 2
0 2 2	 2a) attacked	 6 0
6 1	 2b) attacked	 6 0 0
O 1 0	 2c) mutilated	 6 0 2
01 1	 3a)cut	 31
O 1	 3b) shaped	 6 1 1
O 1 0	 3c) smashed	 4 1 1
010
Suj2ject 10
la) braked	 3 1
3 1	 lb) braked	 2 1 0
3 1 0	 ic) sweated	 1 0 2
3 2 2	 2a)cutup	 6 1
4 1	 2b) cut up	 5 1 0
4 1 1	 2c)cutup	 6 1 0
3 1 1	 3a) scraped at	 3 0
4 1	 3b) scraped at	 3 0 0
4 1 0	 3c) scraped at	 3 0 0
3 1 1	 Subject 11
la) braked	 4 1
lb) braked	 4 1 0
6 1	 lc) pulled the reins 3 2 2
4 0 2	 2a) carved	 3 1
5 2 2	 2b) carved	 3 1 0
5 0	 2c) carved	 3 1 0
6 1 2	 3a) ground	 2 0
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2c) massacred
3a) smashed
3b) hammered
3c) belted
Subject 5
Ia) braked
ib) braked
lc) braked
2a) cut
2b) cut
2c) chopped
3a) chipped
3b) chipped
3c) chipped
Subject 6
la) placed his
foot on the
brake
lb) placed his
foot on the
brake
ic) pulled the
reins of the
horse
2a) cut
2b) scraped
2c) gutted
3a) picked up
3b) gripped
3c) ground
Suble ct 7
la) braked
lb) braked
ic) pulled
2a) cut
2b) cut
2c) cut
3a) broke
3b) smashed
3c) cut
602
61
411
011
61
610
610
61
610
611
61
610
610
51
310
522
61
502
411
50
501
502
11
010
222
31
310
410
21
111
211
3b) ground	 3 0 0
3c) ground	 2 0 0
Subject 12
la) braked	 4 1
ib) braked	 4 1 0
lc) braked	 6 1 0
2a) dissected	 3 0
2b) dissected	 4 0 0
2c) cut	 4 1 2
3a) ground	 3 0
3b) ground	 4 0 0
3c) ground	 5 0 0
Subject 13
Th) braked	 6 1
lb) braked	 6 1 0
lc) pulled the reins 5 2 2
2a) pulled apart	 4 0
2b) pulled apart	 4 0 0
2c) opened	 5 1 2
3a) filed	 3 0
3b) filed	 6 0 0
3c) filed	 6 0 0
Subject 14
la) put his foot down
on the brake	 5 1
ib) braked sharply	 4 1 1
ic) put the brakes on 3 1 1
2a)cutup	 4 1
2b) carved up	 4 1 1
2c) slaughtered	 4 0 2
3a) filed	 4 0
3b) filed	 4 0 0
3c) sharpened	 3 0 2
-448-
Appendix 4
This appendix gives the instructions given to subjects
for Experiment 5. These instructions were the same for both
parts of the experiment with the exception that in the second
part of Experiment 5, subjects were told that they would see
three passages and would need to guess the meaning of three
words.
Experiment Instructions
You will see a short passage in which there will be a
word, TO SASHAY, which you probably won't know. If you have
seen it before then please tell me now. What you need to do is
guess the meaning of this word and tell me how confident you
are in your guess. When you write your guess you can use a
single word eg. "sing" or a phrase "sing in a high pitched
voice". For confidence
0= no confidence
6= maximum confidence
Now when you guess the meaning of a an unknown word in
real life everything happens very fast. Look at this example:
"Mike dropped the g on the floor and it broke into
pieces. Nobody would ever dInk from that again. The only bit
he could recognise was the handle."
Now you've probably zoomed through that and got the
answer "cup". What I want you to do is slow the whole thing
down and tell me how you get that answer. So find a clue, the
one that you spot first. It may be "dropped". Note this down.
Also note down your guess. Perhaps it is "wallet". Also note
down how confident you are in this guess. 	 Perhaps 2. Then
find a second cue.	 This may be "broke".	 Note this down.
Perhaps your guess this time is "glass". Note this down.
Again note down how confident you feel in this guess. Perhaps
3. The next cue you find may be "drink". This may suggest the
guess "glass" again. Note down again the clue and your guess
together with your confidence. Go on and finish this passage
by finding the clues, making a guess and giving your
confidence.
What you need to do then is find a clue, make a guess and
state your confidence in your guess then keep repeating this
process until you feel you've finished. I know this is a bit
clumsy and artificial but doing it like this will give me the
information I want. Let's have one more practice. You can use
a single word or phrase to give the meaning of the unknown
word. Write the clues you spot, the guesses you make from
those clues and your confidence in your guesses in the space
provided.
"The rickshaw of China is pretty basic, the sedan chair
of 18th century England was clumsy- more at home in a pantomime
than on the Street, but the howdah of India, swaying to the
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motion of the great beast on whose back it is carried, is the
very stuff romance is made from."
CLUE
	
GUESS	 CONFIDENCE
-4 50-
Appendix 5
This appendix contains the data for Experiments 3 and 4.
For Experiment 3, the block of data shows 41 subjects
down the side and 144 responses for each subject across the
top. The data in each block is organised as follows: Meaning
x 2 (unknown/known), Form x 2 (pseudoword/cloze), Part of
speech x 2 (noun/verb, Information x 3 (1, 2, 3 amounts) and
Order x 6 (abc acb bac bca cab cba).
For Experiment 4 each block of data is organised across
the top as follows. For confidence and accuracy: Target 1, cue
1, cue 2, cue 3; Target 2, cue 1, cue 2, cue 3; Target 3, cue 1
cue 2, cue 3. For uncertainty: Target 1 cue 2, Target 2 cue 2,
Target 3 cue 2, Target 1 cue 3, Target 2 cue 3, Target 3 cue 3.
Down the side, the first 2 columns contain the figures 1 and 2.
For column 1, the figure 1 corresponds to a known target and 2
to an unknown target. For the second column, 1 corresponds to
Order 1 and 2 to Order 2.
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